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short time before my arrival, on his way to Constantinople, where he had been sent to be disposed of as the Grand Signior thought proper. Although during the absence of the Pacha, the Kiaja Bey or Minister, who acted, might have brought about a revolution, and set himself up in that character, yet so much confidence had been reposed in Mahomed Ali, that an act of this nature was never thought of, and the whole of Egypt was perfectly tranquil during the period he was drawn from it in consequence of these hostilities.

"In every quarter of Egypt, travellers may now proceed and prosecute their inquiries with equal safety as in the most civilized countries, to whom every protection is afforded and respect paid. To promote the happiness of the people, and the prosperity of these vast dominions, has been the grand object of Mahomed Ali; and thus Egypt, formerly a country where disorder and confusion reigned, now ensures personal safety. The traveller is not under any apprehension of danger-the Christian not insulted or trampled upon; and it is now more flourishing than any other in the Levant, where contentment is to be found, abuses removed, and a liberal and most enlightened administration has been established.

"It may be further added, that Mahomed Ali has two sons, one named Ibrahim Pacha, who completed the subjugation of the Wacchabees, and who is understood to have imbibed the principles of his father. The other, Ismail Pacha, is now engaged in penetrating with an expedition into the interior of Africa, who, to this date, has laid the country, to Senaar, at his feet, and detached troops up the Nile to examine some of the great rivers, which promises to afford facility to religious missions, and unfold objects of the highest interest.

"In conclusion, having said so much respecting the present Pacha of Egypt, I may be allowed to express a hope that his growing powers, great resources, and increasing popularity, added to those benevolent and patriotic dispositions by which he is actuated, with the estimation in which he holds the British nation, all this will be duly appreciated by the Government of this country, and that prudence will be exercised to preserve a proper understanding with Mahomed Ali, who governs several millions of people, and in which not only our political and commercial interests, but those of the antiquarian and traveller, are so deeply interested."

B

ART. IX.-On Judicial Presumptions*.

EFORE the trial of a cause is entered upon, there are certain presumptions against which a Judge neither can nor ought to guard himself. These presumptions, vague and general, have in themselves no considerable force; but they may be guides in an obscurity till particular proofs are obtained, or may incline the balance, when suspended between contradictory evidence.

* For this article we are indebted to the same distinguished person as for the one on Publicity of Courts of Justice..

1. Between a plaintiff and defendant, the presumption ought to be in favour of the first, and against the second.

The probabilities are in favour of the first, because he comes on his own impulse, to submit his right to the decision of justice: the defendant, by compulsion. The cases in which the first may have an interest in instituting a suit against his own conviction, must be rare; but the defendant, whether right or wrong, has always, or almost always, an evident interest in defending it, because the course of judicial proceedings offers the chance of gain; and because, if he lose his cause, he is only just where he would have been, had he surrendered without contesting the claim.

How many infringements on property, how many injuries, and great ones too, do people submit to, before they encounter the hazards of law! How many sacrifices do they make, to spare themselves the embarrassments, the wearisomeness, the loss of time and of expense, which are never compensated! There must be many motives for confidence to surmount this natural repugnance; and these motives constitute a natural presumption in favour of him who appeals to the courts. There is nothing of this kind on the part of the defendant.

To strengthen this presumption, let us look to facts. Let us compare the events of adjudged cases. The causes gained by plaintiffs are in a very superior proportion to that of causes gained by defendants: and yet the first, in our different systems of judicial procedure, are in a far more unfavourable position than their adversaries, because they have against them so many nullities, formalities, and impediments-such, indeed, as could have no existence under a more perfect judicature. We are not ignorant that many lawyers incline towards the contrary presumption. There must be some delusion. A defendant appears in their eyes as a man attacked in his right of possession, and the presumption should be in favour of possessors, because the number of legal is infinitely greater than that of illegal possessors. But that is not the state of the question. The point is to learn, whether, among contested rights, the number of those justly contested be not far superior to those which are unjustly contested: and it is evident that this must be superior; for to undertake to dispute in a court of justice, the legality of a possession, you must discover some flaw which takes the case out of the condition of ordinary possessions.

A prejudice against plaintiffs has prevailed very generally in the world; and the cause is obvious enough. The more vexatious and perverted judicial proceedings have been, the more they are dreaded and no one can be impelled against his own consent in this thorny career, but by a plaintiff. Thus the terror of legal process, originating in the faults of the system of judicature, has cast a strong

a strong prejudice, and even a sort of odium, on this character. Instead of complaining of lawyers, who have thrown a hedge of thorns around the approaches of justice, the world, always thoughtless, avenges itself upon those who choose rather to litigate than suffer. The man, who has sustained a first injury, if he attempt redress, runs the risk of incurring a second in the esteem of his fellow-citizens. Public opinion is ever ready to side with the aggressor, who says nothing against the oppressed, who troubles its repose and clamours for justice. This mistaken and cruel prejudice has had but too much influence on legislators themselves. It has given birth to the worst of all possible taxation-to that upon actions-atlaw*. The object has been to discourage a litigious spirit; the effect, to favour injustice.

We must not, however, rush from one extreme to the other: all that has been said goes no further than this-that vexation is more frequent on the side of the defendant, than on that of the plaintiff. This conclusion is proved by the nature of things, and by a comparison of causes lost and gained.

