DIFFERENT KINDS OF REALITY.

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orange- we shall see that they consist in the fusion or coalescence of two states of consciousness

a percept and an image in the first, a percept and a concept in the second and third. We need to note (1) that this fusion or coalescence is the way our thoughts sometimes behave when we pass from a state of doubt to a state of belief; (2) that although it is thoughts or states of consciousness that coalesce, the belief does not relate to states of consciousness, but to some kind of reality. We do not say, 'My percept of that object fuses with my idea of John Smith"; nor, "My percept of that object fuses with my concept of cow"; nor, "My percept of that object fuses with my concept of orange." Though beliefs or judgments are rendered possible by states of consciousness, and though we may describe the states of consciousness in which judgments or beliefs consist, judgments do not, as a rule, relate to states of consciousness, but always to some kind of reality.

Different Kinds of Reality Asserted. -The reality may be the reality of external nature, as when I say, That is an orange. Or the reality of literature. Thousands of books have been written upon the question of Hamlet's insanity. If I say he was insane, my proposition expresses a belief about a reality in literature. Or the reality of mythology. A student of the classics, on the way to recitation, is running over his lesson in his mind. He asks himself, How did Minerva originate? He is in doubt. Suddenly something brings the forgotten fact to his mind. He remembers that she sprang from the head of Jupiter. His memory is an assertion of a reality in mythology. Or

1 See Baldwin's Psychology, p. 286.

it may be a reality of mental facts. I say, The concept man and the concept rational animal are one and the same. Here the reality asserted is a certain relation between mental facts.

Nature of Act of Judgment. If we examine what takes place in our minds when we perform the judgment expressed by the proposition, Minerva sprang from the head of Jove, we shall see that there is no such fusion or coalescence between the thoughts that stand for the subject and predicate as takes place when we judge That is John Smith. The reason plainly is because of the dif ference in the things asserted. In the last case we assert identity. I see that the individual before me has all the characteristics of John Smith, because he is John Smith. In the first, we make an assertion about the origin of Minerva; we say not that she is, but that she sprang from, the head of Jove. So when I say, I dreamed last night, I make a still different assertion I assert a different kind of fact. But no matter what we assert, we shall find, in the period of doubt that preceded the assertion, no fixed relations between the thoughts or concepts or states of mind that represent the various parts of the proposition that we finally assert. "I don't know whether that is John Smith or his brother." As long as I am in uncertainty, my percept tends now towards the image of John Smith, now towards that of his brother, according to my estimate of probabilities. When I pass from a state of doubt to a state of certainty, my percept assumes a definite and fixed relation towards the image of John Smith. "I don't remember whether Minerva sprang from the head of Jupiter or the head of Apollo." Here again there is

the same lack of definiteness and fixedness in the relations between the thoughts expressed by Minerva, sprang from, head of Jupiter, head of Apollo. But when I say: "I remember now - she sprang from the head of Jupiter," this lack of definiteness disappears; they are transformed into a new whole, or rather the first three are, each of them sustaining a definite and fixed relation towards the rest a relation which they resume whenever I think of them, unless my belief changes.

Judgment Defined. We see, then, not only that a judgment is that act of the mind which is expressed in a proposition, but we see what the act is. It is the mental assertion of some kind of reality - the transformation or relating of separate units or elements of thought into one whole, in which each sustains definite and fixed relations to the rest.

QUESTIONS ON THE TEXT.

1. State and illustrate what judgment is.

2. When do we make unconscious assertions, and why?

3. Under what circumstances do these unconscious assertions become conscious?

4. State and illustrate the various kinds of reality to which our judgments refer.

5. State and illustrate the difference (1) between the mere association of ideas and judgment, (2) between doubt and belief.

SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS.

1. State the various causes to which, in your opinion, judgments are due.

2. Show that judgments could never have originated from the mere association of ideas.

LESSON XXXIV.

JUDGMENT.

(Continued.)

Difference between Association of Ideas and Judg. ment. I said in the last lesson that there is a wide difference between the mere association of ideas and judg

ment.

There is hardly an assertion in this book which it is of greater importance for you to verify at great length by a study of your own experience than this. Take proposition after proposition and make clear to yourself the difference between merely associating the subject and predicate in your mind, and thinking them in the relation of a judgment.

Suppose, for example, you should have a conversation with a man from the moon, and should explain to him the meaning of water, quench, and thirst, without showing him the relations which these facts actually bear to each other. When he thinks of the three at the same time, they have only a mechanical connection in his mind — the same kind of connection that exists in the mind of a child between the thought of a Chinaman and the thought of a steam-engine when the child thinks of the two at the same time because he first saw them together. But when you think of them together, you assert a real relation between the facts water and thirst— they are no longer mechani

ESSENCE OF AN ACT OF JUDGMENT.

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cally juxtaposed, but parts of one logical whole, you think them in the relation of a judgment.

Take also the proposition, "Napoleon conquered Europe.” Do you not see the difference between merely thinking about "Napoleon," "conquered," and "Europe" at the same time, and thinking the judgment, "Napoleon conquered Europe"? The first might be possible through the association of ideas alone.

You say,

mental assertion only when this act of logical relating for some reason becomes a matter of attention. That is a cow, only after you have been in doubt as to what animal you are looking at, or when you see it in some unexpected place, as in a public park. Some psychologists confine the term judgment to these conscious assertions of the mind. Assertions made unconsciously they refuse to call judgments, simply because they are made unconsciously. But assuredly those psychologists take the sounder position who hold that whenever thoughts assume that fixed and definite relation we have seen they have in a judgment, whenever they become parts of a logical whole, there is an act of judgment, whether the act is conscious or not. The essence of an act of judgment consists in this logical relating of thoughts. To refuse to call it a judgment because it takes place so rapidly and unobtrusively as to escape the eye of consciousness is to use language in a way that does not conduce to clearness of thinking.

We may, indeed,

Implicit and Explicit Judgments. properly enough mark the distinction between them by