That Germany clearly expected these ships to be seized is apparent by the orders that had been given to cripple them beyond usefulness, if possible, which orders have been carried out in all cases save that of the "Vaterland." Why the greatest of all ships has not been injured it is easy to understand. Possibly her officers have felt that such a work would be unnecessary since that monster ship is as completely useless to us for the time being as if her engines had been destroyed. With her great draught she has been lying at her slip at Hoboken for two and a half years. With constant dredging it has always been a difficult matter to dock her, and, with the sewage of two and a half years accumulated about her, it is by no means impossible that she is as completely out of commission as any of the other German ships. It is certain that she cannot be moved from her berth until she is virtually dug out.-- an operation of uncertain duration. In addition to this we may recall with chagrin that there is not a dry-dock in this country large enough to take this ship. The only one on this hemisphere of sufficient size for that purpose is at Balboa on the Pacific Ocean side of the Panama Canal.

It is reasonably certain, however, that at least two-thirds of the German ships now in the physical possession of the United

States can be put into service before we can complete the wooden ships we have undertaken to build, or before a similar amount of tonnage now building in our yards can be put into commission. It is quite likely that by the time we have a considerable body of troops trained and equipped to take their place on the firing line these ships can be made available for transport duty. Were it to happen that these ships - not improperly called the "pride of the German Merchant Fleet"— should be the means for our placing actual fighting men "Somewhere in France" to fight for the right of Democracy against Autocracy, it would seem and we say it with all revthat the God of Battles, so often. invoked by both sides, had at last spoken.

erence

Again the United States has to face the consequences of its own indifference and apathy. Secretary Daniels on April 7 announced that recruiting for our Navy was progressing "very satisfactorily," and at this writing it is the hope of Navy Department officials that by the time these words can see the light we shall have recruited our Navy to to its full authorized fighting strength of 134,000 men, sufficient to put into commission every ship of every description we have available. It is "a consummation devoutly to be wished" and if the whole-hearted enthusiasm and patriotic co-operation manifested on every hand is any criterion it will be so. Yet we can but feel that if every young man fitted for the service would realize the truth of the words "Your Country Needs You," and also the opportunity afforded by naval service, this full quota would have already been made up, with thousands eagerly waiting.

That this is not so to the fullest degree is due to our Rip Van Winkle sleep as a nation regarding our heritage of and our

destiny on the sea. Without a merchant marine our sea-traditions cannot be kept alive. With the vast majority of our population inland, and with eyes ever turned inward, nothing better can be expected, unless it becomes a part of our fixed and set national policy to keep the tang of the sea always in the nostrils of our rising generations. Just now there is a patriotic fervor born of the crisis and we will rise to this emergency as we have to all others. But when this passed we should have learned the lesson that many of us have been vainly trying to teach for years, that the safety of this nation demands ships and men to man them.

One thought may be dropped now in the hope that it will take root in the fertilized soil of an awakened public interest and perhaps bear fruit in the form of legislation when matters of the immediate moment have been dealt with. We are now confronted by a full realization of the fact that our navy needs men and that our merchant marine is inadequate to supply them. We have been discharging trained men from the navy at the estimated rate of 4,000 a year, yet these men are not now largely available because they have sought and found land occupation, the sea no longer presenting attractions.

Our merchant marine has languished because of the apparent impossibility of competing with foreign-owned ships under our wage-scale, which is greatly in excess of that of our rivals. In fact, it may almost be said that in that excessive wage scale alone lies the difference in cost of operation between the American and foreign owned ship. To meet it, many plans have been suggested, but, whatever the

outward form, each plan has usually been condemned as being some form of subsidy. Yet we, as a nation, are not so unalterably opposed to subsidy that we cannot aid our farmers by rural credits, and our manufacturers by a system of Protection. It is the ship-owner and the ship-operator who apparently can seek and find no relief from artificially created conditions that have put him largely out of successful competition.

