itself with the whole spirit of his philosophy. I mention it now because it presents itself in the passage in which Bacon's idea of the nature of science is most distinctly stated. "Super datum corpus novam naturam, sive novas naturas, generare et superinducere, opus et intentio est humanæ potentiæ. Data autem naturæ formam, sive differentiam veram, sive naturam naturantem, sive fontem emanationis, (ista enim vocabula habemus quæ ad indicationem rei proxime accedunt) invenire, opus et intentio est humanæ scientiæ." This passage, with which the second book of the Novum Organum commences, requires to be considered in detail. In the first place it is to be remarked, that natura signifies "abstract quality," it is used by Bacon in antithesis with corpus or "concrete body." Thus the passage we have quoted amounts to this, that the scope and end of human power is to give new qualities to bodies, while the scope and end of human knowledge is to ascertain the formal cause of all the qualities of which bodies are possessed. Throughout Bacon's philosophy, the necessity of making abstract qualities (nature) the principal object of our inquiries is frequently insisted on. He who studies the concrete and neglects the abstract cannot be called an interpreter of nature. Such was Bacon's judgment when, apparently at an early period of his life, he wrote the Temporis Partus Masculus1; and in the Novum Organum he has expressed an equivalent opinion: “quòd iste modus operandi, (qui naturas intuetur simplices licet in corpore concreto) procedat ex iis quæ in naturâ sunt constantia et æterna et catholica, et latas præbeat potentiæ humanæ vias." 2 Quite in accordance with this passage is a longer one in the Advancement of Learning, which I shall quote in extenso, as it is exceedingly important. "The forms of substances, I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But on the other side to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make 1 Mr. Ellis alludes, I think, to the De Interpretatione Naturæ Sententia XII., which M. Bouillet prints as part of the Temporis Partus Musculus. My reasons for differing with M. Bouillet on this point, and placing it by itself, and assigning it a later date, will be found in a note to Mr. Ellis's Preface to the Novum Organum.-J. S. 2 Nov. Org. ii. 5. simple letters is easily comprehensible, and being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner, to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold—nay of water, of air — is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities which like an alphabet are not many, and of which the essences upheld by matter of all creatures do consist,—to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysique which we now define of." And a little farther on we are told that it is the prerogative of metaphysique to consider "the simple forms or difference of things" (that is to say, the forms of simple natures), "which are few in number, and the degrees and coordinations whereof make all this variety." We see from these passages why the study of simple natures is so important—namely because they are comparatively speaking few in number, and because, notwithstanding this, a knowledge of their essence would enable us, at least in theory, to solve every problem which the universe can present to us. As an illustration of the doctrine of simple natures, we may take a passage which occurs in the Silva Silvarum. "Gold," it is there said, "has these natures: greatness of weight, closeness of parts, fixation, pliantness or softness, immunity from rust, colour or tincture of yellow. Therefore the sure way, though most about, to make gold, is to know the causes of the several natures before rehearsed, and the axioms concerning the same. For if a man can make a metal that hath all these properties, let men dispute whether it be gold or no."1 Of these simple natures Bacon has given a list in the third book of the De Augmentis. They are divided into two classes: schematisms of matter, and simple motions. To the former belong the abstract qualities, dense, rare, heavy, light, &c., of which thirty-nine are enumerated, the list being concluded with a remark that it need not be carried farther, "neque ultra rem extendimus." The simple motions — and it will be observed that the word "motion" is used in a wide and vague sense are the motus antitypiæ, which secures the impenetrability of matter; the motus nexûs, commonly called the motus ex fugâ vacui, &c.; 1 Compare Nov. Org. ii. 5. NB and of these motions fourteen are mentioned. This list however does not profess to be complete, and accordingly in the Novum Organum (ii. 48.) another list of simple motions is given, in which nineteen species are recognised. - The view of which we have now been speaking—namely, that it is possible to reduce all the phenomena of the universe to combinations of a limited number of simple elements is the central point of Bacon's whole system. It serves, as we shall see, to explain the peculiarities of the method which he proposed. (8.) In what sense did Bacon use the word "Form"? This is the next question which, in considering the account which he has given of the nature of science, it is necessary to examine. I am, for reasons which will be hereafter mentioned, much disposed to believe that the doctrine of Forms is in some sort an extraneous part of Bacon's system. His peculiar method may be stated independently of this doctrine, and he has himself so stated it in one of his carlier tracts, namely the Valerius Terminus. It is at any rate certain, that in using the word "Form" he did not intend to adopt the scholastic mode of employing it. He was much in the habit of giving to words already in use a new signification. "To me," he remarks in the Advancement of