App. Div.] SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1902. * * the statements that Simon E. Williams made to me in regard to the purpose of the paper that he presented to me to sign, and it was in reliance upon these statements that I signed the paper." This is his testimony with reference thereto: "On the ninth of November, 1898, Simon E. Williams presented to me a certain paper with the request that I sign it. At the time he called upon me then, he had a letter with him, from George Whittell to him. I have been acquainted with the handwriting of George Whittell for three years. The letter you show me is the letter Simon E. Williams handed me on the ninth of November, 1898. When he handed me the letter he said he called at the hotel to see Mr. Whittell, and that he had gone out, and he left him this letter at the office, I believe. At this meeting between Simon E. Williams and myself, on the ninth of November, 1898, he said that Mr. Whittell had prepared this paper, and had selected this special will as the one on account, first, of its later date, and secondly, because in the first copy that she made the day before she omitted to appoint him executor in making the copy; that it was not in legal form, * * and that in order to have it probated all the heirs should agree to sustain it as a will; that if that was done it would expedite the probate of it as a will, and that matters could be settled up quickly. He did not say how quickly. He did not say whether or not Mr. Whittell had legal advice on the subject." On his cross-examination the plaintiff testified: "In the course of that conversation, the fact of the paper not being a valid will was not discussed. The only thing said about it was that it was not in legal form. It would expedite matters if all the heirs would agree to sign an agreement or respect it as a will and then the surrogate could not object to the probate. The propriety of carrying out the provisions contained in the will was not discussed at all. We had very little conversation about it. I took it for a fact that there was no contest, and did not intend to contest it." I cannot, in this evidence, find any fraud in Williams. The plaintiff at that time understood the purport of the letter left by his wife, for he testifies that when he had held a conversation with Whittell prior to this time he was surprised and astonished with the provisions his wife had made, but that he did not say anything to him on the subject; that he did not object or express either satisfaction or dissatisfaction. After he received the agreement he read it over, retained it in his possession SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1902. [Vol. 69. for half an hour, went and explained it to his son Drage, and thereupon they went before a notary and executed it. He who runs may read the instrument. It recites that the dead made a certain writing intended to be a disposition of her property by will, but "said paper writing was not in the form of a will nor executed according to the statutes of New York in regard to wills," and further recites that "whereas the parties of the first and second parts are desirous of carrying out the provisions made in said paper writing, with the same force and effect as if the same had been properly executed as a will of real and personal property." I think that the evidence not only fails to show that there was fraud on the part of any of the defendants, but that it does establish that the plaintiff anderstood the purpose of the letter and its legal defects; that he was resigned to the disposition of property attempted to be made by his wife and renounced his legal rights; that he understood the purport and purpose of the agreement before he executed it, and that he assented and consented to a legal execution of the wishes of his wife as if they had been expressed in a legal testament, even so far as to accept payment on account of the sun bestowed upon him by the letter. This appeal may be determined without passing upon the question of consideration. I may, however, say that while the agreement is in the form of an instrument under seal, and the consideration expressed is "one dollar and other valuable considerations," yet, as it was executory, I think that the plaintiff was not, in any event, foreclosed from raising the question. (Code Civ. Proc. § 840; Baird v. Baird, 81 Hun, 300, 302, per HAIGHT, J.; affd., 145 N. Y. 659.) Proof that the one dollar was not paid did not establish failure of consideration, in view of the recitals of other valuable considerations. (Kam v. Benjamin, 10 App. Div. 419; affd., 158 N. Y. 725.) In Elderkin v. Rowell (42 How. Pr. 330) the intestate left a draft of his will, and his widow and five children consented, covenanted and agreed by an assignment indorsed thereon to abide by its provisions. Subsequently one of the children brought an action to set aside the agreement. The Special Term held that the agreement was without consideration and, therefore, void, and the General Term affirmed the judgment on argument. But in Bunn v. Bartlett (28 N. Y. St. Repr. 239), where there was dissatisfac App. Div.] SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1902. tion with the