In these facts, as barely and briefly related, lies the possibility of a co-ordination of necessities that might for the future make it possible for an American merchant marine to exist against foreign competition; supply us with our own ocean-carrying vehicles; remove us from the possibility of ever again suffering from lack of tonnage; open foreign markets; hold what we have gained during this war and increase further our foreign trade, and, at the same time, provide a naval reserve su that never again may we find it difficult to secure the men to man our ships of war.

The necessity for some aid to our merchant shipping lies in this excessive wage scale. It is to meet t' is that subsidies have been asked, and denied because it is aid to a favored class. Yet such subsidies would go more or less directly to the men required to man the ships. Let us face the situation fairly and recognize it. Let us create a naval reserve by offering to every man who is honorably discharged from the navy an annual bonus, to be paid to him direct, upon proof that he has engaged himself in the merchant marine service of the United States and kept himself likewise enrolled for the call to government duty.

Such a policy would make it possible for our merchant shipping to acquire trained men at a wage scale that would make it profitable to employ navy men; would provide the bone and sinew necessary in reserve for our naval needs, and would make sea employment attractive to the men who, under present conditions, promptly leave it.

At the time the announcement was made that the United Fruit Company had placed an order with Harlan & Hollingsworth for four new ships, thus bringing the number soon to be built in this country for that company up to eight, it was rumored that the Cunard Line would also place orders here for a considerable number of new ships. The rumor was denied at the time, but it is now reported on apparently good authority that contracts for twelve new steamships for the Royal Mail, - said to be a subsidiary of the Cunard Line, have already been placed in American shipyards at a total cost of about $30,000,000. It is further reported now that the Cunard Line is negotiating for 114 American built passenger vessels ranging in size from 8,000 to 17,000 tons, the aggregate cost to be approximately $120,000,000. If the very British Cunard Line is forced to the hitherto unheard of thing of building British ships in American yards, some very interesting speculations become pertinent. It may indicate a departure in the future Cunard policy that will be an entering wedge to the acquirement by British interests of a portion of our jealously restricted and profitable American coastwise trade.

and taking American registry these British owned ships would enjoy the privileges of our coastwise trade,- its profits as well as its burdens. Whatever our marine handicaps in competition with the ships of other nations, there are none in the coastwise trade of a like nature. Since all ships so engaged must be of American registry they fall under the American laws as well as the American wage-scale for operating; but since these charges are similar for all such ships none has the advantage over any other. The costs are borne and charged up to operating expense, passed along to the man who pays the freight, who, in turn puts it over on the next fellow and it is the ultimate consumer who carries the bag all the while. It is only when American ships come into competition with the more cheaply operated foreign ships that the handicap becomes a killing burden. Therefore, it is by no means impossible that it is the design and purpose of the Cunard Line to get into this favored field by building some of its smaller new tonnage in American yards.

Such ships would of course, become subject to the call of our government for use in the event of future war, and, on paper, their existence would swell the amount of tonnage of the American mrchant marine. Economically they will be of no use whatever to this country. Our coastwise trade is very well developed and an increase of foreign tonnage, only nominally American. can have no effect beyond a possible reduction of trans-continental freight rates by reason of the greater water competition thus created through the Panama Canal. A million or more tons of foreign owned, though American-built, ships engaged in our coastwise trade will merely send out of the country a considerable part of the freight money now paid by Americans to

Americans, and will not enable Americans to gain any of the foreign money that comes from the acquirement of foreign markets for our raw products and manufactured goods.

The paramount value of an American merchant marine to the United States in time of peace is in foreign trade, in the gaining of new markets across the seas for our products, raw or manufactured, in order that the surplus production of which we are capable may be consumed by foreigners and bring to us foreign money in return. Such an opening and holding of foreign markets means full operation for all our industries and full time employment for all of our people. Therein lies our economic welfare and the continuance of the favorable balance of trade that we have enjoyed since the war began.

