lengthened connexion with the court of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and is quite competent to take care of himself.

If it be only to get rid of a government which is a scandal to Europe, we should be glad to see the conference assemble, although we hope little from it. We wisely held aloof during the war, and, had the Conservatives remained in power, matters would not have reached such a crisis; but with Lord John Russell at the helm, and his avowed sympathies for the Italian cause and similar Utopias, the republican party were enabled to carry on their intrigues in perfect safety. Lord John has reason, we think we have shown, to feel proud of his interesting protégés: they do him and his principles of government all honour, and if a few thousand persons are imprisoned, that must not be taken into consideration when a great experiment is being tried. After all, revolutions are not made with rose-water. No doubt Lord John will make a resolute struggle to keep his friends in power, but we fancy that Lord Normanby's most inopportune revelations will do them serious injury in public opinion. We could quite forgive Louis Napoleon were he to interfere and restore the Grand-Duke of Tuscany by the operation. Nothing could be easier : the Italians are tremendously brave when they have no enemy before them, but were the French to march on Florence, a military parade would be amply sufficient. Something of the sort will have to be done sooner or later: the sooner, then, the better.

In fact, there seems no choice but the return to the old situation; Italy will not endure for any length of time the odious domination of Piedmont, while it is equally unnatural to have foreign troops constantly stationed in Italy to maintain the peace. Prior to the campaign matters went on comfortably, but since the expulsion of the Austrians from Lombardy, Europe has not known a moment's peace. Sardinia should be amply rewarded with such a magnificent province as Lombardy-such a present ought to satisfy her utmost ambition-and we feel convinced Victor Emmanuel will have quite sufficient difficulty in keeping it, without being desirous to cumber himself with an unwieldy territory, which it would be physically impossible for Sardinia to keep in subjection if it attempted any revolt from excessive taxation. Above all, let him be cautious ere he parts with Savoy, for from the day he consummates that sacrifice, France becomes his suzerain. His strongest bulwark will be torn down. On the east he has the formidable quadrilateral, and the fate of the new kingdom can be easily predicted: it will become a second cockpit on which great nations will fight out their battles, and will not come off scathless itself. In clutching at the shadow, Victor Emmanuel may suddenly find himself deprived of the substance. The situation is far from pleasant for any of the powers concerned; but somebody will have to be victimised, and we have a shrewd suspicion that it will fall to Victor Emmanuel yet to pay the reckoning.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE FRENCH ARMY.

AMONG the many surprising things connected with that mystery, the Italian war of 1859, not the least curious was the certainty the French entertained that they would thrash the Austrians wherever they met them; and the result justified their confidence. We had been told that the reforms introduced into the Austrian army since 1852 had rendered it the finest in the world, and we knew, too, that the material was excellent. How, then, to account for Magenta and Solferino ? We will do our best to solve the problem.

It is a favourite theory, now-a-days, that numbers decide, and in war, where so much depends on the physical resources of the combatants, such a statement would appear conclusive. We, however, taught by recent experience, prefer to say that numbers deceive. Take the Crimean war, for instance we were told by Haxthausen and other competent authorities, that the Russian army amounted to 1,250,000 men. Yet there were never more than 200,000 concentrated in the Crimea, and within twelve months of the commencement of hostilities the recruiting had risen to thirteen per thousand. And even assuming that the Russians had a million of fighting men at one time, we must remember that they lost during the war one-fourth of that number, in fighting, by disease, and on the march, or more than the four allies did. What use, then, are a million of warriors if they are thrice decimated during two years?

Or, take another example. From a recently published official statement we learn that Austria has 743,783 men, and 139,538 horses; France 595,785 soldiers, and 144,726 horses and mules. Hence, France has nearly 150,000 less soldiers than Austria, and probably her cavalry is weaker. But where was the numerical difference between the two armies that lately fought on the plains of Lombardy? Austria has more men at her disposal than France, who, however, was aided by the Piedmontese and the free corps. The latter, possibly, saved a third action between the Po and Mincio, but who can doubt that the French could have fought another Magenta or Solferino on their own account? Figures, then, are of no use in military statistics.

