express judgments of different value. Thus, if I make a historical judgment under reservation, then it is more likely to be true than if it were stated unconditionally. Of course the reservation is not going to give you knowledge as to which part or how much of your judgment is true.* It would certainly be better to say, not that there are degrees of truth, but more precisely that there are degrees in which a judgment may be true. Moreover, if truth is not an existent, and if reality is a connected whole, or concrete unity, then where is the need for the subject and the predicate to coalesce? There is nothing in the nature of knowledge-which is always about entities that are not constituents of the judgment-that prevents it from being complete, i.e. completely true. If, again, it is the nature of truth to be coherent, then reality is either coherent or unknowable. But, if reality is unknowable, it cannot interest us, and neither the philosopher nor the scientist could, in that case, treat it as other than unreal. Hence we may assume that reality is coherent, that is, it is a systematic or connected whole. This is undoubtedly the assumption upon which the scientist works; if the "facts" will not "fit in," then new principles are devised, so strong is the scientist's conviction that the physical world is a connected whole to which the term "physical universe' can be applied. Mr. Russell recognises the success of physical theory, but he seems to me to fail to draw out its implications.† * See Philosophical Essays, p. 155. "If I affirm, with a 'confident belief in the truth of my knowledge,' that Bishop Stubbs used to wear episcopal gaiters, that is an error; if a monistic philosopher, remembering that all finite truth is only partially true, affirms that Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder, that is not an error." Certainly I should say that if we were to say, "We can't accept all the stories about German callousness, since they have only an element of truth in them," we are in a better cognitive attitude than if we swallowed them all wholesale and unconditionally. + See Lowell Lectures, p. 218, and cf. the Spencer Lecture. With regard, then, to the problem of the coherence theory I should assert all of the following propositions: (1) Reality is such that it can be known. (2) This knowledge of reality is what is meant by truth. (3) Truth, then, is not identical with reality, nor does it exist. (4) The adjective logical cannot be predicated of reality as a whole, but only of truth. (5) Reality is a concrete unity within which is truth or knowledge, which is an interconnected system in which the whole affects every part, although a part quâ part can be true. It would follow from the last of these propositions that truth is a whole, in the sense that there is no test of truth but "the fuller truth." This is what is true and important in Professor Bosanquet's theory of the "truth as the whole"; his difficulties arise, I think, entirely from his confusion of truth with reality, and with existence. Once this confusion is removed, I think the difficulties are lessened. VII. Finally, I began by saying that the two opposed theories as to the nature of relations, which we have been examining, afford the basis respectively of pluralism and of monism. I do not think that either of these labels is an appropriate or convenient one for the view which seems to me most likely to be correct. Not monism, because in the hands of Mr. Bradley and of Mr. Joachim, and, to some extent, in those of Professor Bosanquet also, this label has come to denote a distinctionless unity which, as I have pointed out, appears to be meaningless. Not pluralism again, for in the hands of Mr. Russell this label has come to denote a multiverse in which atomistic entities jostle atomistic entities-if indeed "jostle" be not too intimate a term! Nor is the repudiation of these labels idle, for the conception of concrete unity, which seems to me fundamental, is rejected by both these schools of thought, by the one as meaningless absurdity, by the other as a conception valid "here and now but not "in the end." But, as I have tried to show, once the conception is seriously taken and consistently maintained throughout, then many of the difficulties of the coherence theory disappear. In particular, the difficulty of assuming that knowing confers existence upon the objects known is overcome, for it arises from the false assumption that "only like can know like." Another difficulty that may well be dispelled is that arising from the confusion of truth with existing reality, namely, that truth can never attain its ideal. Moreover, this line of reflection opens up to us the possibility of the unification of existing minds through the content of knowledge. Suppose, for example, that each of us knew reality completely, then would there not be through the identity of the content of knowledge a unity of individuals? Each individual would know a coherent system of truth, but, as a knower, each would be distinct from every other. Thus we should have unity while yet preserving that multiplicity as existents which is the most important element of pluralism. On the other hand, we should avoid that absorption of the individual which is the nemesis of any Absolute. In this way, existence and truth would form a concrete unity in which unification and diversity would remain. On the one hand, this concrete unity would transcend ultimate or radical pluralism; on the other, it would preserve that differentiation of elements which is surely necessary for a significant whole. In spite, therefore, of Mr. Russell's ridicule, the conception of concrete unity does seem to me to be one valid for thought and pregnant for philosophy, for it means the conception of the universe as a connected whole capable of being known because it is a rational system. ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION. November 6th, 1916. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -Resolved: "That the Members of this Society desire to express their sense of the great loss to philosophical research sustained by the death of Prof. Josiah Royce, a Corresponding Member, and wish to convey to the members of his family sincere sympathy in their bereavement." The President delivered the Inaugural Address of the Session on "The Problem of Recognition." The Chair was afterwards taken by -Prof. Hicks, who opened a discussion in which the following also took part-Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Miss Edgell, Mr. Joad, Dr. Brough, Mr. Worsley, Mr. Lynch, Dr. Tudor Jones, Dr. Armstrong-Jones, and Dr. Thomas. The President replied. December 4th, 1916. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -A paper was read by Dr. Bernard Bosanquet on "The Function of the State in promoting the Unity of Mankind." The discussion which followed was opened by Mr. Bertrand Russell. Mr. Burns, Mr. Cole, Lord Haldane, Prof. J. A. Smith, Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, and the Chairman also spoke. Dr. Bosanquet replied. December 18th, 1916. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -Prof. A. N. Whitehead read a paper on "The Organisation of Thought." The Chairman opened the discussion, in which Dr. Silberstein, Dr. Wolf, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Worsley, Prof. Nunn, Dr. Thomas, and Prof. Hicks took part, and Prof. Whitehead replied. January 8th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -A paper was read by Mr. C. D. Broad on "Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles." A written contribution to the discussion from Mr. Bertrand Russell was also read. The discussion was opened by the Chairman. The following took part: Prof. Hicks, Prof. Whitehead, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Joad, Mr. Worsley, Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Mr. Douglas Ainslie, and Mr. Mead. Mr. Broad replied. January 22nd, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. —Mr. C. E. M. Joad read a paper on "Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy." The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and continued by Prof. Hicks, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, Mr. Fox-Pitt, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Worsley, Mr. Ginsberg, Mrs. Duddington, and Miss Stebbing. Mr. Joad replied. February 5th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -A paper was read by Mr. F. C. Bartlett on "Valuation and Existence." The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and Mr. Ainslie, Prof. Hicks, Miss Edgell, Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, Miss Shields, Mr. Davies, Mr. Drake, and Mr. Ginsberg took part, and Mr. Bartlett replied to the criticisms that had been made. February 19th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair. -Resolved that Prof. Émile Boutroux, Dr. Benedetto Croce, Prof. John Dewey, and Prof. Harald Höffding be elected Honorary Corresponding Members of the Society. A paper was read by Mr. Morris Ginsberg, M.A., on "The Nature of Knowledge as conceived by Malebranche." The Chairman opened the discussion, in which Mr. Worsley, Dr. Wolf, Prof. Hicks, Miss Stebbing, and others took part, and Mr. Ginsberg replied. March 5th, 1917. Dr. H. Wildon Carr, President, in the Chair.Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan spoke on the subject of his paper, entitled "Truth and Fact." A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Dr. Nunn, Prof. Mackenzie, Miss Oakeley, Prof. Hicks, Dr. Thomas, and Dr. Wolf took part, and Prof. Lloyd Morgan replied. |