it is not surprising that he reached the seaport in safety. There is also another surprising interlude of a discharged servant, who was bribed by the Mollahs of Mecca to poison him, and continually turned up in the most improbable places. Even the ship that bore him to Mascat underwent adventures sufficient for a three-volume novel; but it bore Cæsar and his fortunes, and of course made the port at last.

Once arrived at Mascat, the hadji goes out of his way to make a furious attack on the perfidy of the English Leopard, who has been intriguing against French interests in those parts for many years. Of course he

calls the affair at Jeddah a horrible massacre, and longs for the time when the innocent Arabs shall be avenged. "How long, how long, oh, Allah?" he piously asks. We should not have paid much attention to this point, were not his work dedicated to Prince Napoleon, as a recognition of "the grandeur and nobility of his character and actions."

Worthy hadji! we forgive you all, in consideration of the amusement your work has afforded ourselves, and, we trust, our readers. We will not even stop to inquire whether the prince, to whom you dedicate your book, endorses the views you put forward, for we know that Frenchmen cannot refrain from abusing the English policy in the East. But we assure you that politics are not your forte; go on describing or inventing marvellous adventures occurring in unknown regions, and we promise to accept them all on your ipse dixit.

The hadji, indeed, promises a succession of works; the next will be his adventures in Persia, and his expulsion from that country-of course at the instigation of the English. We shall anxiously await its appearance, and at once bring it to our readers' notice. Our treatment of the present volumes will sufficiently prove our belief that Major Longbows and colonels of French origin in the Egyptian service may greet each other with fraternal affection.

THE CHANNEL FLEET: ITS PRESENT STATE.

DURING the fearful storm which visited our coasts on the 25th and 26th of October, a squadron of the Channel fleet, commanded by RearAdmiral George Eliot, was shaping its course up the English Channel, and about noon on the 25th, when the storm first reached it, was near the Eddystone Lighthouse.

A few days after the gale had ceased (and while the papers were teeming with accounts of disastrous wrecks and the accompanying loss of life) there appeared in the Times a letter from an "eye-witness," describing the proceedings of this squadron on that occasion. The letter was well written, and doubtless was a faithful and unembellished account. But stating, as it did, that the squadron had arrived in safety at Portland, having weathered the gale and returned to port at its conclusion without loss of spar, sail, or rope, and appearing as it did beside tales of the fearful losses sustained by the mercantile marine, it gave to the public an

undue impression of the amount of peril to which the royal squadron was exposed, and thereby, also, of the skill and courage displayed in overcoming this danger; and the public, most anxious to believe all they heard which tended to enhance the fleet, drank in with amusing eagerness the idea that they had really got a fleet manned by English sailors in the Channel.

Before offering any further remarks, we will state for the benefit of the unprofessional public:

1st. That though a squadron or ship, "well found," and in the open sea, may pass through a gale without loss, it by no means follows that the said squadron or ship is manned by good sailors.

2ndly. That, under any circumstances, the simple fact of weathering out a gale does not (provided there is no loss of spar, no accidents to sails or rigging) reflect any particular credit on the seamen who man the ships, whatever it may sometimes do to the officers.

3rdly. That the most unskilful of officers (at all deserving the name) and the most ignorant of "ships' companies" would find it a difficult operation to mismanage a ship so much as thereby to lose her when there is previous warning of the approach of the storm, when there is no occasion for carrying a heavy press of canvas, when there is plenty of "searoom," and the ship good and sound.

Now, the Channel squadron had ample warning of the coming gale, and was in no hurry whatever to reach its destination (and hence did not carry a heavy press of canvas); they also had plenty of sea-room, no accident occurred from the "ill-finding" of the ships, and the vessels themselves were the finest in the world.

We have, then, no proof (in the incident of the late storm and the Channel squadron) that the said squadron is manned by good sailors, or is at all in that state which the public seem so anxious and ready to be persuaded it is in.

Had they been in chase of, or been chased by, an enemy's squadron, when it would have been necessary to carry sail to the utmost; had spars and sails been carried away and split, and been promptly and effectually replaced; and had the squadron executed intricate and difficult manoeuvres with success, or had they been caught on a lee shore in ground requiring skilful navigation, then we should have said that both officers and men had a fair trial, and came out of it with good characters as seamen.

We now most distinctly state that the Channel fleet is not manned by good sailors, nor is it in an efficient state.

How is this? and, In what state is it? are questions which must necessarily rise in the mind of every one.

How it is so is pretty generally known.

For well-nigh fifty years the navy has been suffered to be a "political toy," and a thing to be reduced or increased at the will of time-serving ministers, without the slightest regard to the harm done to a noble profession, or fearful and lasting injury inflicted on the nation.

Whole navies have, from time to time, been created on sudden emergencies (the energies of the officers and men taxed to the utmost to get the ships into fighting order), and then, just as the work was done, and officers and crews taking pride in their ships, and beginning to love the royal service again, whole fleets have been paid off, the men been turned

adrift to seek their daily bread, and the officers left on shore without employment for years. So matters have gone on since the peace of 1815, from bad to worse, till the evil has worked its own dire and dreadful cure, in the total absence of men to man ships, and the inability of England to raise a fleet (in her hour of need) which is manned by sailors.

The seafaring population of Great Britain has received such an impression of the instability of the royal navy, and the little certainty of their obtaining constant employment therein, as well as of the hard work necessitated by the sudden and urgent calls for efficient ships, that they will not enter into the royal navy at all.

Thus, when the nation, which a few years ago became suddenly aroused from its extraordinary lethargy, demanded of the government a Channel fleet, the government had no fleet to give, or any means of manning one.

The necessity was considered great, and no expense was spared in the endeavour to get a fleet to sea. Vast sums were expended, the skill and industry of workmen tasked to the utmost, and the result is a navy which boasts a larger proportion of magnificent war-ships than that of any other nation. But money, which could build ships, could not create seamen, or recal to their own country the men-of-war's men now scattered among the navies of the world. The ships remained unmanned, and at last the government had recourse to the bounty system-i. e. they offered a reward in a certain sum of money to be given to any man who entered her Majesty's service in certain capacities. The result was, that the fleet was manned-manned, indeed, but not by sailors. All the riff-raff population of Great Britain who were unable to obtain occupation elsewhere, accepted the "bounty;" cast-off merchant seamen of bad character, deserters from regiments, discharged convicts, men incapacitated by bodily infirmities from otherwise earning their living,-all these flocked to the rendezvous, and were entered as sailors into the royal navy. And we believe, that were the present blue-jacket crews of the ships in the Channel fleet divided into tenths, six-tenths would be found to be men who were never afloat before this summer; two-tenths would be seafaring men of various descriptions from seaports and merchant ships, who are of indifferent character, or physically incapable of ever performing their duty with credit to themselves or the country; onetenth would be men who, though tolerably good seamen, and ultimately capable of being converted into good men-of-war's men, are at present totally ignorant of the use of fire, or other arms; and the remaining tenth would be men who have served in the royal navy before, a lamentably small proportion of whom are good sailors or skilful warriors.

When such are the ingredients of which the navy is formed, how is it possible that a fleet, which practically only sprang into existence a few months ago, can be in an efficient state, or be able to keep the sea when opposed to an equal number of skilled, well-trained war-sailors-the result of standing navies? and how ridiculous to suppose that they would be able to protect the commerce of England in a maritime war! Add to the above the painful truth that the number of officers is so small that they are inadequate to perform the every-day duties in peace times, and who are greatly discontented at the men placed under them, and the

enormous amount of hard work thus added to the always onerous duties, and it will be seen how little cause there was, or is, for the laudatory, congratulatory article in the Times, which followed the letter to which we have before alluded, and on what a frail protection the people of England are resting when they depend on the Channel fleet.

Many persons, on reading the foregoing remarks, will most likely say, Why publish these facts? What is to be gained by exposing our weakness? And shall we be any stronger from the fact that we know our weakness?

And to these questions we answer, That we consider it a matter of the highest importance that the British public should not only be reminded that they have no longer the navy of the last war, composed of splendid seamen and trained warriors (that, indeed, passed away long ago, sacrificed to the demon of false economy and misrule), but that they should also be aware of the exact state the navy is in.