Or, take a more striking example still. England, in an offensive war, has at the most 110,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry, 300 guns, and about 2000 engineers. Even then every available man would have to be drawn home from the colonies. But England never had 120,000 disposable troops in the Peninsula to contend against the 300,000 laurel-crowned French: not even at Waterloo had we such a number. Sir John Burgoyne has lately told us that we could not concentrate more than 60,000 April-VOL. CXVIII. NO. CCCCLXXII. 2 B

men on the south coast, and that our fleet, owing to its dispersion, could not prevent a French invasion, for the Channel would be in the possession of the French for a month or six weeks. What, then, can prevent the conquest of England? 60,000 men could not withstand 150,000, and the obstacles on the road from the coast to London would be scattered like chaff before the wind. And yet who of us fears a permanent occupation of England by the French? We possess resources not taken into calculation by military statisticians, but which enable us to sleep comfortably in our beds even when the wind blows direct from Cherbourg.

But let us dive a little deeper into these statistics, and consider the proportional strength of the various arms in the continental armies. Perhaps the key for these difficulties may be found here. France and Prussia have a Guard, Austria none, but there is a vast difference in their constitution in the two first-named countries. In Prussia the Guard, consisting of 14,000 men, is no better than the line, but the case is different in France. Here the Guard is composed of the élite of all the regiments, and is formed of tried troops, and is a political rather than a military corps, intended from the outset for the personal protection of the emperor. Through the favour he shows them, Napoleon III. has attached to himself a pretorian guard amounting to 64,000 men!

Examining the infantry of the French army, we find it comprises no less than 53,445 light infantry (Chasseurs, Zouaves, light African infantry, or Turcos), the whole infantry amounting to 359,352 men. Austria has 519,576 infantry, of whom the light infantry (Borderers, Tyrolese, and other rifles) amount to 89,800, and the special corps of rifles to34,340.

In cavalry Austria is superior to France both in numbers and the value of the troops. While the light cavalry of France amount to 34,725, Austria possesses 53,162, although the disproportion is nearly balanced in the heavy cavalry. The French are notoriously poor horsemen ; their horses are nearly all small, with the exception of the Norman, while grooming horses is by no means a favourite performance with your thorough Frenchman. The men, however, are most carefully taught their exercise. Under the present government of France, great efforts have been made to improve this arm, although the cavalry did not do anything in the Crimean war, and were slightly available in Italy. Probably Napoleon III. only thinks of maintaining the equilibrium of all arms in the organisation of his army; perhaps, too, he has an eye to improving the breed of horses in France. The Austrian cavalry has hitherto been regarded as the finest in the world, and the horseman's song from Wallenstein's Camp is in reality the Austrian Marseillaise. The nobility of Europe, who are so proud of wearing the Austrian tunic, must be well mounted, and ride to death with all possible advantages. It is not by accident that the Emperor Francis Joseph is considered one of the best riders in Europe. The heavy Cuirassier horses are bred in Bohemia and Moravia, and also a few in Styria and Carinthia, and the horseman who mounts them comes from the same provinces. The light cavalry of the Austrians is quite unsurpassable; it possesses two specialities which cannot be found elsewhere-namely, Gallician riders on Polish horses for the Lancer regiments, and Hungarian Hussars on Transylvanian, Magyar,

and Moldavian horses. What Austria is without her Hungarian cavalry was seen in 1848 and 1849, and it is a public secret that the many Austrian prisoners in 1859 were not all the honest product of fighting.

Austria performed none of her old cavalry marvels in the last war, and this circumstance, apart from all desertion, gives occasion for serious thought. If the Eastern war had not been broken off, but honestly employed for the liberation of nationalities-in other words, had Austria attacked Russia, her cavalry would have found itself on the right terrain, and the German heavy cavalry would have ridden down the Russian Guards, and the Hussars scattered the Cossacks. Cavalry actions require the enormous plains of Hungary, Wallachia, and Poland; in Western Europe, even on level ground, the cultivation, hedges, and ditches, prevent the employment of heavy masses of cavalry.

The Prussian cavalry is the worst on the Continent: owing to the saving system, in case of a war breaking out, it is calculated that Prussia would have to procure 84,000 horses, which would be an enormous expense. Under existing circumstances we presume that Prussia will employ her utmost energies to make up the deficiency.

