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VII. THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS.

By H. WILDON CARR.

THE first difficulty in the attempt to make philosophy truly systematic is to find an initial certainty that can withstand criticism and admit a real advance in knowledge. The most notable of such attempts in recent philosophy is Mr. Bradley's argument, in Appearance and Reality, that we have a metaphysical criterion of reality in the logical principle of noncontradiction, and that this enables us to assert of ultimate reality, the Absolute, that it is a harmonious, self-subsistent system; that this positive knowledge of reality is assured to us beyond the reach of scepticism, because to doubt it is selfcontradictory. This argument is worked out and presented in systematic form in the opening chapters of Prof. A. E. Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics.* The absolutely certain knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality which this criterion is held to prove is there made the basis of a science of Metaphysics. Prof. Taylor holds that we have absolutely certain knowledge that ultimate reality, the Absolute, is indissolubly one with actual experience, and that it is an internally coherent system, and that doubt of this is a logical self-contradiction. Ultimate reality, or the Absolute, is the subject-matter of the science of Metaphysics, and as such is not given or assumed, but self-constituted; and this character of its subject-matter distinguishes it from all the subject sciences. My object in this paper is not to discuss the nature of ultimate reality, but to examine the particular arguments on which this theory of reality is founded, and especially to contest the claim of these arguments to certainty on the ground that the denial of them involves a logical contradiction. I propose to examine (1) the proposition that the criterion of reality affirms the existence and nature of the Absolute, and to maintain that a criterion by its nature cannot itself constitute our positive knowledge of the existence and content of any object of experience whatever; (2) to examine the proposition that the Absolute is an individual experience, and to maintain that it is based on a meaning of reality quite distinct from that demanded by the criterion, and that the two positive characteristics of the Absolute, viz., that it is self-consistent reality, and that it is indissolubly one with experience, have no necessary connection with one another, and are arrived at by quite separate arguments; and (3) the proposition that there is a proposition, doubt of which is a logical contradiction, or that absolute scepticism is logically impossible. I maintain that so long as the problem of Metaphysics is the problem of the relation of knowledge to reality, ultimate scepticism cannot be excluded.

* All the arguments dealt with in this paper will be found in Prof. A. E. Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics, chap. ii. I have chosen Prof. Taylor's work because the doctrine of ultimate reality, the Absolute, is there set forth in systematic form at the beginning of the book as the special subject-matter of a science of Metaphysics.

1. THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION.

The argument from the metaphysical criterion is this: We have a criterion of reality in the principle that "what is real is not self-contradictory, and what is self-contradictory is not real." This principle is the basis of the distinction of Appearance and Reality; what is self-contradictory we declare to be Appearance, not Reality. Every negation is an affirmation. The negation, "Reality is not self-contradictory," is an affirmation that Reality is positively self-consistent or coherent, and this can only mean that Reality is a self-consistent, systematic whole. This is absolutely certain, inasmuch as to deny it would be to deny the criterion and make meaningless the distinction between Reality and Appearance. This is the argument; the dilemma in it is to me so obvious that I cannot understand how it has apparently been overlooked. If a criterion gives me of itself positive knowledge of anything, it cannot be a criterion of the knowledge it has given me. It cannot, that is to say, be at the same time and in the same relation both positive knowledge of something and a criterion of that knowledge. Consequently, the positive knowledge that I have of reality is knowledge of which I have no criterion. If the principle of non-contradiction is in any sense positive knowledge of reality, it is at least in that sense not a criterion. It could not be used as a criterion of the positive knowledge it itself was, nor would a criterion of such knowledge be necessary. Positive knowledge of reality does not admit the question of appearance. I have some knowledge then of which I do not possess a criterion, or to which this metaphysical criterion does not apply. If I may have some knowledge without a criterion, the metaphysical criterion is not universal, and therefore a worthless criterion. Let me put it in another way: If there be knowledge of reality that it is impossible to doubt, it must be knowledge that is independent of a criterion and not subject to a criterion; for if it is subject to a criterion it cannot be free from possibility of doubt. But the knowledge so characterised is given by and entirely dependent upon the criterion. Therefore, my knowledge of reality is both entirely dependent upon and entirely independent of a metaphysical criterion. The metaphysical criterion itself on this view is shown to be a self-contradiction, and must therefore be condemned as appearance, not reality. But if the criterion itself is appearance, how can it give us positive knowledge of reality? I am not concerned, however, to bring the theory to such a reductio ad absurdum. I consider that the dilemma is a quite unnecessary one, and arises from a wrong interpretation of the idea of a criterion. A criterion is purely formal, and is neither a negation nor an affirmation. You may deny or affirm of anything that it satisfies the test of the criterion, but the criterion is not that denial or affirmation. The possession of a criterion does not assure the existence or the content of any idea whatever. It is indifferent in its essential meaning, to all and every existence.

This seems to me the direct and complete answer to the proposition that the possession of the metaphysical criterion gives us positive knowledge of the existence and nature of ultimate reality, rather than either of the objections that Prof. Taylor has put into the mouth of his supposed sceptic. Yet these objections are forcible, and I do not think that they are to be got rid of very easily. They serve in any case to emphasise the criticism I have made. The first objection that he supposes the sceptic to make is that the criterion is simply the logical law of contradiction, and that the law of contradiction, like all purely logical laws, is concerned not with real things, but exclusively with the concepts by which we think of them. Prof. Taylor has a double reply to this objection. Firstly, that it is unjustifiable to assume that the law of contradiction, admitted to be a law of thought, is therefore only a law of thought. And, secondly, that this interpretation of the law of contradiction rests on a positive confusion of the meaning of a law of thought, which may mean either (a) a psychological law, a true general statement as to the way in which we actually do think; or (b) a logical law, a true general statement as to the conditions under which our thinking is valid. In effect, a logical law of thought is a law of true thinking. To think truly about things is to think in accord with their real nature, and therefore if non-contradiction is a fundamental condition of true thinking, it is a fundamental condition of real existence. The first of these answers charges the objector with making an unjustifiable assumption; but there is no assumption whatever, justifiable or unjustifiable, in question, and the appearance of one rests simply on a forced interpretation of the word only. The law of contradiction is a law of thought only in that sense in which thought is distinct from reality. If there be no distinction, then an assertion about thought is an assertion about reality. If there be a distinction, then an assertion about thought is not necessarily an assertion about reality. Because I declare a law to be only a law of thought, I do not say that it is not a law of reality, but only that it is not therefore a law of reality. And this same distinction is ignored in the second answer. Our thoughts of things are thoughts and not things. If things be other than thoughts of things, then truth can only be of thoughts of things, not of things unthought of or things in themselves. The special problem of the thing-in-itself is not for the moment in question; I use the expression merely to designate one term of the distinction between thought and reality. If this distinction is an unreal one, if thought is reality and reality is thought, there is no metaphysical problem; or, if there is, it must be stated in a quite different way to any that we are accustomed to, and not as the problem of the relation of thought to reality.

The second objection that Prof. Taylor supposes the sceptic to make is to affirm the relativity of knowledge. "All our truth is only relatively truth, and even the fundamental conditions of true thought are only valid relatively and for us." And his reply to this is that such a doubt is meaningless and irrational when directed against the ultimate nature of reality as a self-consistent system. He claims that this must be so, because the knowledge of reality in question is actually given by the very test of consistency by which alone it can be disproved or its validity questioned, and that its truth is necessarily assumed in the very process of calling it in question. But Prof. Taylor does not seem to see that the doubt is founded on the very universality of the principle of non-contradiction itself. If it be universally true for our thinking that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same relation, then if the knowledge of anything be distinct from

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