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CHAPTER VI.

SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE.

THE system of Spinoza, which has excited so much odium, is but the logical development of the system of Descartes which has excited so much admiration. Curious! The demonstration of the existence of God was one of Descartes' proudest laurels; the demonstration of the existence of God-and of no other existence but that of God, being possible -was Spinoza's title to almost universal execration.

Dugald Stewart, generally one of the most candid of men, evidently shared the common prejudice with respect to Spinoza. He refuses, therefore, to admit that Spinoza, whom he dislikes, held opinions at all similar to those of Descartes, whom he admires. "It was in little else," says he, “than his physical principles that he agreed with Descartes; for no two philosophers ever differed more widely in their metaphysical and theological tenets. Fontenelle characterizes his system as Cartesianism pushed to extravagance." This is far from correct. Spinoza differed with Descartes on a few points, and agreed with him on most; the differences were only those of a more rigorous logical development of the principles both maintained.

It was at an important era in Spinoza's life that the writings of Descartes fell in his way. He was

then striving to solve for himself the inexplicable riddle of the universe. He had penetrated deep into the science of the Cabbala; he had studied with the learned Morteira; but though wise in all the wisdom of the Jews, he was still at an immeasurable distance from the desired solution. Descartes captivated him by the boldness of his logic, by the independent nature of his Method, whereby truth was sought in the inner world of man, and not in the outward world, nor in the records of authority. He studied Descartes with avidity; but he soon found that there also the riddle remained unsolved. He found the fact of his own existence somewhat superfluously established; but the far greater existence in which his own was included -of which the great All was but a varied manifestation of this he found no demonstration. Cogito, ergo sum, is irresistible. Cogito, ergo Deus est, is no syllogism.

Spinoza, therefore, leaving Descartes, asked himself What is the noumenon which lies beneath all phenomena? We see everywhere transformations perishable and perishing; yet there must be something beneath which is imperishable, immutable; what is it? We see a wondrous universe peopled with wondrous beings, yet none of these beings exist per se, but per aliud: they are not the authors of their own existence; they do not rest upon their own reality, but on a greater reality-on that of the τὸ ἕν και τὸ πᾶν. What is this reality?

This question, Spinoza thought, could not be answered by the idea of Perfection. No: the great reality of all existence is Substance. Not substance in the gross and popular sense of " body'

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"matter," but that which is substans-which

is standing under all phenomena, supporting and giving them reality. What is a phenomenon?an appearance, a thing perceived: a state of the perceiving mind. But what originates this perception-what changes the mind from its prior to its present state? Something, external and extrinsic, changes it. What is this something? What it is, in itself, we can never know: because to know it would bring it under the forms and conditions of the mind, i. e. would constitute it a phenomenonunknown, therefore, but not denied this ens-this something, is; and this Kant calls noumenon. This Spinoza calls Substance.

All science, as all existence, must start from one principle, which must be the ground of all. What is this commencement-this apx? Perfection, replies Descartes. No, says Spinoza, Perfection is an attribute of something prior to it. Substance is the apx. Descartes, in common with most philosophers, had assumed a duality: he had assumed a God and a real world created by God. Substance, to him, was by no means the primal fact of all existence; on the contrary, he maintained that both Extension and Thought were Substances; in other words, that mind and matter were distinct independent Substances, different in essence, and united only by God. Spinoza affirmed that both Extension and Thought were no more than Attributes; and by a subtle synthesis he reduced the duality of Descartes to his own allembracing unity, and thus arrived at a conception of the One.

The absolute Existence-the Substance-(call it what you will) is God. From Him all individual concrete existences arise. All that exists, exists

in and by God; and can only thus be conceived. Here, then, thought he, the mystery of the world begins to unfold itself to the patient thinker; he recognises God as the fountain of life; he sees in the universe nothing but the manifestation of God; the finite rests upon the bosom of the infinite; the inconceivable variety resolves itself into unity. There is but one reality, and that is God.

Such was Spinoza's solution of the problem: upon this he felt he could repose in peace, and upon this only. To live with God-to know God with perfect knowledge, was the highest point of human development and happiness; and to this he consecrated his life. Taking the words of St. Paul, "In Him we live, move, and have our being," as his motto, he undertook to trace the relations of the world to God and to man, and those of man to society. His Tractatus' and Ethica,' were the great results of that endea

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vour.

Spinoza agreed with Descartes in these three vital positions. I. The basis of all certitude is Consciousness. II. Whatever is clearly perceived in Consciousness must therefore be necessarily true; and distinct ideas are true ideas, true expressions of objective existences. III. Consequently metaphysical problems are susceptible of mathematical demonstration. The only novelty in Spinoza's Method is, that it is the Method of Descartes carried out. Descartes thought that the mathematical method was capable of being applied to metaphysics, but he did not apply it; Spinoza did.

This may seem a trifling addition; in reality it was the source of all the differences between Spi

Descartes' principles in

noza and his teacher. evitably lead to Spinoza's system, if those principles are rigorously carried out. But Descartes never attempted the rigorous deduction of consequences, which Spinoza, using the mathematical method, calmly and inflexibly deduces. Those who rebel at the conclusions drawn must impugn the premisses from which they are drawn; for the system of Spinoza is nothing more nor less than a demonstration.

To this demonstration we are about to lead our readers, and only beg of them a little steady attention and a little patient thought, convinced that they will then have little difficulty in finding their way in this abstrusest of all subjects. We shall translate some portion of the Ethica' with the utmost care, because we think it every way advisable that the reader should have Spinoza's own mode of statement, and thereby be enabled to watch his manner of deducing his conclusions from his premisses. The work opens with eight

DEFINITIONS.

I. By Cause of itself I understand that, the essence of which involves existence; or that, the

nature of which can only be considered as existent.*

II. A thing finite is that which can be limited (terminari potest) by another thing of the same nature, e. g., body is said to be finite because it can always be conceived as larger.

So

*This is an important definition, as it gets rid of the verbal perplexity hitherto felt relative to an "endless chain of causes." The doubter might always ask the cause of the first cause in the series; but here, by identifying cause and existence, Spinoza very properly annihilates the sophism.

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