will and all of the heirs executed an agreement for an equal division and then destroyed the will, and in a subsequent action for partition the defendants resisted the force of the agreement, the General Term, per LANDON, J., said: "The defendants. were of full age, knew the effect of their action, and acting upon their sense of justice and a desire to preserve family harmony, generously released their superior rights under their father's will and accepted an equality of rights with their brothers and sisters. Such is the effect of the finding of the referee upon evidence which, we think, not only supports but requires it. The agreement was made upon sufficient consideration. All the heirs received something under the will. Each one released his or her portion to all, and all united in granting to each one an equal portion of the whole. There was, moreover, the consideration of love and affection, and the desire that family harmony should not be destroyed by an unequal distribution of their father's bounty." But this case should be affirmed upon the doctrine applied by the learned Special Term that the plaintiff was estopped from raising the question of consideration. Mrs. Williams died in 1898. The plaintiff took the testamentary letter from her dead body and gave it to the son whom she had named as executor. While he was surprised and astonished with the provisions of the letter, he made no objection thereto. Several weeks thereafter he executed the sealed instrument which made the letter a will so far as his assent could make it. In December, 1898, he signed renunciation of his right to administer and obtained his son Drage's renunciation. Whittell was allowed to take the letters, to file a bond for $36,000 and to administer upon the estate. On November 10, 1898, the plaintiff received a letter from Whittell acknowledging the papers signed by him, wherein Whittell wrote that such papers were necessary to sustain the written will because it was not in legal form, and stating that Williams had requested Whittell to send the plaintiff thirty dollars a month pending the distribution. This amount was paid and accepted up to January 9, 1900. In December, 1899, the administrator's attorneys wrote for an assignment in furtherance of the agreement, stating that they wished to settle the estate. The plaintiff received the assignment, calculated upon it the result of the fractional division in accord SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1902. [Vol. 69. with the agreement, found a variation, and wrote to have it corrected or to specify the different amounts, and made no further cavil or objection. The personal property was distributed in accord with the letter of the dead. Although this was done before the agreement was signed, it was after the parties had agreed to stand by the letter. The administrator had advanced to the other beneficiaries substantial sums of money, and to Mrs. Robinson a much larger sum, in reliance upon the agreement, than she would have been entitled to under distribution, and this is probably true as to the other beneficiaries. Mrs. Robinson has expended the money advanced to her. Not until January 22, 1900, did the plaintiff make any objection or give any sign of dissatisfaction or disposition to withdraw from the family arrangement. Neither false representation nor concealment of material facts, nor the intent to mislead, is necessary to an equitable estoppel. (Trustees, etc., v. Smith, 118 N. Y. 634.) In the same case, the court, per BROWN, J., say: "The authorities in this state are all harmonious on the subject of estoppel in pais. When a party, either by his declarations or conduct, has induced a third person to act in a particular manner, he will not afterwards be permitted to deny the truth of the admission if the consequence would be to work an injury to such third person or to some one claiming under him," citing many authorities. There was not mere silence or omission to speak or to protest for more than a year, but a series of solemn, overt acts, all in furtherance of the agreement which the plaintiff would not repudiate. I think that the plaintiff was estopped. (Crawford v. Ormsbee, 6 App. Div. 50, and authorities cited; Haviland v. Willets, 141 N. Y. 35, 51, 52.) The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concurred. Judgment affirmed, with costs. App. Div.] SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1902. 69 349 CHARLES A. WAGNER, Respondent, v. THE BROOKLYN HEIGHTS a174 NY 520 RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. Negligence - elevated railroad structure — injury from an electric current to an employee of the city engaged in repairing a broken police telegraph wire attached thereto — liability of the company for a feed wire from which the insulation had worn off-effect of a pass issued to such employee containing an assumption of risk by him. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries it appeared that the Held, that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be affirmed; That the fact that the defendant had issued a pass to the plaintiff in the follow- APPEAL by the defendant, the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings |