of faith, and under the surveillance of religious authority."*

Scholasticism derives its name from the Schola (schools) which Charlemagne opened for the prosecution of philosophical studies. The clergy were almost the only persons who, in those days, had leisure or inclination for such studies. Thus, as M. Cousin remarks, the convents formed the cradle of modern philosophy, as the Mysteries formed that of Greek philosophy.

Scholasticism extended from the 8th to the 15th century, but its fortunes during that period were various. M. Cousin divides it into three epochs. The first was the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology. The second was the alliance of philosophy and theology. The third was the beginning of a separation, which, though feeble at first, gradually increased, until it ended in Modern Philosophy.

There are many illustrious names in each of these epochs. In the first we shall only mention Scotus Erigena, and we mention him only to quote his clear enunciation of the nature of scholasticism. "There are not two studies," says he, "one of philosophy and the other of religion; true philosophy is true religion, and true religion is true philosophy." In this spirit they all wrote.

The second epoch was formed by the introduction, through the Arabians, of the works of Aristotle. "It has long been a commonplace," says M. Cousin,

* Victor Cousin, Hist. de la Philos., ii. 9ième leçon. Perhaps the most intelligible and satisfactory idea of Scholasticism, in its method, object, and results, is to be gained from the analysis of Abélard's works, which fills a volume and a quarter of M. de Rémusat's Abélard, Paris, 1845.

"to deplore that philosophy should have been under the yoke of Aristotle for so many years, and that commonplace is not yet extinct. This only proves how little we know of the real science of history. In the first place, inasmuch as men were then only in possession of Aristotle, and Plato was to them almost unknown, no choice was left them between Aristotle and Plato. In the second place, if they had known Plato, they would inevitably have rejected him; for only imagine what would have become of the authority of the church, face to face with the dialectics and induction of Plato and Socrates! The Platonic induction would infallibly have decomposed the dogmas. The philosophy of Plato was doubtless more accordant, at bottom, with the doctrines of the church; but the form was so original, so independent, and so provocative of liberty of thought, that it would have then been inadmissible if it had been known. The philosophy of Aristotle had the immense advantage of being admissible. In a word, it perfected the only thing about which men dared then to occupy themselves the only thing about which it was then necessary to occupy themselves, viz. the form. Strictly speaking, there was no philosophy in scholasticism; for it was condemned to be nothing more than a simple means-a form of theology. But in this state of things, that which ameliorated the form ameliorated philosophy."

Aristotle, ill understood as he was, became the great authority in all matters of reasoning, as the Bible was the great authority in all matters of faith. Aristotle and the Bible may be said to have ruled the whole of this epoch with almost equal sway. The reverence felt for the Grecian sage was such, that in many universities the teachers were re

quired to pledge an oath that they would follow no other guide. An attempt was made to canonize him as the Philosopher par excellence. And Melancthon bitterly complains of Aristotle's Ethics having been read aloud in the sacred assemblies.

The third epoch is opened by two extraordinary men, Raymond Lully and Roger Bacon. In the former we see the tendency to shake off the yoke of Aristotle by the substitution of a new method of Dialectics. Lully is the precursor of Ramus. In Roger Bacon's Exhortation to study Physics, and in his own attempts in that department, we see the growing tendency towards Positive Science. But it may be questioned whether either of these tendencies had so dissolving an effect as the mysticism of Tauler, Gerson, and the rest. In truth, this third epoch, on the whole, was characterized by its mysticism rather than by anything else.

Throughout these three epochs there was but one subject of philosophical dispute the rest were wholly theological. This one was the old dispute of Nominalism and Realism, which we have already characterised.* The doctrine of Realism, as we saw, lies at the root of Plato's philosophy. In the scholastic dispute, although the subject was philosophical, yet it was made to have a theological bearing of a very important kind. No less a dogma than that of the Trinity was understood to be based upon it. If, as Roscelinus and the Nominalists pretended, all general ideas are but the abstractions which the mind makes-if what are called abstract ideas are but the general names which we give to classes of individuals, then can generals, universals, abstract ideas (call them how

*See Vol. II. p. 61.

you will) have no external independent existencethey can be but words. If this be admitted, it follows that there is no reality except in individual things; and in that case many things we regard as. unities can only be simply abstractions; amongst others the unity which is the basis of the Holy Trinity.

Roscelinus was ordered to appear before the Council of Soissons. There, in peril of his life, he retracted his opinion. William de Champeaux wrote a treatise against him, in which he maintained Realism in its extreme form, declaring that universals were the only real existences, and that individuals had only an existence in as far as they participated in universals; men were but fragments of humanity.

This dispute has been very fruitful of dissensions in later times, and is the sole dispute of the Middle Ages which has any philosophical value.

The

With the 15th century another epoch commences, which may be regarded as one of transition from Scholasticism to modern philosophy. taking of Constantinople, and the revival of ancient letters, hastened materially the development of the human mind, by effectually enabling it to dethrone scholasticism. The works of Plato became known, and were enthusiastically studied. A school of Platonists, with Marsilio Ficino at their head, was quickly formed. A school of Aristotelians rose up against it: both counted remarkable men amongst their members; and the rest of the 15th century was occupied with their disputes.

The result of the introduction of ancient systems into Europe, was that of eager imitation of those systems. Some men became Platonists, others

Aristotelians, others Epicureans, others Sceptics, and others Mystics. However they might differ amongst themselves, they all united in their exaggerated admiration of antiquity; and whilst on the one hand the literary men were striving to catch the Ciceronian turn of phrase, or the Virgilian and Horatian curiosa felicitas, the speculative thinkers were as busily endeavouring to reproduce the errors of the ancient Greeks.

Philosophy had ceased allegiance to the Church, only to accept the authority of Antiquity!

But this was a highly important change. As M. Cousin remarks, it was impossible to pass at once from scholasticism to modern philosophy, and suddenly cast off all authority. It may therefore be regarded as fortunate that philosophy accepted a new species of authority; one altogether human, yet having no root in the thoughts and habits of the nation-having no external power, and divided in itself-consequently very flexible, and not at all durable; fortunate, because this was the very authority which served for the transition-which bridged over the chasm.

The 16th century brought Luther and the Reformation. The immediate result, as far as philosophy was concerned, may be at once divined: it placed the Bible in the hands of the people, as the revival of letters had placed Aristotle and Plato in the hands of students. Authority, already feeble, was quickly thrown to the ground.

While these various elements of discord were working the gradual dissolution of the old philosophy, Positive Science was also making considerable advances. Galileo had popularised Copernicus; and in 1609 had invented the telescope, which