CHAPTER I.

HOBBES.

WE had at one time determined to omit Hobbes from our History. His contributions to Philosophy, though not insignificant, had scarcely any influence, except through his illustrious successor, Locke. His real eminence lies in Politics; there also lies his influence.

But on further consideration, finding that the much vilified, little read, Hobbes had not only been contemptuously treated by antagonists, but had also been neglected by historians, we thought that it would be unjust to pass over so great a name. Dugald Stewart, in his Historical Dissertation,' bestows only three pages upon Hobbes; and those are pages of depreciation rather than of exposition. Mackintosh, whose admiration was greater, is more copious, and more instructive; his temper was calmer than Stewart's, and he was better able to tolerate differences of opinion; but in the account he has given of Hobbes there is little exposition, and of that little no portion is devoted to the psychological doctrines.

Perhaps no writer except Spinoza has ever been so uniformly depreciated as Hobbes. From his first appearance until the present day he has been a by-word of contempt with the majority of writers; and even with those who have been liberal

enough to acknowledge merit in an adversary, he has been treated as a dangerous and shallow thinker. The first person who saw his prodigious importance as a political thinker, and had the courage to proclaim it, was, we believe, James Mill. But as long as political and social theories continue to be judged of by their supposed consequences, so long will Hobbes be denied a fair hearing. He has roused the odium theologicum. It will be long ere that will be appeased.

At the risk of incurring some of the odium cast upon his name, we cannot help standing up in his defence. Faults he had, unquestionably; shortcomings, incomplete views; and—as all error is dangerous in proportion to its plausibility-we will say that he was guilty of dangerous errors. But what then? Let the faults be noted, but not overstrained; the short-comings and incomplete views enlarged and corrected; the errors calmly examined and refuted. We shall all be gainers by it; but by inconsiderate contempt, by screaming and vilifying, no result can be obtained. Impartial minds will always rank Hobbes amongst the greatest writers England has produced; and by writers we do not simply mean masters of language, but also masters of thought. He is profound and he is clear; weighty and sparkling. His style, as mere style, is in its way as fine as anything in English: it has the clearness of crystal, and it has also the solidity and brilliancy. Nor is the matter unworthy of this form. It is original; in the sense of having been passed through the alembic of his brain, even when perhaps the property of others. Although little of it could now appear novel, it was novel when he produced it. Haughty, dog

matic, overbearing in manner, he loved Truth, and never hesitated to proclaim her. "Harm I

can do none,' he says, in the opening of the "Leviathan,'" though I err no less than they (i.e. previous writers), for I shall leave men but as they are, in doubt and dispute; but intending not to take any principle upon trust, but only to put men in mind of what they know already, or may know by their experience, I hope to err less; and when I do, it must proceed from too hasty concluding, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.” *

In this passage we see Locke anticipated. It is also an evidence of the Baconian spirit. It proclaims that Psychology is a science of observation; that if we would understand the conditions and operations of our minds, we must patiently look inwards and see what passes there. All the reasoning and subtle disputation in the world will not advance us one step, unless we first get a firm basis on fact. "Man," he says elsewhere, with his usual causticity, "has the exclusive privilege of forming general theorems. But this privilege is alloyed by another, that is by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living creature is subject but man only. And of men those are of all most subject to it, that profess Philosophy." And the cause of this large endowment of the privilege to Philosophers we may read in another passage, where he attributes the difficulty men have in receiving Truth, to their minds being prepossessed by false opinionsthey having prejudged the question. The passage is as follows:-"When men have once acquiesced

* Works edited by Sir W. Molesworth, vol. iv. p. 1.

in untrue opinions, and registered them as authenticated records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men than to write legibly on a paper already scribbled over."

Hobbes's position in the History of Philosophy is easily assigned. On the question of the origin of our knowledge he takes a decided stand upon Experience: he is the precursor of modern Materialism :

"Concerning the thoughts of man I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in a train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearances.

"The original of them all is that which we call Sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first totally or by parts been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original."*

We have here stated in the broadest manner the principle of Materialism. It is a direct antagonism to the doctrine of Descartes that there are innate ideas; a direct antagonism to the old doctrine of the spirituality of Mind. Theoretically this principle is trivial; historically it is important, and we call attention to it.

*Leviathan,' chap. i.

In the following exposition we shall sometimes cite from the Leviathan' and sometimes from the Human Nature.' This general reference will enable us to dispense with iterated foot-notes.