LESSON XI.

WHAT ARE WE CONSCIOUS OF?

THE object of the last lesson was to make clear the distinction between necessary truths and necessary beliefs. I tried to show that there are truths that the mind must see when it clearly grasps the subject and predicate of the proposition that expresses them. But the mind by no means inevitably sees all the necessary truths it is capable of seeing, because there are subjects and predicates that are beyond its grasp at certain stages of its development, and others that it might grasp, but which, as a matter of fact, it has not grasped. "Seven plus five makes twelve" is a necessary truth. But the child does not see it, because he can not grasp seven and five. A necessary truth, then, is not a truth that the mind must see, but one which, when seen, is seen to be necessary.

Necessary beliefs resemble necessary truths in that we are not only willing, but, in a measure, forced to believe them, in the absence of reason and evidence. Indeed, we are certain both of necessary truths and necessary beliefs; but our certainty differs widely in the two cases. In the one, it is a certainty of knowledge; in the other, of belief. Moreover, the necessity of necessary beliefs, unlike that of necessary truths, is not in all cases absolutely unyielding in its nature. When we look through an opera-glass

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we can not help seeming to see the object much nearer than it really is. Such irresistible "seemings" we call beliefs until we learn that they are false, but no longer. This is one of a multitude of instances in which what seems to be true is directly opposed to what we know to be true. It would appear, therefore, only a matter of common prudence to accept as true only those necessary beliefs which we can not get along without.

Reasons for Studying the Nature of Necessary Truths. Necessary truths, necessary beliefs, and what we are conscious of, then, constitute the foundation of everything we know and believe, not only about mind, but about the world in general. Now that we know what necessary truths and necessary beliefs are, it will be comparatively easy for us to determine the kind of knowledge that consciousness is, and the kinds of facts of which we are conscious. If we had attempted to learn what consciousness is before making a study of necessary truths, there would have been great danger of our confusing the knowledge of the facts that we are conscious of, with the knowledge of necessary truths.

Nature of Conscious Knowledge. Let us first try to ascertain what that kind of knowledge is that we call conscious knowledge. For to ask what kind of facts we are conscious of is to ask what we know in precisely the same way, with the same kind and degree of certainty, that we do the facts which every one admits we are conscious of. Every one admits that we are conscious of the mental facts we know by introspection. Evidently, in order to learn whether we are conscious of anything else, we need

to learn whether we know anything else in the same way, and with the same kind and degree of certainty; we need to learn whether our knowledge of any other facts has the same characteristics as our knowledge of mental facts. When Columbus first came to this country, if he had been told that certain animals that he saw were buffaloes, he would have had to learn their characteristics in order to be able to recognize buffaloes when he saw them again. Knowing their characteristics, he would have been able to recognize a buffalo as easily as a horse or dog. In like manner, since we are conscious of those facts which we have agreed to call mental facts, we have to learn the characteristics of our knowledge of mental facts, in order to learn whether we are conscious of anything else. For if our knowledge of anything else has the same characteristics as our conscious knowledge, it also must be conscious knowledge. What, then, are the characteristics of the kind of knowledge that every one admits to be conscious knowledge?

Have you ever been in pain? Suppose that, while you were writhing in agony, some one had asked you if you were sure you had any pain. How do you think you would have answered the question — if, indeed, you had possessed the patience to answer it at all? You would have said, I think, that your certainty was so great that it could be no greater. Put so much water into a glass, and not another drop, not an atom more can you make it hold. So, you would have said, certainty beyond or greater than yours it was impossible for any conscious being to have. "But may you not be deceived may not your pain be a mere illusion, like the experiences of your dreams?" your questioner might have asked. "Deceived as to being in

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pain, when I am literally writhing in agony? No! I know it so absolutely that I know that I can not be mistaken. There is much that I believe that I realize I may be mistaken in. But this is certainty-certainty that admits of no doubt certainty that makes doubt an absurdity and an impossibility." Conscious knowledge, then, is abso lutely certain knowledge — knowledge so certain as to make doubt an absurdity and an impossibility.

Difference between Knowledge of Necessary Truths and Conscious Knowledge. But this, we have seen, is exactly what the knowledge of necessary truths is. We know that two straight lines can not inclose a space so certainly as to make doubt an absurdity and an impossibility. Is there no difference between the knowledge of necessary truths and conscious knowledge?

If we compare the attitude of our minds towards a necessary truth with its attitude towards a mental fact, I think we shall see a difference. Two straight lines can not inclose a space. Where? In England, on the sun, wherever straight lines are, we know that they can not inclose a space. Our knowledge is not of an individual. fact, with which the mind seems face to face, but of an entire class of facts, wherever they may exist. But our knowledge of a pain, for example, although it is like our knowledge of a necessary truth in the kind and degree of certainty that it gives us, differs from it in being knowledge of an individual fact with which the mind seems face to face — of which the mind seems directly aware.

Conscious knowledge, then, is absolutely certain knowledge of individual facts of which the mind seems directly aware. Instead, then, of asking whether there are any

facts except mental facts that we are conscious of, we can put the question in this form: Are there any facts except mental facts with which the mind seems face to face, and which we know with such absolute certainty as to make doubt an absurdity and an impossibility ?

Perhaps, some

Are you Conscious of the Stars? evening shortly after reading this lesson, you will take a walk. As you glance at the stars shining so brightly above you, you think of the subject of the lesson, and ask yourself if you really are conscious of them. Do you, as you see those little twinkling points of light in the heavens above you, know that they exist, so certainly, so absolutely, as to make doubt an impossibility?

The fixed stars, as we know, are almost inconceivably far away. They are so far away that astronomers never think of stating their distance in miles. Instead of telling us their distance in miles, they tell us how long it takes light to travel from them to us. Now, light travels about 180,000 miles in a second, and the nearest of the fixed stars is so far away that it takes light three years to come from it to us. Suppose, then, that the nearest fixed star had been destroyed two years and a half ago. Would you see it to-night? Certainly, just as you see any other star; for the light that strikes your eyes as you look at it left it two years and a half ago six months before it was destroyed. And for the same reason you would see it to-morrow night, and the next, and so on for six months. Night after night for six months you would see the star shining above you, although it did not exist at all. When, then, I ask if you know that the stars exist as you look at them, evidently the most you can say is that they do,