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rest" applies to all the synonymes and circum- | about the whole species, the impossibility of locutions which are employed to convey the answering is still more evident. Man differs same meaning; pain and pleasure, happiness from man; generation from generation; na and misery, objects of desire, and so forth. tion from nation. Education, station, sex, age, accidental associations, produce infinite shades of variety.
The whole art of Mr. Mill's essay consists in one simple trick of legerdemain. It consists in using words of the sort which we have been describing, first in one sense and then in another. Men will take the objects of their desire if they can. Unquestionably-but this is an identical proposition: for an object of desire means merely a thing which a man will procure if he can. Nothing can possibly be inferred from a maxim of this kind. When we see a man take something, we shall know that it was an object of his desire. But till then, we have no means of judging with certainty what he desires, or what he will take. The general proposition, however, having been admitted, Mr. Mill proceeds to reason as if men had no desires but those which can be gratified only by spoiliation and oppression. It then becomes easy to deduce doctrines of vast importance from the original axiom. The only misfortune is, that by thus narrowing the meaning of the word desire, the axiom becomes false, and all the doctrines consequent upon it are false likewise.
When we pass beyond those maxims which it is impossible to deny without a contradiction in terms, and which, therefore, do not enable us to advance a single step in practical knowledge, we do not believe that it is possible to lay down a single general rule respecting the motives which influence human actions. There is nothing which may not, by association or by comparison, become an object either of desire or of aversion. The fear of death is generally considered as one of the strongest of our feelings. It is the most formidable sanction which legislators have been able to devise. Yet it is notorious that, as Lord Bacon has observed, there is no passion by which that fear has not been often overcome. Physical pain is indisputably an evil; yet it has been often endured, and even welcomed. Innumerable martyrs have exulted in torments which made the spectators shudder; and, to use a more homely illustration, there are few wives who do not long to be mothers.
Is the love of approbation a stronger motive than the love of wealth? It is impossible to answer this question generally, even in the case of an individual with whom we are very intimate. We often say, indeed, that a man loves fame more than money, or money more than fame. But this is said in a loose and popular sense; for there is scarcely a man who would not endure a few sneers for a great sum of money, if he were in pecuniary distress; and scarcely a man, on the other hand, who, if he were in flourishing circumstances, would expose himself to the hatred and contempt of the public for a trifle. In order, therefore, to return a precise answer, even about a single human being, we must know what is the amount of the sacrifice of reputation demanded, and of the pecuniary advantage offered, and in what situation the person to whom the temptation is proposed stands at the time. But when the question is propounded generally
Now, the only mode in which we can conceive it possible to deduce a theory of government from the principles of human nature, is this. We must find out what are the motives which, in a particular form of government, impel rulers to bad measures, and what are those which impel them to good measures. We must then compare the effect of the two classes of motives; and according as we find the one or the other to prevail, we must pronounce the form of government in question good or bad.
Now let it be supposed that, in aristocrat.cal and monarchical states, the desire of wealth, and other desires of the same class, always tend to produce misgovernment, and that the love of approbation, and other kindred feelings, always tend to produce good government. Then, if it be impossible, as we have shown that it is, to pronounce generally which of the two classes of motives is the more influential, it is impossible to find out, a priori, whether a monarchical or aristocratical form of government be good or bad.
Mr. Mill has avoided the difficulty of making the comparison, by very coolly putting all the weights into one of the scales,-by reasoning as if no human being had ever sympathized with the feelings, been gratified by the thanks, or been galled by the execrations, of another.
The case, as we have put it, is decisive against Mr. Mill; and yet we have put it in a manner far too favourable to him. For in fact, it is impossible to lay it down as a general rule, that the love of wealth in a sovereign always produces misgovernment, or the love of approbation good government. A patient and far-sighted ruler, for example, who is less desirous of raising a great sum immediately, than of securing an unencumbered and progressive revenue, will, by taking off restraints from trade, and giving perfect security to property, encourage accumulation, and entice capital from foreign countries. The commercial policy of Prussia, which is perhaps superior to that of any government in the world, and which puts to shame the absurdities of our republican brethren on the other side of the Atlantic, has probably sprung from the desire of an absolute ruler to enrich himself. On the other hand, when the popular estimate of virtues and vices is erroneous, which is too often the case, the love of appro bation leads sovereigns to spend the wealth of the nation on useless shows, or to engage in wanton and destructive wars. If, then, we can neither compare the strength of two motives, nor determine with certainty to what description of actions either motive will lead, how can e possibly deduce a theory of government from the nature of man?