Learning, "it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras, and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions." And thus though he has spoken of the scholastic forms as figments of the human mind', he was nevertheless willing to employ the word "Form" in a modified sense, "præsertim quum hoc vocabulum invaluerit, et familiariter occurrat." He has however distinctly stated that in speaking of Forms, he is not to be understood to speak of the Forms 66 quibus hominum contemplationes et cogitationes hactenus assueverunt." "3 2 As Bacon uses the word in his own sense, we must endeavour to interpret the passages in which it occurs by means of what he has himself said of it; and this may I think be satisfactorily accomplished. We may begin by remarking that in Bacon's system, as in those of many others, the relation of substance and attribute is virtually the same as the relation of cause and effect. The substance is conceived of as the causa immanens of its attri 1 Nov. Org. i, 51. 2 Nov. Org. ii. 2. 3 Nov. Org. ii. 17. butes', or in other words it is the formal cause of the qualities which are referred to it. As there is a difference between the properties of different substances, there must be a corresponding difference between the substances themselves. But in the first state of the views of which we are speaking this latter difference is altogether unimaginable: "distincte quidem intelligi potest, sed non explicari imaginabiliter."" It belongs not to natural philosophy, but to metaphysics. These views however admit of an essential modification. If we divide the qualities of bodies into two classes, and ascribe those of the former class to substance as its essential attributes, while we look on those of the latter as connected with substance by the relation of cause and effect-that is, if we recognise the distinction of primary and secondary qualities-the state of the question is changed. It now becomes possible to give a definite answer to the question, Wherein does the difference between different substances, corresponding to the difference between their sensible qualities, consist? The answer to this question of course involves a reference to the qualities which have been recognised as primary; and we are thus led to the principle that in the sciences which relate to the secondary qualities of bodies the primary ones are to be regarded as the causes of the secondary.3 This division of the qualities of bodies into two classes is the point of transition from the metaphysical view from which we set out to that of ordinary physical science. And this transition Bacon had made, though not perhaps with a perfect consciousness of having done so. Thus he has repeatedly denied the truth of the scholastic doctrine that Forms are incognoscible because supra-sensible'; and the reason of this is clearly that his conception of the nature of Forms relates merely to the primary qualities of bodies. For instance, the Form of heat is a kind of local motion of the particles of which bodies are composed, and that of whiteness a mode of arrangement among those particles." This peculiar motion or arrangement corresponds to and engenders heat or whiteness, and this in every case in which those qualities exist. The statement of the distinguishing character See Zimmerman's Essay on the Monadology of Leibnitz, p. 86. (Vienna, 1807). * Leibnitz, De ipsâ Naturâ, 3 Whewell, Phil. Ind. Science, [book iv. ch. i.] S See Scaliger, Exercit, in Cardan. [Valerius Terminus, il. 1.] of the motion or arrangement, or of whatever else may be the Form of a given phenomenon, takes the shape of a law; it is the law in fulfilling which any substance determines the existence of the quality in question. It is for this reason that Bacon sometimes calls the Form a law; he has done this particularly in a passage which will be mentioned a little farther on. With the view which has now been stated, we shall I think be able to understand every passage in which Bacon speaks of Forms; - remembering however that as he has not traced a boundary line between primary and secondary qualities, we can only say in general terms that his doctrine of Forms is founded upon the theory that certain qualities of bodies are merely subjective and phenomenal, and are to be regarded as necessarily resulting from others which belong to substance as its essential attributes. In the passage from which we set out', the Form is spoken of as vera differentia, the true or essential difference, -as natura naturans-and as the fons emanationis. The first of these expressions refers to the theory of definition by genus and difference. The difference is that which gives the thing defined its specific character. If it be founded on an accidental circumstance, the definition, though not incorrect if the accident be an inseparable one, will nevertheless not express the true and essential character of its subject; contrariwise, if it involve a statement of the formal cause of the thing defined. 2 The second of these phrases is now scarcely used, except in connexion with the philosophy of Spinoza. It had however been employed by some of the scholastic writers. It is always antithetical to natura naturata, and in the passage before us serves not inaptly to express the relation in which the Form stands to the phenomenal nature which results from it. The phrase fons emanationis does not seem to require any explanation. It belongs to the kind of philosophical language which attempts, more or less successfully, to give clearness of conception by means of metaphor. It is unnecessary to remark how much this is the case in the later development of scholasticism. A little farther on in the second book of the Novum Organum than the passage we have been considering, — namely [Nov. Org. ii. 1.] 2 See Vossius De Vitiis Serm. in voce Naturare; and Castanæus, Distinctiones in voc. Natura, |