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how there can be recognition, as there appears to be, where there ean beno conscious memory of the prior cognition. This is the problem of recognition so far as its source is beyond the individual's experience and in his ancestral experience. More briefly I may describe my problem as that of the nature of intelligent recognition and of instinctive recognition and of their relation.

As the subject is a very large one and the temptations to turn off the track of the inquiry will be manifold, it may be well to state clearly certain very closely connected problems which I wish to avoid discussing. I do not propose to discuss the nature of instinct and intelligence and their relation to one another. I wish only to discuss the nature of recognition, intelligent or instinctive. I do not propose to discuss any of the well-known theories as to the nature of the relation of mind and body, though the dependence of recognition on physiological process on the one hand and on conscious process on the other will lead me to deal with the problem of mind and body. I wish only to discuss in this connection in what sense instinctive recognition is a mental fact.

In recognition there is, as distinctive of the experience, an element we may describe as "againness." It is the experience "had before," "seen already." Under the first question I wish to discuss the nature and genesis of the experience of "againness." Under the second question, I wish to inquire how there can be, as there certainly appears to be, recognition in the first performance by an animal of an instinctive action.

These two questions may appear to be quite distinct and to have nothing whatever in common, and some may object that while the first is a question which can only be resolved by subjective or introspective analysis and is therefore in the full sense a question of philosophy, the second is merely a question of descriptive natural history, and any theory founded on the description can only be of quite secondary philosophical

importance. It must rest, they will say, almost entirely on analogy and if treated philosophically cannot avoid the taint of anthropomorphism. I shall try to show that this is not so. The two questions are in my view very closely associated and are indeed part of one and the same metaphysical problem. At the same time I propose to keep them distinct.

1. What is the Nature of the Modification of Cognition which makes it Recognition?

There may be no cognition which is cognition only and not recognition. Every cognition may be a recognition, and a pure cognition may be a limiting concept. In a developed consciousness such as our own, were there only cognition and no recognition, there would be no acquirement of meaning and therefore no experience in the ordinary sense of the word. The recognitions in present experience may be the cognitions on which future recognitions depend, and so likewise the cognitions on which present recognitions depend may themselves have been recognitions. Pure cognition, however, is theoretically conceivable, and as an abstract possibility it forms part of the concept of experience as a concrete reality. Logically and etymologically cognition is presupposed in recognition. Cognition is the ground or condition of recognition.

If the second apprehension of an identical object or of an identical event were a repetition of the first apprehension and only numerically different from it, recognition would simply be the addition of memory and judgment to the mental act of apprehension. But plainly this is not the fact, for there are cases of recognition in which there is no repetition of any experience at all, and in most cases of recognition, if not in all, even though there may seem to be a similarity between a present experience and a past experience on which a judgment of identity could be based, there is no similarity in fact. If this be disputed it is at least certain that there may be

recognition where there is no similarity even between the present recognised object and any previous experience of that object whatever.

to us.

The term recognition, as distinct from the term cognition, connotes that the meaning, or content, or implication of a sense presentation is in some way already known it is the direct immediate apprehension of familiarity with the object presented The nature of this apprehension of a mark of our own past experience in an object present to sense or to thought is the problem of recognition. That the problem is a difficult one will be evident to anyone who will refer to the article on "Recognition" in Baldwin's Dictionary. Three main groups of theories are there specified and these are again subdivided into twelve sub-groups, and a list of psychological writers, by no means exhaustive, is added, each of whom seems to have propounded a distinct theory or to have adopted some characteristic doctrine of recognition.

The task I am going to set myself is not that of comparing and criticising these different theories: I wish to inquire how far we can directly observe the process of recognition at workthe process by which cognition acquires the modification which makes it recognition. It will lead me to a metaphysical theory. I do not see how this can be avoided, and therefore it is well to give warning. The problem of recognition cannot be decided by observation of empirical fact, for that depends on the presuppositions which psychology, like every special science, adopts. This was made clear, I think, if nothing else was, in the symposium to which I have referred. The real difference which divided us was metaphysical-so at least it appeared to me-a different theory of the nature of the continuity of experience.

Let me begin by taking some definite instances of what everyone would accept as cases of recognition. This appears an easy matter because recognition is a perfectly familiar experience. It is in fact, however, peculiarly difficult, and the difficulty is

of a quite paradoxical nature, due to a veritable embarras de richesse. I can find nothing else in my cognitive experience but recognitions, and I cannot therefore establish by a clear example what is a recognition in distinction from what is only a cognition. Nevertheless for practical purposes we make a clear and well-marked distinction between what we term recognitions and the cognitions on which they depend. It is only when we analyse these cognitions that we find that they in their turn are also recognitions. When we push our analysis to the point of imagining the simplest conditions of cognition and the absolutely unanalysable character of a first cognition we are driven to hypostasise some theoretical being like Condillac's statue and endow it with sense organs one at a time, and follow out the gradual complications of sense experience from its hypothetically simple origin. It is logic or epistemology which spurs us to the attempt, not psychology.

(1) The young chick, we are told by Professor Lloyd Morgan, at first pecks instinctively at all small objects. But experience very rapidly teaches it that it is pleasant to peck at some things, such as yolk of egg, or cabbage-moth caterpillars, and very unpleasant to peck at others, such as cinnabar caterpillars or bits of orange peel. The young chick profits by experience and thereby comes to recognise objects. The latter experience we should call recognition of objects in distinction from the earlier experience, and this earlier experience we should call cognition in contrast to the later experience.

(2) I arrive at a town I have not visited before and take a first stroll through its streets. All that I notice is new to me and I set to work to find my way about. After a time or on a second stroll I am familiar with my surroundings, and I recognise what I see. The later cognitions I call recognitions, as distinguished from the earlier ones on which they depend, and which I then think of as cognitions merely.

(3) Two friends are walking in the country for the enjoyment

of the exercise. Each is experiencing the same exhilaration from the crisp air, the bright sunshine and the beauty of the surroundings. One is an engineer, the other a naturalist. Their recognitions are entirely distinct. The one recognises gradients, strains, actual or possible constructions, and the details of locomotive devices, which to his companion are merely roads, banks, valleys, hills, engines, etc. The other recognises the character of the vegetation, the nature of the soil and subsoil, the various species of animals, which to his companion are merely green grass, hedgerows, woods, and singing birds, etc. Here then we have a practical difference between recognition and general awareness. It is only part of experience which we distinguish as recognition, and one man's recognitions are different from another's, even when the sense stimuli of each are, so far as they are external influences, identical.

(4) A favourite book of mine is Fielding's Tom Jones, but the enjoyment it never fails to give me is due to something literary and perhaps to something sympathetic in the author, not to an interest in the plot. Yet I distinctly remember the delightful surprise I experienced on the first reading as the plot unfolded itself. This enjoyment can never recur, and in this respect recognition, in giving me "againness," leaves me poorer. It illustrates, however, and this is why I cite it, how recognition may depend upon an experience, the repetition of which the recognition itself renders impossible.

With these illustrations of the use of the term recognition, let me try to define it. Recognition is the whole content, meaning, or significance of a sense presentation in so far as we have learnt that content, meaning, or significance by experience. What is recognised, or what we call objectively the recognition, is what we have learnt by experience, and learning by experience is a subjective process, by which I mean an activity of the mind. I think we always mean this by recognition. We perceive in what is present to sense what we have learnt to

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