Voting complaints filed pursuant to Public Law 85-315, sec. 104(a) (1), listed by State and category-Period covered: From the organization of the Commission through May 17, 1963

1 Sworn voting complaints are those in writing and under oath or affirmation alleging unlawful denial of the right to vote and have that vote counted.

2 Unsworn voting complaints are those in writing but not under oath or affirmation alleging unlawful denial of the right to vote and have that vote counted.

3 General voting irregularities complaints are either sworn or unsworn complaints alleging that unlawful restraint or hardship was placed upon the complainant, or that the complainant was subjected to some unlawful discrimination in the exercise of his suffrage rights.

431 voting complaints received from Mississippi since Mar. 15 of this year: 3 sworn, 28 unsworn.

BRIEF OF MORGAN v. UNITED STATES (304 U.S. 1)

Appellants, market agents, challenged the validity of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be charged by them at the Kansas City Stockyards pursuant to be Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159; 7 U.S.C. 181-229.

The appellants claim that the Secretary did not accord them a hearing which the statute requires as a prerequisite to a valid order. The Supreme Court sustained this contention.

The procedure followed by the Department of Agriculture was the following: Testimony was taken from both sides by an examiner of the Department. Oral argument was heard by the Secretary. A brief was submitted by the appellants, but none was submitted by the Government. Findings were prepared by the Department. The Secretary based his decision on these findings, ex parte conversations with Department officials and sketchy review of the record.

The Court held that in a quasi-judicial hearing, which this was, since the outcome affected appellants' property rights, a hearing which did not afford appellants the opportunity to contest the findings of the Government did not meet the requirements of law in that they were not "in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play."

GREENE V. MCELROY (360 U.S. 474)

Petitioner, an aeronautical engineer with a private firm, lost his job after the Navy revoked his security clearance. The hearing procedures afforded petitioner did not accord him the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. The Court held that since the clearance procedure is of questionable constitutionality, it could not be adopted without explicit congressional authorization. The Court found that there was no such authorization. The Court considered the procedures to be of questionable constitutionality in that a person would be deprived of the right to follow his chosen occupation without a full hearing.

Facts

WILLNER V. COMMITTEE ON CHARACTER AND FITNESS, ETC.
May 13, 1963

Petitioner passed the New York bar examinations in 1936 and since that time, intermittently has been seeking admission to the bar. In 1938 the character and fitness committee, after several hearings, refused to certify to the Appellate Division of the New York Court of Appeals that Willner possessed the requisite character for membership in the bar. In 1943 the appellate division refused to review its 1938 opinion. Permission of the appellate division is necessary before one can reapply for admission, once admission has been denied. In 1948, the appellate division granted Willner permission to reapply and after two hearings, the character committee again refused to certify him. In 1951, Willner again applied to the appellate division which denied his application. A similar application was denied in 1954; the court of appeals refused leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

The appellate division denied Willner's final application to reapply in 1960 and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then affirmed the action of the appellate division holding that Willner had not been denied due process of law (11 New York 2d 866). Willner had contended that he "was never afforded the opportunity of confronting my accusers, of having the accusers sworn and cross-examining them, and the opportunity of refuting the accusations and the accusers."

Holding

The Supreme Court, per Justice Douglas, reversed the court of appeals. He stated: "We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood." The Court stated that Willner was denied due process of law in that he was not allowed to confront and cross-examine the adverse witnesses whose testimony was relied on by the character committee. The Court noted that the "role of the committee is more than that of a mere investigator." Goldberg concurring (Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart).

Justice Goldberg interprets the majority opinion and the demands of due process as requiring confrontation and cross-examination somewhere in the total proceedings, but not necessarily before the character committee.

Harlan dissenting (Justice Clark).

The writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

Facts

BRIEF OF HANNAH V. LARCHE (363 U.S. 420 (1960))

The Commission on Civil Rights adopted rules of procedure which provided that the identity of compiainants need not be disclosed and that witnesses summoned to appear before the Commission could not cross-examine other witnesses called by the Commission who accused them of illegal acts. These rules were challenged by registrars and private citizens of Louisiana in connection with hearings on voting rights which the Commission intended to hold in Shreveport. These persons, who had been subpenaed to appear, petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana to enjoin the hearings on the basis that these rules were unconstitutional because they denied witnesses the right to cross-examination and confrontation in violation of the fifth amendment.

The district court enjoined the hearings on the theory that there was no congressional authorization for adoption of the challenged rules (following Greene v. McElroy) and therefore the Commission was without power to adopt them (Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816).

Holding

The Supreme Court (Chief Justice Warren) reversed the district court, holding that the Commission had the power to promulgate the rules in question; and that those rules were constitutional as the Commission exercises an investigatory, not an adjudicatory function.

Argument

1. It is clear that Congress authorized the Commission to promulgate such rules because

(a) the legislation establishing the Commission specifically mentions certain safeguards which must be given to witnesses. Confrontation and crossexamination are not included (42 U.S.C. 1975 (a)).

(b) a bill embodying these rights was defeated by the Congress at the time of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

2. The requirements of due process vary with the type of proceeding involved. Historically, investigatory hearings are not surrounded by the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. This is true in legislative, executive, and administrative hearings.

The fact that witnesses might be exposed to "public opprobrium and scorn, the distinct likelihood of losing their jobs, and the possibility of criminal prosecutions," does not entitle the witnesses to the rights sought as "they would not be the result of any affirmative determinations made by the Commission, and they would not affect the legitimacy of the Commission's investigative function." 3. The opinion goes on to outline other agencies which deny these rights in investigatory proceedings. Among them are the FTC and SEC. An appendix details procedures of various agencies.

OPINION OF JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
(Concurring)

Balancing the needs of Government against the need of protecting the individual, the Commission's rules provide sufficient safeguards such that their rules of procedure do not offend due process. See In re Groban (352 U.S. 330) and Anonymous v. Baker (360 U.S. 287).

JUSTICE HARLAN AND JUSTICE CLARK
(Concurring)

In re Groban and Anonymous v. Baker are dispositive of the issues presented.

JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND JUSTICE BLACK

(Dissenting)

Denial of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in this case is a violation of due process of law. The complaints filed before the Commission charge the registrar witnesses with denying them the right to vote. If true, this would constitute a Federal criminal violation. The witnesses are thus put in the position of being required to testify, without being able to confront their accusers, to something which might result in a criminal prosecution being brought against them.