How, then, are we to arrive at just conclusions on a subject so important to the happi ness of mankind? Surely by that method which, in every experimental science to which
it has been applied, has signally increased the ] of nations,-which, of all sciences, most tends power and knowledge of our species,-by that to expand and invigorate the mind,-which method for which our new philosophers would draws nutriment and ornament from every part substitute quibbles scarcely worthy of barba- of philosophy and literature, and dispenses, in rous respondents and opponents of the middle return, nutriment and ornament to all. We are ages, by the method of induction;-by observ- sorry and surprised when we see men of good ing the present state of the world,-by as- intentions and good natural abilities abandon siduously studying the history of past ages, this healthful and generous study, to pore over by sifting the evidence of facts,-by carefully speculations like those which we have been combining and contrasting those which are examining. And we should heartily rejoice to authentic,-by generalizing with judgment and find that our remarks had induced any person diffidence, by perpetually bringing the theory of this description, to employ, in researches of which we have constructed to the test of new real utility, the talents and industry which are facts, by correcting, or altogether abandoning now wasted on verbal sophisms, wretched of it, according as those new facts prove it to be their wretched kind. partially or fundamentally unsound. Proceeding thus,-patiently, diligently, candidly, we may hope to form a system as far inferior in pretensions to that which we have been examining, and as far superior to it in real utility, as the prescriptions of a great physician, varying with every stage of every malady, and with the constitution of every patient, to the pill of the advertising quack, which is to cure all human beings, in all climates, of all diseases.
As to the greater part of the sect, it is, we apprehend, of little consequence, what they study, or under whom. It would be more amusing, to be sure, and more reputable, if they would take up the old republican cant, and declaim about Brutus and Timoleon, the duty of killing tyrants, and the blessedness of dying for liberty. But, on the whole, they might have chosen worse. They may as well be Utilitarians as jockeys or dandies. And though quibbling about self-interest and motives, and This is that noble science of politics, which objects of desire, and the greatest happiness is equally removed from the barren theories of of the greatest number, is but a poor employthe Utilitarian sophists, and from the petty ment for a grown man, it certainly hurts the craft, so often mistaken for statesmanship by health less than hard drinking, and the fortune minds grown narrow in habits of intrigue, job-less than high play: it is not much mor bing, and official etiquette;-which, of all laughable than phrenology, and is immeasusciences, is the most important to the welfare rably more humane than cock-fighting.
BENTHAM'S DEFENCE OF MILL.*
[EDINBURGH REVIEW, June, 1829.]
We have had great reason, we think, to be gratified by the success of our late attack on the Utilitarians. We could publish a long list of the cures which it has wrought, in cases previously considered as hopeless. Delicacy forbids us to divulge names; but we cannot refrain from alluding to two remarkable instances. A respectable lady writes to inform us, that her son, who was plucked at Cambridge last January, has not been heard to call Sir James Mackintosh a poor ignorant fool more than twice since the appearance of our article. A distinguished political writer in the Westminster and Parliamentary Reviews has borrowed Hume's History, and has actually got as far as the battle of Agincourt. He assures us that he takes great pleasure in his new study, and that he is very impatient to learn how Scotland and England became one kingdom. But the greatest compliment that we have received is, that Mr. Bentham himself should have condescended to take the field in defence of Mr. Mill. We have not been in the habit of reviewing reviews; but as Mr. Bentham is a truly great man, and as his party have thought fit to announce in puffs and placards that this article is written by him, and contains not only an answer to our attacks, but a development of the "greatest happiness principle," with the latest improvements of the author, we shall for once depart from our general rule. However the conflict may terminate, we shall at least not have been vanquished by an ignoble hand.