Turning to the artillery, we find that France has 56,662 men, with 37,761 horses, and 197 batteries of 1182 guns can be taken into the field. Austria has 55,297 men, with 29,944 horses, and, in a war, 168 batteries, of 1344 guns, with 20 rocket batteries, can be sent into the field. But the French artillery has been reformed, and the "rifled cannon," on every occasion, proved the ruin of the Austrians. A 4-pounder gun has now a very different signification from what it had formerly: at Solferino the balls tore through the first and second lines, and produced greater destruction among the reserves than in the front! That the Austrians held their ground through a long summer day, speaks highly in their favour; and, as in any future war every army will have rifled guns, an entire change in the tactics and formation of line must be introduced. Finally, comparing the engineer corps of the two armies, we find that, while France has 22,272 men, with 12,485 horses, Austria has 41,260 men, and 28,490 horses.

We have learned from the above details that France not merely maintains her army at the correct strength and efficiency, but that the various arms stand in a proper proportion to each other. The defects entailed by Guards or privileged troops are removed by the selection of the men and their employment: the light infantry form one-seventh of the infantry the cavalry has been strengthened, in readiness for any enemy: the artillery is above all praise, and for the moment has been rendered invincible by the new inventions: the engineers, the soul of an army in the field, are excellent; while the transport is ample and always mobile.

If, then, we compare the achievements of the Austrian army with those of the French in the Italian war, we find, after allowing for the relative want of value of cavalry in more recent times, no other visible advantage in favour of France than the new artillery. Taking this, however, at its utmost value, as Solferino taught us, we have riddles enough still left to solve. Such are the direction of the campaign on both sides, the rapidity of the French blows, the timid retreat of the Austrians, and the consequences of all French victories, which went far beyond the military

result. What is it, in a word, that ensures the French army in the first campaign?

the victory

We Te can pass over the nourishment of the troops in the field and the ambulances, for in both respects the advantage was on the side of the Austrians. They were at home: Piedmont had enough to do to support her own army, and a large portion of the country on the right bank of the Ticino was ravaged by Gyulai. The French army made up for this by its excellent administration, and the army bakery was the object of general admiration, for it kept up life and strength in the French army, for on bread and coffee it will fight half a campaign.

Since Austria commenced her system of centralisation in 1850, most important reforms have certainly been introduced into the army; scarce a month passed without something being done to improve one or the other arm; but, for all that, the Austrian army suffers radically from the vices of tradition. We are only alluding here to the material arrangements, which, however, soon exercise a reaction on the moral. Thus the Austrian system of carrying the baggage is marvellously clumsy, and impedes the free movement of the men. Each battalion has thirty-eight baggage-waggons, and soldiers are told off as escort in enormous numbers. In France the transport system is independent, and not one-fourth so many men are taken away from the line for escort duty.

No less injurious is the size of the sub-divisions and the paucity of officers. In Austria, the company is composed of 220 men with 4 officers; in France and England, the companies are reduced to 120 and 110 men, after the model of the old Roman century, which was the result of true military instinct. The same force which in Austria is commanded by 4 field-officers and 32 subalterns, has in France 1 general officer, 8 fieldofficers, and 44 subalterns. In an army, however, officers represent the nervous system; the more widely they spread the more active the organism will become. Now, too, when they are ordered to march at the head of the column, and form a target for the enemy, their value and the importance of their numbers have greatly increased. While during the wars of the first Napoleon the cry was to spare the officers, as they thought and cared for the rank and file, the democratic spirit, which has cautiously retreated from political life, is so developed among the "saviours of order," that in an attack or in storming a fortress the officers must be to the front. As they receive higher pay and better food, they are expected to expose themselves before the rank and file. Every one will remember how the English officers fell in the Crimea, even more than the French, because they were more numerous in proportion to the privates, while the French tirailleurs in every engagement picked off the Russian officers, and rejoiced to see the men standing like a flock of sheep that had lost their shepherd. The French officers, too, fell in large numbers in every affair, but the men did not feel their loss. In spite of the severe discipline maintained in Africa, every soldier is taught from the beginning to become independent. He not only knows how to use his weapon, but can command, if the occasion arise. The sergeant will take the captain's place, the corporal or the private can lead the company in case of need, and, though it may not be exactly according to regulations, he gets on somehow. Even when drilling, the recruit is entrusted with the command, and the peasant lad, who sees a hundred of