2. In penal matters, and particularly in the more serious ones, the presumption ought to be in favour of innocence, or, at least, we ought to act as if this presumption was established.

How is this presumption to be reconciled with the preceding? Where there is an accusation, there is an offence, either on the part of the accuser or the accused: but to speak generally, there is no crime so rare, that a false accusation of that crime is not still more so. We must here make a distinction. If the supposition of innocence on the part of the accused can be reconciled with the supposition of good faith on that of the accuser, the presumption ought to be in favour of the accused. Precipitancy, error, and passion, should more readily be presumed, than crimes, and particularly serious crimes. The presumption against an accusation ought to be still stronger in cases where the facts are connected with a party or sectarian spirit, with religious opinions, or false popular notions. How many imagined offences are there of which thousands have been accused, without the possibility of guilt-witchcraft, for instance !

The presumption would be very strong in favour of the accused party, if a judgement was formed by what occurs in the ordinary course of conversation-where false accusations are much more frequent than true ones. But what a difference is there between these petty tales, which turn upon peccadillos, and judicial accusations, which bear upon the gravest matters! In the one case, facts and conjectures are carelessly advanced, because there is no

The reader will bear in mind, that this Essay was written in Switzerland.

responsibility,

responsibility, and because little importance is attached to them; decisions are thrown out at random, through vanity, or indolence, or levity. But in the case of judicial testimony, if you remove the seductions of interest and passion, the most thoughtless wit-. nesses become scrupulous; they feel their honour to be concerned, and that a false testimony may expose them to serious consequences. But in granting that in the commonest cases, the presumption is not in favour of the prisoner, it is not the less true, that we ought to act as if this presumption was established; and consequently the Judge ought to hold it as a maxim, that it is better to suffer the guilty to escape, than to condemn the innocent; or, in other words, he ought to be much more on his guard against the injustice which condemns, than the injustice which acquits. Either is a great evil; but the greatest evil is that from which the greatest alarm results: and every one knows there is no compa rison to be made between the two cases. To speak generally; a too easy acquittal excites regret and disquietude only among the reflecting; whilst the condemnation of a prisoner, who is afterwards discovered to be innocent, spreads a general terror: all security seems destroyed; there is no protection left, where innocence fails.

This is, perhaps, one of those occasions where the imagination usurps the place of reason; the alarm is superior to the danger; that is, the apparent is greater than the real danger. In fact, the danger resulting from the acquittal of the guilty, is greater than what results from the condemnation of the innocent: but it is not so apparent-not so universally recognised. If a thief be acquitted, the almost certain effect will be, the production of new thefts. If an innocent man, accused of theft, be condemned, it does not follow, that other innocent persons will be condemned for the same cause. If the Judges be supposed the most severe, the condemnation of an innocent person, in such a case, is an insulated misfortune, and has no tendency to produce similar consequences.

But it ought to be considered, on the other side, that the evil of an unjust punishment for a theft, far surpasses the evil which would be sustained, by the renewed thefts of the acquitted thief. Thus the alarm of the punishment is greater than the alarm of the offence; and consequently the danger of the innocent being punished, will always appear greater than the danger of suffering by the acquittal of the guilty. Therefore, though a Judge may have entertained an internal presumption against a prisoner, he ought not to hesitate in acting on the presumption of his innocence; and, when in doubt, to regard the mistake which acquits, as more

justifiable,

justifiable, or less adverse to the good of society, than the mistake which condemns.

But all sentimental extremes, which tend to give impunity to crime, under pretence of establishing the security of innocence, must be distrusted. The applause of the public, so to speak, has been offered to the highest bidder. At first, it was said, it is better to save many guilty, than to condemn one innocent person; another, to make the maxim more definite, assigned the number ten; another decupled this ten; and a fourth centupled it. All these candidates for the prize of humanity have been completely distanced by innumerable writers, who would, in no case, have a prisoner condemned, unless his guilt were a matter of nathematical or absolute certainty. On this maxim, no person whatever ought to be punished.

ART. X.-Fifteen Years in India. By an Officer in His Majesty's Service. 1822.

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TT is impossible to contemplate India, and every thing concerning it, without the deepest interest. A population of more than 80 millions, under the influence, more or less complete, of the British Government; and that population, by the barbarism of its religious creeds and castes, sunk into an almost hopeless state of demoralization, is a subject to awaken the dullest sympathy. With our fast-rooted convictions, that though good or bad sanctions may not always be accompanied by good or bad morals, with the precision, which might have been, perhaps, naturally expected; yet their influence is confessedly so powerful, that our desire to aid the introduction of higher and more holy considerations and motives, grows but the more intense, by the very magnitude and appalling difficulty of the evils which call for reformation. The most striking enormities, which present themselves in the moral world of India, are the tyranny of superstition, the contempt of oaths, the sacrifice of life, and the debasement of the women. The root of all these evils is deep-struck in the religion of the country. It is this which sanctions the distribution of society into castes; and hence have sprung the oppressions of the strong, and the degradation and profligacy of the weak. It is this which entails the spell of that horrible distribution. It is this which degrades the women, and constitutes them the property of the men: and hence are perpetuated the cruelty and contempt with which they are treated the prostration of their understandings, and the sacrifice of their persons. It is this which consecrates the murder of infants;

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