"think twice before damning" the owner of a fair freehold estate. Liberal sporting rights and the sympathy of the county or local society made residence in a sporting shire a delightful privilege-even at the cost of low interest on invested capital. The enlightened estate agent, who was at once devout and artistic and who recommended a residence because it was close to a church, generally added that there were two packs of fox-hounds within reach, and that fair shooting and trout-fishing were obtainable. In short the ownership of English land involved a large measure of security, credit, peace and pleasure-which was honestly worth every penny of the price paid for it. But this view is undergoing a steady process of dissolution. Investors of capital must judge for themselves, in view of recent political and social complications, on which side of the Atlantic they have, on the whole, the best prospect of protecting and enlarging their store. One thing is plain, that if England abdicates her commercial supremacy, the humiliating process will not have been compelled from without, but invited from within. She will have decided for herself what is a proper price to pay for a somewhat servile observance of successful demagogues.

CHAPTER III.

CONTROL.

ON the mind of an uninitiated visitor to Wall Street a strong impression is made by the constant recurrence of the word 'Control' in discussions affecting the securities of railroad companies and their various degrees of merit or demerit. He hears experts say that it is dangerous to touch this or that stock, because it is "controlled by A. or by B's crowd, and you never quite know where you are." Or, again, that the stock of the C. Railroad will never really be good for any thing until the road is "controlled by K. and his people." The stranger had supposed that the value of the securities of any given railroad was roughly measured by comparatively simple and definite conditions; such, for instance, as the amount of the company's fixed and floating debt, the volume of its business, the relation between net and gross receipts, the ability of its executive, and so forth. Ten or twelve years' familiarity with the details of railroad administration in its various relations to Wall Street would lead him to the conclusion that "control" has more to do with values than he had supposed, and that it is a word of the first importance in the railroad vocabulary.

Some observations have been made above (pages 8-10) as to the history and growth of American railroads, and it has been indicated that a great number of these have

been built in very large part with foreign money. It has been further noticed that many of these were built in advance of any real need for them; and were, in short, rather promoters' roads, than expressions of genuine supply addressed to meet a pressing demand for effective transportation.

In days of so-called "inflation," which perhaps might better be described as periods of irrepressible speculative restlessness, there was a general scramble for all sorts of privileges which seemed to possess elements of remote potential value. Concessions to construct public works and enterprises in foreign countries were eagerly sought, in spite of very imperfect knowledge of their environment. A promising sphere for the construction of a railroad was instantly pounced upon, and innumerable routes for future railroads were selected and protected by charters granted by various American States. The limited scope of such charters was but imperfectly understood in Europe, or understood only by a few, and not generally investigated or discussed. The solemnity of a charter, its seal, its language, its formality, were impressive details. If a Government subsidy in the form of land were added, the success of an effort to raise money in Europe was almost assured. To the uninstructed mind, the notion of connecting the "rolling Atlantic" with the waters of the "blue Pacific" was pictorially irresistible. To "tap" the resources of districts possessing untold latent wealth seemed an attractive privilege, rather than an incalculable risk. And so it happened that European money was very freely invested. So great was the encouragement offered to the energetic American, that he did not hesitate to employ his means in building a mile or two of railroad from his house to his sand-pit in an Eastern State, and then fear

lessly propose extension to San Francisco, or some other indefinitely remote point. It is quite true that he might be imperfectly equipped for so great an undertaking. He might, for instance, have a mule and a five-dollar bill. History shows that this is an insufficient basis on which to undertake a transcontinental railroad. Still, if Europe was good to find the necessary money, the energetic contractor had no reason to complain. When the money was provided, the foreign investor rarely took the pains to insist on having his own representative on the board of the constructing company, or on its executive committee, for the purpose of checking improper expenditure; and the neglect of this precaution resulted in a luxuriant crop of extravagance and jobbery, which judicious restraint might have prevented or minimized.

The tremendous effort made by the North to preserve the integrity of the Union was a fine display of decision and patriotism. But it necessarily involved sacrifices resulting in grave and enduring difficulties. The inevitable effect of the war was to let loose evil passions and to disintegrate, to a certain extent, the creed and the canons of commercial morality. A vast number of people had been hopelessly wrecked and ruined. It could hardly be expected that complete re-adjustment of old relations would be accomplished in a year. The Country was depressed. Ill-conceived undertakings failed to answer the expectations formed of them. Many railroads constructed or in course of construction failed to pay or to give reasonable assurance of ultimate success. Their securities could not be regarded as safe and profitable investments, and became a foot-ball upon the "Street." Fortunes could not be made out of their coupons or dividends. Yet, many large fortunes were put together in Wall Street in

connection with railroads to a large extent built by foreign capital, and quite unsuccessful,-considered as strictly commercial concerns. Observant people were struck with this difficulty, and enquired for the key. The answer they received was simply "Control."

To give a scientific definition of this word, in such a form as to meet the requirements of the critic, would be difficult; at all events, it is too serious a task for the writer to attempt. A rough description of one of its aspects—sufficient for immediate practical purposes-may properly be essayed. In this view, "Control" is the power of creating and regulating a market, in relation to the securities of a given undertaking, which its creator subsequently proposes to interpret for his own advantage. Obviously, this attempt at description must appear very obscure in the absence of some reference to the context of circumstances. It may be pertinent to indicate one or two salient points. The general situation postulated certain conditions, which might be matter of regret, but could scarcely be matter for wonder or surprise. As above noted, a serious shock had been given to subsisting commercial relations and to the unwritten code which was supposed to define and govern good faith in trade. The unflinching repudiation of their just obligations by several American States is evidence (sufficient for the present purpose) of the existence of great demoralization. Many enterprises when involved in serious difficulty had been resuscitated or helped more than once by Wall Street financiers, and were virtually in their hands. The latter had little hope of recovering their outlay from coupons on bonds or dividends on stock. But, if the restless spirit of the day made the securities of these doubtful enterprises sufficiently active (in its