supposed there would be little left either of the notion or proof of spirits." Recapitulating the contents of the chapter devoted to the refutation of innate ideas, he says, "I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration, and probably it will hardly down with anybody at first hearing." And elsewhere: "What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer." How well he anticipated his critics!

Locke's Method was purely psychological; although he had been a student of medicine, he never indulges in any physiological speculations, such as his disciples Hartley and Darwin delighted in. Ideas, and ideas only, occupied his analysis. Dugald Stewart has remarked that in the Essay there is not a single passage savouring of the anatomical theatre or of the chemical laboratory.

6

We have already spoken of the positivism of Bacon; that of Locke shall now speak for itself in his own words :

"If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with the things exceeding its comprehension, to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach

of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God has thought fit for them, since he has given them, as St. Peter says, πάντα πρός ζωην καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatsover is necessary for the convenience of life and the information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may be of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitutions, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything.

"We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us, for of that they are very capable; and it will be an unpardonable as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things set out of reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and

untoward servant who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up within us shines bright enough for all our purposes.

"When we know our own strength we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; * and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, despairing of knowing any thing; or, on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon any shoals that they may ruin him.

This

was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding; for I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, and to see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being; as if that boundless extent were the

*The real cause and root of almost all the evils in science is this: that falsely magnifying and extolling the powers of the mind, we seek not its true helps."-Bacon.

natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there is nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism."

No apology is necessary for the length of these extracts; their calm wisdom will be appreciated by all; and the decisive manner in which Locke separates himself from the ontologists is not only historically noteworthy, but is also noticeable as giving the tone to his subsequent speculations. We have admired the Portico; let us enter the Temple.

CHAPTER V.

THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.

HOBBES had said, with Gassendi, that all our ideas are derived from sensations; nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.

Locke, who is called a mere popularizer of Hobbes, said that there were two sources, not one source, and these two were SENSATION and RE

FLECTION.

Separating himself decisively from the upholders of the doctrine of innate ideas-of truths independent of experience, he declared that all our knowledge is founded on experience, and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Separating himself no less decisively from the Gassendists, who saw no source of ideas but Sensation, he declared that although SENSATION was the great source of most of our ideas, yet there was "another fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas; and this source, "though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense:" this he calls REFLECTION.}

After Dugald Stewart's ample exposure of the wide-spread error that Locke was the chief of the so-called sensational school, we need spend no time in inquiring whether Locke did or did not teach