However sharply he may speak of us, we can never cease to revere in him the father of the philosophy of Jurisprudence. He has a ful right to all the privileges of a great inventor; and, in our court of criticism, those privileges will never be pleaded in vain. But they are limited in the same manner in which, fortunately for the ends of justice, the privileges of the peerage are now limited. The advantage is personal and incommunicable. A nobleman can now no longer cover with his protection every lackey who follows his heels, or every bully who draws in his quarrel; and, highly as we respect the exalted rank which Mr. Bentham holds among the writers of our time, yet when, for the due maintenance of literary police, we shall think it necessary to confute sophists, or to bring pretenders to shame, we shall not depart from the ordinary course of our proceedings because the offenders call themselves Benthamites.
Whether Mr. Mill has much reason to thank Mr. Bentham for undertaking his defence, our readers, when they have finished this article, will perhaps be inclined to doubt. Great as Mr. Bentham's talents are, he has, we think, shown an undue confidence in them. He should have considered how dangerous it is for any man, however eloquent and ingenious he may be, to attack or to defend a book without reading it. And we feel quite convinced that Mr. Bentham would never have written the article before us, if he had, before he began, perused our review with attention, and compared it with Mr. Mill's Essay.
Of Mr. Bentham himself, we shall endeavour, even while defending ourselves against He has utterly mistaken our object and his reproaches, to speak with the respect to meaning. He seems to think that we have which his venerable age, his genius, and his undertaken to set up some theory of governpublic services entitle him. If any harsh ex- ment in opposition to that of Mr. Mill. But we pression should escape us, we trust that he distinctly disclaimed any such design. From will attribute it to inadvertence, to the momen- the beginning to the end of our article, there is tary warmth of controversy,-to any thing, in not, as far as we remember, a single sentence short, rather than to a design of affronting him. which, when fairly construed, can be considered Though we have nothing in common with the as indicating any such design. If such an excrew of Hurds and Boswells, who, either from pression can be found, it has been dropped by interested motives, or from the habit of intel- inadvertence. Our object was to prove, not lectual servility and dependence, pamper and that monarchy and aristocracy are good, but vitiate his appetite with the noxious sweetness that Mr. Mill had not proved them to be bad; of their undiscerning praise, we are not per- not that democracy is bad, but that Mr. Mill haps less competent than they to appreciate had not proved it to be good. The points in his merit, or less sincerely disposed to acknow-issue are these, Whether the famous Essay on ledge it. Though we may sometimes think his Government be, as it has been called, a perfect reasonings on moral and political questions solution of the great political problem, or a se feeble and sophistical-though we may some-ries of sophisms and blunders; and whether times smile at his extraordinary language-we the sect which, while it glòries in the precision can never be weary of admiring the amplitude of its logic, extols this Essay as a masterpiece of his comprehension, the keenness of his pene- of demonstration, be a sect deserving of the ratior, the exuberant fertility with which his respect or of the derision of mankind. These, mind pours forth arguments and illustrations. we say, are the issues; and on these we with full confidence put ourselves on the country. It is not necessary, for the purposes of this
The Westminster Review, No. XXI., Article XVI.
Edinburgh Review, No. XCVII., Article on Mill's Essays investigation, that we should state what our
trusting to arbitrary power on the credit of these specimens."
political creed is, or whether we have any political creed at all. A man who cannot act the most trivial part in a farce has a right to his Romeo Coates-a man who does not know a vein from an artery may caution a simple neighbour against the advertisements of Doctor Eady. A complete theory of government would, indeed, be a noble present to mankind; but it is a present which we do not hope, and do not pretend, that we can offer. If, however, we cannot lay the foundation, it is something to clear away the rubbish-if we cannot set up truth, it is something to pull down error. Even if the subjects of which the Utilitarians treat were subjects of less fearful importance, we should think it no small service to the cause of good sense and good taste, to point out the contrast between their magnificent pretensions and their miserable performances. Some of them have, however, thought fit to display their ingenuity on questions of the most momentous kind, and on questions concerning which men cannot reason ill with impunity. We think it, under these circumstances, an absolute duty to expose the fallacy of their arguments. It is no matter of pride or of pleasure. To read their works is the most soporific employment that we know; and a man ought no more to be proud of refuting them than of having two legs. We must now come to close quarters with Mr. Bentham, whom, we need not say, we do not mean to include in this observation. He charges us with maintaining,—
Fourthly, Mr. Bentham says, that in this balanced contest the people turned the scale in favour of the king against the aristocracy. But Mr. Mill has demonstrated, that it cannot "First, that it is not true that all despots possibly be for the interest of the monarchy govern ill:'-whereon the world is in a mis- and democracy to join against the aristocracy; take, and the whigs have the true light. And and that wherever the three parties exist, the for proof, principally, that the king of Den-king and the aristocracy will combine against mark is not Caligula. To which the answer the people. This, Mr. Mill assures us, is as is, that the king of Denmark is not a despot. certain as any thing which depends upon He was put in his present situation, by the human will. people turning the scale in his favour, in a balanced contest between himself and the nobility. And it is quite clear that the same power would turn the scale the other way, the moment a king of Denmark should take into his head to be Caligula. It is of little consequence by what congeries of letters the majesty of Denmark is typified in the royal press of Copenhagen, while the real fact is, that the sword of the people is suspended over his head in case of ill-behaviour, as effectually as in other countries where more noise is made upon the subject. Everybody believes the sovereign of Denmark to be a good and virtuous gentleman; but there is no more superhuman merit in his being so, than in the case of
We have no dispute on these heads with Mr Bentham. On the contrary, we think his ex
a rural squire who does not shoot his land-planation true-or, at least, true in part; and steward, or quarter his wife with his yeomanry sabre.
