weakness and ignorance of the people. And then reason is to be depreffed as much as it can be; because its light tends to difpel the mist which they are for introducing. And, by this means, religion and divine revelation are made fubfervient not to the good and benefit, but to the hurt and damage of mankind; and are indeed, only stalking-horfes to the pride and avarice of those, who affume to themselves the fole power of teaching and explaining them. A fad instance of this we have in the church of Rome; in which, as reason is laid afide, so religion is funk into the dregs of paganism. And as the underStandings and confciences of the people are captivated to their pretended guides; so all is made fubfervient to gratify the lufts, and paffions, and avarice of a vicious clergy. Ought not Protestants therefore to be upon their guard, when reason is attacked? feeing that every depreffion of reason is a step to popery; and feeing that reason is our only Security againft it. Certain it is, that when reason is laid aside in matters of religion and divine revelation, then these may be molded into every fhape, and made to serve every purpose. • Let me then intreat my fellow Protestants, especially the laity, to contend for, and hold faft their reason, and to follow its guidance in matters of religion, and divine revelation: this being their best security against popery, which fome think gains ground among us. For if once we let go our reason in matters

of

of religion and divine revelation, we are in danger of being captivated to the fee of Rome, or to a body of Clergy who may be equally injurious to us. The power of the clergy in the church of Rome, which hath done fo much mischief in the world, doth not spring up in a day; but it arose gradually, (fuch power being too monstrous to be put upon the world at once,) and this may be the cafe amongst Protestants, if timely care be not taken to prevent it. However, whether we of this nation may have any just ground to apprehend danger, is out of the reach of my enquiry. What I would observe is, that others harm ought to be our warning: and that we, as well as all other protestants, ought to be upon our guard; especially when reason is attacked, the free use thereof being our best preJervative and Security against all corruption and impofition in matters of religion, and divine revelation. And that as the interest of the clergy feems to be diftinct from the common intereft of mankind; to it is the intereft, and ought to be the care of all focieties, not to be brought under the power of any body of clergy whatsoever.

SOME

REFLECTIONS

UPON

The comparative excellency and useful ness of moral and pofitive duties.

A

S moral and positive duties are, in a late controversy, put in compe tition with respect to their excellency, &c. And as it is a point in difpute to which of these the preference ought to be given, so I have thought proper to make a few reflections on this fubject, because, I think, it is a matter which nearly concerns mankind. And that I may be fully understood I will shew what I mean by moral, and what by positive duties; and what are the true grounds of our obligation to obedience in either cafe; and thereby set the point in question in as clear a light as I can.

By moral duties, I understand the performance of such actions as are in themfelves right and fit to be performed by every intelligent being, or moral agent, in equal circumitances; which fitneis refults solely from

from the nature and reason of things, when confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to any promulged law, whether human or divine. And that there is such a fitness and unfitness arifing from, and founded in the natural and effential differences in things, when confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to the determination of any intelligent being concerning them, is, I think, as clear and evident as that the whole is equal to all its parts, or as any other felf-evident proposition. And to suppose a power in God to constitute such a difference, when there is none in nature, is very abfurd; for as right and wrong, good and evil, truth and error, necessarily suppose a natural difference in things, (take away the difference and there can be no such distinction, crooked and strait cannot take place without a diffe rence in nature) so to suppose a power in God to conftitute such a difference, when there is none in nature, is to suppose that things can differ while they are alike, which is a contradiction.

Pleasure and pain are plainly distinct and different in nature, the one is naturally the object of our choice, and the other of our aversion and shunning; and this is manifestly the cafe when confidered abstractedly from and antecedent to any divine determination concerning them. And as plea fure is manifeftly preferable to pain, so the communicating of pleasure is preferable to

E

the

the communicating of pain, when these are confidered fimply in themselves, and abstractedly from any other confideration. There may, indeed, be cases so circumstanced, as that the communicating of pain may be preferable to the communicating of pleafure; but this does not arife from pains being preferable to pleasure, when confidered abstractedly, but only from the particular circumstances of those cases. And when, I fay, that the communicating of pleasure is preferable to the communicating of pain, my meaning is, that the communicating of pleafure is an action which, in itself, is kind and good; it is commendable and praifeworthy; and therefore, in reafon, is right and fit to be performed: Whereas the communicating of pain is an action which is unkind and evil, it is disapproveable and blame-worthy; and therefore, in reason, is wrong and unfit, and confequently the former is preferable to the latter. And this difference betwixt the communicating of pleasure and pain, and the preference which is due to the former, does not arife from any law of God, or from any divine deternation concerning them, but from the natural and effential differences in things, and must and will always be the fame, whether God interposes and determines any thing concerning them, or not. * So that, from * See Supplement to the Previous Question, page 35, 36, 37. Or my Collection of Traits, page 233, 234.

the