the idea of Object, relegating that of Thing-in-itself to the domain of pure fiction. But heartily as I welcome Mr. Carr's exhibition of the futility of dialectics when they pose as philosophy, I doubt whether his confutation of Prof. Taylor's mode of presenting the problem of philosophy (which at least gets rid of the fictitious Thing-in-itself) is so complete as he thinks it. I find Prof. Taylor calling non-contradiction an universal characteristic of Reality as we are compelled to think of it, and in that I cannot but agree with him. But I do not find him excluding other possible characteristics from our idea of Reality, characteristics which may be found in the perceptual data upon which thinking operates. The idea of Being or Existence (including, of course, Real Being and Real Existence) is not derived from the operation of Thinking, or from its law of non-contradiction, which, as Mr. Carr very truly says, is purely formal, that is, does not bring with it any content, any idea or category, however abstract or universal, such as the idea or category of Being. Consequently it does not bring with it the idea of "a systematic whole of some kind or other." Here I part company with Prof. Taylor, as, for instance, where he says: "Hence to say 'Reality is not self-contradictory' is as much as to say that we have true and certain knowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent; that is to say, that whatever else it may be, it is at least a systematic whole of some kind or other" (p. 20 of his Elements of Metaphysics). The ideas of self-consistence, of coherence, and of a systematic whole, are, in my opinion, derived not from the logical law of non-contradiction. but from some of the perceptual data upon which thinking under that law operates. Mr. Carr makes, I think, "a hit, a very palpable hit" at Prof. Taylor, when he says (p. 123), "The curious thing about that proof is, that the metaphysical criterion of reality forms no part of the argument" (in which Kant's 100 dollars figure as an illustration). Only, would not Prof. Taylor be ready to admit, that the imagined dollars were equally " psychical matters of fact" with the real dollars? Mr. Carr takes him to mean that the real dollars only were psychical matters of fact [here, in the discussion, Mr. Carr ably defended his interpretation of Prof. Taylor's meaning]; and then. proceeds to argue, that actual and immediate experiences are "riddled with contradictions." Now here I join issue with Mr. Carr. He says (p. 124): "For example, I perceive matter in motion, but I know that the idea of motion is self-contradictory. It implies that a thing can be in two places at once, and this is impossible; and therefore motion, notwithstanding that I have experienced it, is merely appearance." The passage runs to greater length, and other so-called experiences are instanced; but this will perhaps suffice. My answer would be this: The self-contradiction in the idea of motion attaches to the thought of it, not to the perception of it. Instead of using thought instrumentally, to interpret perception, you set up some concept or concepts of thought, which are abstractions hypostasised, as the realities of which perceptions are supposed to be the appearances; but it is these concepts, these falsely-assumed realities, which are self-contradictory, not the perceptions falsely called appearances. In thinking of motion as perceived, we ideally arrest the motion from point to point of space, these points being themselves ideally introduced into perceived space by thinking, and then we can only conceive of motion as rest at one or other of these ideally introduced points; and motion being the contrary of rest in perception, and contradictory of it in thought, motion thus becomes self-contradictory. Suppose, however, that the points in perceived space are real points in real perceived space, as no doubt they are, still the motion of a body from one to another of them is only ideally arrested at any one of them, and even ideally arrested only by our ignoring (in our concept of motion) the time-element in the perception, the time required for the body's passing from point to point, the time being equally divisible with the space into ideal points or instants, which are equally real with the ideal points of space. These points of space and of time we introduce into our perception of motion, by thought, for the purpose of better understanding the perception; and without the perception we could not conceive or imagine their coming into our thought at all, unless, indeed, we adopted the adventurous hypothesis that they are a priori forms of Thought which are constitutive or creative of experience. It is the Dialectician's world of Reality which is "riddled with contradictions," since their world of Reality is a world of Thought-concepts. Philosophy begins by provisionally doubting of everything; that is, it begins by excluding all unwarranted assumptions. Mr. Carr's paper once more shows that, if you begin your philosophy by taking a self-contradictory notion as your "initial certainty," which is Dogmatism, you cannot exclude selfcontradictory notions from your conclusion, which is, that Philosophy is, no longer provisional, but ascertained Scepticism. But Mr. Carr has not shown, and I venture to think never will show, that Philosophy is ascertained Scepticism, when it is founded on simple analysis of experience, without the introduction of dogmatic assumptions. Mr. CARR replied : The principal contention in this very valuable criticism is one that I am not concerned to refute. It is that in the reality member of the distinction between knowledge and reality I am simply introducing into philosophy an "old friend the Thing-initself." I must confess that in my opinion this old friend has never been satisfactorily got rid of, and it is quite fair to interpret my defence of ultimate scepticism as simply meaning that it never can be. At any rate, it certainly seems to me that if the Thing-in-itself is ever finally relegated to the domain of fiction," it will not be in the simple and direct manner that Mr. Hodgson proposes. I do not think the result of any enquiry will be to replace the idea of Thing-in-itself by the idea of Object, because to me the former represents an ultimate question. I am very far from denying the value of simple analysis of experience, and I recognise the importance and great extent of the work that philosophy may do without raising the ultimate question, but the question of the relation of knowledge to reality presents itself to me as an ultimate question in philosophy. If, as I think, it takes the form of a question that must be asked and cannot be answered, then the positive outcome of philosophy is "ascertained Scepticism." VIII.-IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF By G. DAWES HICKS. "THE principle of all genuine Idealists, from the Eleatic School to Bishop Berkeley," says Kant in a well-known passage at the end of the Prolegomena, “is contained in the formula 'that all knowledge which comes to us through sense and experience is nothing else than mere illusion, and that truth is to be found only in the ideas of pure understanding or pure reason.' But the main principle which dominates and determines my Idealism is, on the other hand, that all conceptions of things derived from pure understanding or pure reason are nothing else than mere illusions and that truth lies only in experience." It is difficult, and no doubt fruitless, to venture a guess as to the reasons which induced Kant to include Berkeley amongst those who accepted the principle here ascribed to "all genuine idealists." On the face of it, nothing seems to be farther from the standpoint of the Principles of Human Knowledge than the view that truth could only be found in the ideas of pure understanding. The famous polemic against abstract ideas, with which Berkeley begins his philosophising, is virtually identical in import with Kant's own criticism of the position that the objects of knowledge are things-in-themselves, and, throughout the treatise mentioned, Berkeley certainly seems to be repudiating, often in so many words, the doctrine Kant attributes to him. There are, however, considerations suggested even by the course of argument in the Principles which Kant might have offered in justification of his statement. The philosophical conception, forming the termination of the line of thought there |