we heartily thank him for lending us his as sistance to demolish the essay of his follower. His wit and his sarcasm are sport to us; but they are death to his unhappy disciple.
Mr. Bentham seems to imagine that we have said something implying an opinion favourable to despotism. We can scarcely suppose that, as he has not condescended to read that portion of our work which he undertook to answer, he can have bestowed much attention on its general character. Had he done so, he would, we think, scarcely have entertained such a suspicion. Mr. Mill asserts, and pretends to prove, that under no despotic government does any human
"It is true that there are partial exceptions to the rule, that all men use power as badly as they dare There may have been such things as amiable negro-drivers and sentimental masters of press-gangs; and here and there, among the odd freaks of human nature, there may have been specimens of men who were No tyrants, though bred up to tyranny.' But it would be as wise to recommend wolves for nurses at the Foundling, on the credit of Romulus and Remus, as to substitute the exception for the general fact, and advise mankind to take to
Now, in the first place, we never cited the case of Denmark to prove that all despots do not govern ill. We cited it to prove that Mr. Mill did not know how to reason. Mr. Mill gave it as a reason for deducing the theory of government from the general laws of human nature, that the king of Denmark was not Caligula. This we said, and we still say, was absurd.
In the second place, it was not we, but Mr. Mill, who said that the king of Denmark was a despot. His words are these :-"The people of Denmark, tired out with the oppression of an aristocracy, resolved that their king should be absolute; and under their absolute monarch are as well governed as any people in Europe." We leave Mr. Bentham to settle with Mr. Mill the distinction between a despot and an absolute king.
In the third place, Mr. Bentham says, that there was in Denmark a balanced contest be tween the king and the nobility. We find some difficulty in believing that Mr. Bentham seriously means to say this, when we consider that Mr. Mill has demonstrated the chance to be as infinity to one against the existence of such a balanced contest.
Fifthly, Mr. Bentham says, that if the king of Denmark were to oppress his people, the people and nobles would combine against the king. But Mr. Mill has proved that it can never be for the interest of the aristocracy to combine with the democracy against the king. It is evidently Mr. Bentham's opinion, that "monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, may balance each other, and by mutual checks produce good government." But this is the very theory which Mr. Mill pronounces to be the wildest, the most visionary, the most chimeri. cal, ever broached on the subject of government.