This projected movement of the Cunard Line peculiarly favored by the British government, should it actually be made, might well be construed as an acceptance of the virtual suggestion of President Wilson in his memorandum to Senator Clarke to "come on in" to our coastwise trade, "the water's fine." For, in recommending legislation that would make it possible to take over the ships now building in American yards for foreign account, President Wilson expressly suggested that their foreign ownership would not be disturbed and that their foreign officers would be left in command. Such a move by the Cunard Line would merely indicate the desire to do voluntarily and for foreign profit what President Wilson would empower our government to compel for American benefit. It is not possible to contemplate such an incursion into our natural and pre-empted domain with equanimity if it means that Great Britain, in pursuance of her policy

to be Mistress of the Sea, means now to extend her sovereignty over our home waters.

What effect the passage of the legislation that President Wilson recommends covering the commandeering of ships built in American yards for foreign account, will have upon future foreign orders remains to be seen. If the purpose of the Cunard Line is as we have intimated, American builders will doubtless get these contracts. It must be remembered, however, that foreign owners are not very likely to put their building into American yards if they are in danger of having these ships commandeered by the American government.

We may not be able to prevent the entry of such ships into our coastwise trade, either directly or under the subterfuge of being owned by American corporations, the stock control of which may be in foreign hands. But we can effectually prevent such ships from abandoning our flag at will to seek other allegiance, perhaps at the very time of our own most urgent need. At the present moment our coastwise trade is almost denuded of ships and it would be folly for us to permit any ships of actual alien ownership to engage in the development of a trade that is essential to our economic well-being, unless they are also placed under restrictions that would effectually prevent them from leaving it at a moment's notice if for any reason they decided to do so.

There was an error in the March issue of The Navy and Merchant Marine which we hasten to correct. By one of those perversities that are almost inexplicable, the caption on page thirteen-unlucky number made it appear that we were picturing some 14 inch guns on the U. S. Battleship "Utah." There are no 14 inch guns in that battleship,- 12 inch being the largest.

THE DEFENSE VALUE OF AN AIR

FLEET

It seems a pity that, in the rather keen and widespread discussion that is going on over the problems of naval defense, more is not being said as to the merits of aircraft as a naval adjunct, especially for protection against submarines. The airplane has amply demonstrated its pre-eminence in both offense and defense at sea, but it seems to have been almost, forgotten in the calculations of those who are considering ways and means of meeting the naval situation that may be expected to develop. Possibly the omission is due to the fact that the few reported instances of naval work on the part of aircraft in the European war, striking though they were, have been overshadowed by the enormous preponderance of reports concerning overland operations. The fact is, however, that if any single instrument can be called the "best" anti-submarine weapon, it is the airplane; for it can detect the presence of a U-boat when nothing else can, and it can attack with little or no danger of reprisal.

A striking instance of the value of the airplane, or seaplane, as the naval plane is called, was presented when the steamer "Eastgate," carrying supplies to France, was held up in the English channel by a U-boat. The crew had taken to the boats, according to the story that the men told on their return to New York later, and the submarine was about to launch a torpedo at the ship, when two seaplanes suddenly appeared over the horizon. Before the U-boat could get into position to fire the torpedo, the seaplanes, with their al

most incredible speed, came within range and opened fire. The submarine might not have minded the machine-gun bullets, but it knew the seaplanes carried bombs, too; and it promptly submerged. Thereupon the crew of the "Eastgate" put back to their ship and sailed away.

A signal tribute to the airplane, and one indicating that the naval experts may have been thinking more on the subject than they have been saying, was paid by Admiral Fiske at the Navy League's Luncheon in New York on March 28, when he said that, while aeronautics is the "weakest place in our defense," it is nevertheless "the one bright spot in the whole situation." His words are well worth quoting:

"If we will take up the aeronautical matter with energy and promptness and on a sufficiently large scale, we can get ready by the middle of summer to prevent invasion absolutely, and we can get ready to prevent blockade by the early fall.

"The battle plane is the most modern instrument of war, more modern than the submarine. It combines the prime military elements of power and mobility in a higher degree than does any other weapon used on land, and, if used in sufficent numbers, it can direct an attack on a fleet, especially on the light vessels of a fleet, which they have not yet learned to answer. There would be no trouble

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in this country of a hundred million people in getting the aviators to handle them, and I am informed on excellent authority that there would be no real difficulty in getting the necessary machines and training the personnel to handle them skilfully in six months."

The main factor in solving the submar