Firstly, Because they will then know, in case of a sudden war, that they can neither depend on the navy for production of commerce nor defence of their shores, and will be able (should God spare us from the horrors of war long enough) to take measures which may partly counteract the evils.

Secondly, That should the present crisis be passed without disaster, the country may not be persuaded into suffering the navy to be destroyed again.

Thirdly, That when the present war panic shall be passed, it may not be in the power of any man who wishes to raise the old cry of "Down with the navy !" "What do we want of all these expensive fleets?" to say, "We can have a fleet whenever we want it; look how quickly we formed an efficient Channel fleet; sailors can always be had for money; look what a royal squadron did in the Channel before they had been six months in commission!"

We have now stated facts which, we believe, will somewhat enlighten the people of England; and we appeal to the officers of the British navy as to whether we have exaggerated the evil. And we have also stated our reasons for making these facts public, and to that public we appeal as to whether they be just reasons or not.

In conclusion (rather than we may be thought in any way to cast reflections on the officers of the Channel fleet), we may state that we have the highest opinion of their zeal and ability, and we have good reason for believing that they have done their utmost to avert the impending danger by doing all that the most assiduous zeal could do in training the men placed under their command; and we would say to them, Persevere in your necessary though disheartening and onerous duties. To you alone can the country look to remedy the present incompetency of the navy. Time, if we are spared it, may do wonders in restoring confidence in the government and administration of the admiralty; and, once assured that they may have a certain means of support in the royal navy, seamen will flock to it gladly, and will gradually replace the unhealthy and useless, so that at last (should war come) they may lead forth those men, conquering and triumphant, as of old, and our island home may rest in peace, well satisfied with, and confiding in, its old protectors, the WOODEN Walls.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE FRENCH IN ABYSSINIA.

THE following paragraph appeared a short time back in the French paper the Journal des Débats-a name preserved long after the constitutional debates to which it owed its origin have ceased to be:

"Zoulla, on the coast of Habesch, at the bottom of a fine bay near the spot once occupied by Adulis, was the most frequented port of the Red Sea in ancient times. The coast of Habesch is that part of the Abyssinian seaboard which extends from Cape Nose to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, Cape Nose itself being situated at the boundary of Upper Egypt, opposite the Isle of Emeralds, of which the Viceroy of Egypt has recently taken possession. The town of Zoulla contains an industrious maritime population, said to be superior to any other on the coast. The port possesses excellent anchorage-ground, well sheltered from the north-west winds, which alone enter in the bay. Zoulla is also the most favourable port for communicating with the interior of the states of the Emperor Theodore, who reigns over the greater part of Abyssinia; moreover, it commands the Aden route. The cession of this port to France is said to have been made in strict conformity with established usages."

There is much that is curious and suggestive, and not a little that is erroneous, in this paragraph. It was not Zula, or Zoulla, as the French have it, that was the most frequented port of the Red Sea in ancient times, but Adule. Habesh is the Arabian name of Abyssinia, which is corrupted from it. The name is by no means confined to the seaboard. Zula is a mere village of boatmen and camel-drivers; and, as to its industrious maritime population, it exists only in the fancy of the writer. Adule, and not Zula, is not only the most favourable port for communicating with the interior of the states of the Emperor Theodore, but, moreover, it is the starting-point of the great ancient route from the coast to Axume. The gulf of Annesly, or ancient Sinus Adulicus, commands the Aden route rather than Zula, which is at a short distance from the sea. What a courteous expression, too, is this from one nation in diplomatic alliance and friendship with another! France has little or no commerce in the Red Sea; she has no regular packet service, no colonial interests, except what are very far removed, to protect, yet she assumes upon herself to "command" the route to Aden-that is to say, the route followed by the packets of the Peninsular and Oriental Company! Such an assumption is not merely discourteous, it is inconsistent with the dignity of a great nation. It is possible that the writer had in view the necessity that might arise for France having a station in the Red Sea, to seek shelter, or to refit or otherwise, when the navigation of that Feb.-VOL. CXVIII. NO. CCCCLXX.

K