being, except the tools of the sovereign, possess their benches, if the light wings of saffron more than the necessaries of life, and that the and of blue' should bear this theory into theit most intense degree of terror is kept up by grim domains! Why do not the owners of constant cruelty. This, we say, is untrue. It pocket-handkerchiefs try to ‘saturate?' Why is not merely a rule to which there are excep- does not the cheated publican beg leave to tions: but it is not the rule. Despotism is bad; check the gulosity of his defrauder with a rebut it is scarcely anywhere so bad as Mr. Mili petatur haustus, and the pummelled plaintiff says that it is everywhere. This, we are sure, neutralize the malice of his adversary, by reMr. Bentham will allow. If a man were to say questing to have the rest of the beating in prethat five hundred thousand people die every sence of the court,-if it is not that such conyear in London of dram-drinking, he would duct would run counter to all the conclusions not assert a proposition more monstrously false of experience, and be the procreation of the than Mr. Mill's. Would it be just to charge us mischief it affected to destroy? Woful is the with defending intoxication because we might man whose wealth depends on his having more say that such a man was grossly in the wrong? than somebody else can be persuaded to take We say with Mr. Bentham that despotism is from him; and woful also is the people that is a bad thing. We say with Mr. Bentham that in such a case!" the exceptions do not destroy the authority of Now, this is certainly very pleasant writing. the rule. But this we say that a single ex- but there is no great difficulty in answering ception overthrows an argument, which either the argument. The real reason which makes does not prove the rule at all, or else proves it absurd to think of preventing theft by penthe rule to be true without exceptions; and such sioning off thieves is this, that there is no limit an argument is Mr. Mill's argument against to the number of thieves. If there were only despotism. In this respect, there is a great a hundred thieves in a place, and we were difference between rules drawn from expe- quite sure that no person not already addicted rience, and rules deduced à priori. We might to theft would take to it, it might become a believe that there had been a fall of snow last question, whether to keep the thieves from August, and yet not think it likely that there dishonesty by raising them above distress, would-be snow next August. A single oc- would not be a better course than to employ currence opposed to our general experience officers against them. But the actual cases are would tell for very little in our calculation of not parallel. Every man who chooses can bethe chances. But if we could once satisfy come a thief; but a man cannot become a king ourselves that, in any single right-angled tri- or a member of the aristocracy whenever be angle, the square of the hypothenuse might be chooses. The number of the depredators is less than the squares of the sides, we must re-limited; and therefore the amount of depredaject the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid tion, so far as physical pleasures are concernaltogether. We willingly adopt Mr. Bentham's ed, must be limited also. Now, we make the lively illustration about the wolf; and we will remark which Mr. Bentham censures with resay, in passing, that it gives us real pleasure ference to physical pleasures only. The plea to see how little old age has diminished the sures of ostentation, of taste, of revenge, and gayety of this eminent man. We can assure other pleasures of the same description, have, him that his merriment gives us far more plea- we distinctly allowed, no limit. Our words are sure on his account, than pain in our own. these:-"A king or an aristocracy may be We say with him, keep the wolf out of the supplied to satiety with corporal pleasures, at an nursery, in spite of the story of Romulus and expense which the rudest and poorest commuRemus. But if the shepherd who saw the wolfnity would scarcely feel." Does Mr. Bentham licking and suckling those famous twins, were, deny this? If he does, we leave him to Mr. after telling this story to his companions, to Mill. "What," says that philosopher, in his assert that it was an infallible rule that no Essay on Education, "what are the ordinary wolf ever had spared, or ever would spare, pursuits of wealth and power, which kindle to any living thing which might fall in its way-such a height the ardour of mankind? Not to that its nature was carnivorous-and that it mere love of eating and of drinking, or all the could not possibly disobey its nature, we think physical objects together which wealth can that the hearers might have been excused for purchase or power command. With these starting. It may be strange, but is not incon- every man is in the long run speedily satis sistent, that a wolf which has eaten ninety-nine fied." What the difference is between being children should spare the hundredth. But the speedily satisfied and being soon saturated, we fact that a wolf has once spared a child is leave Mr. Bentham and Mr. Mill to settle tosufficient to show that there must be some flaw gether. in the chain of reasoning, purporting to prove that wolves cannot possibly spare children.
Mr. Bentham proceeds to attack another position which he conceives us to maintain :—"Secondly, That a government not under the control of the community (for there is no question upon any other) may soon be saturated.' Tell it not in Bow Street, whisper it not in Hatton Garden-that there is a plan for preventing injustice by saturation.' With what peals of unearthly merriment would Minos, Facus, and Radamanthus, be aroused upon
The word "saturation," however, seems to provoke Mr. Bentham's mirth. It certainly did not strike us as very pure English; but, as Mr. Mill used it, we supposed it to be good Benthamese. With the latter language we are not critically acquainted, though, as it has many roots in comm. n with our mother tongue, wa can contrive, by the help of a converted Utilitarian, who attends us in the capacity of Moorshee, to make out a little. But Mr. Bentham's authority is of course decisive, and we bow to it.