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man our ardent sympathy. Spinoza stands out from the dim past like a tall beacon, whose shadow is thrown athwart the sea, and whose light will serve to warn the wanderers from the shoals and rocks on which hundreds of their brethren have perished.*

* Spinoza's works have been very ably edited by Prof. Paulus. The edition we use is the quarto which appeared shortly after his death: B. D. S. Opera Posthuma. 1677. An excellent German translation in five small volumes, by Berthold Auerbach, was published in 1841. M. Emile Saisset has also recently published one in French, with an introduction, which, from the character of the translator, is, doubtless, to be relied on. We are aware of scarcely anything in English, critical or explanatory, except the account given in Mr. Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe,' and the articles Spinoza' and 'Spinozism' in the 'Penny Cyclopædia' (by the present writer): the latter contains a few passages not incorporated in this history, because lying beyond its province.

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CHAPTER VII.

FIRST CRISIS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE doctrine of Spinoza was of great importance, if for nothing more than having brought about the first crisis in modern Philosophy. His doctrine was so clearly stated, and so rigorously deduced from admitted premises, that he brought Philosophy into this dilemma

Either my premises are correct; and we must admit that every clear and distinct idea is absolutely true; true, not only subjectively, but objectively; If so, my system is true;

Or my premises are false; the voice of Consciousness is not the voice of truth;

And if so, then is my system false, but all Philosophy is impossible: since the only ground of Certitude-our Consciousness-is pronounced unstable, our only means of knowing the truth is pronounced fallacious.

for

Spinozism or Scepticism, choose between them, you have no other choice.

Mankind refused, however, to make a choice. If the principles which Descartes had established could have no other result than Spinozism, it was worth while inquiring, whether those principles themselves might not be modified.

The ground of discussion was shifted: psychology took the place of ontology. It was Des

cartes' theory of knowledge which led to Spinozism; that theory therefore must be examined: that theory becomes the great subject of discussion. Before deciding upon the merits of any system which embraced the great questions of Creation, the Deity, Immortality, &c., men saw that it was necessary to decide upon the competence of the human mind to solve such problems.

All knowledge must be obtained either through experience, or independent of experience.

Knowledge dependent on experience must necessarily be merely knowledge of phenomena. All are agreed that experience can only be experience of ourselves as modified by objects. All are agreed that to know things per se-noumena—we must know them through some other channel than experience.

Have we, or have we not, that other channel? This is the problem.

Thus before we can dogmatise upon ontological subjects we must settle this question :

Can we transcend the sphere of our Consciousness and know things per se?

And this question further resolves itself intoHave we ideas independent of experience?

To answer this question was the great object of succeeding philosophers. The fact that modern philosophy until Fichte was almost exclusively occupied with psychology has been constantly noticed; but the reason why psychology assumed this importance, the reason why it took the place of all the higher subjects of speculation, has not we believe been distinctly stated. Men have contented themselves with the fact that psychology occupied little of the attention of antiquity, still less

of the attention of the middle ages; and only in modern times has it been the real ground on which the contests of the schools have been carried on. Unless we are strangely mistaken, psychology was the result of a tendency similar to that which in science produced the Inductive Method. In both cases a necessity had arisen for a new course of investigation; it had become evident that men had begun at the wrong end, and that before a proper answer could be given to any of the questions agitated, it was necessary first to settle the limits and conditions of inquiry, the limits and conditions of the inquiring faculties. Thus Consciousness became the basis of Philosophy; to make that basis broad and firm, to ascertain its nature and capacity, became the first object of speculation.

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