observes them more and more carefully he notices more

and more differences the word "dog" means a smaller and smaller number of attributes. And when he hears the name applied to other animals he naturally puts them in the same class, and the meaning of "dog" is correspondingly reduced, although each separate act of abstraction is followed by an act of generalization — the extending of the name so reduced in meaning to all objects having the common characteristics he has observed.

But while a more careful and a wider observation of dogs in this way reduces the concept, it may enlarge it in another way. The child may notice points of resemblance before unobserved. In this way his concept is made to include more attributes the class-name comes to have a richer meaning.

Definition of Concept. From the point of view we have now reached we can see with some definiteness what a concept is. It was said above that a concept is the product of conception, and that conception is that act of the mind which enables us to use general names intelligently. This amounts to saying that we have a concept of a class when we can use the class-name intelligently, but as to what a concept is we are left entirely in the dark.

If we carefully look into our minds when we hear or use a general term which we understand, I think we shall find either no mental picture whatever corresponding to it, or else a mental picture with the feeling that a great many other mental pictures would serve the purpose just as well. When any one speaks of "dogs," for example, in my hearing, I shall probably not form a mental picture of any dog

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY CONCEPTS. 285

whatever. As I hear the word, a feeling of familiarity arises in my mind, a feeling that I know what is meant, and this feeling, attaching itself to the word, constitutes my entire conceptual consciousness, so far as that case is concerned. But if I do form a picture of some particular dog, I do it with the feeling that the picture of any other dog would do as well. In that event, this picture with the accompanying feeling constitutes my entire conceptual consciousness.

The attention

Voluntary and Involuntary Concepts. that results in comparison and abstraction may be either voluntary or involuntary, and therefore concepts may be formed voluntarily or involuntarily. We know from our study of attention that the concepts that a child forms in the first years of his life will, for the most part, be formed involuntarily because he is not able to give much voluntary attention.

How to Make Inaccurate Concepts Accurate. - Of course, concepts formed in this by-rule-of-thumb manner are indistinct and inaccurate. They are sure to contain attributes that careful observation would exclude, and not to include others that such observation would bring to light. But we must remember that it is exactly this kind of concepts that constitutes the furniture of a child's mind when he first starts to school. To transform these indistinct and inaccurate concepts into those that are distinct and accurate to enlarge the number of concepts - is evidently an important part of education.

We shall be able to do this more intelligently if we remember not only the manner in which they are formed,

but the condition upon which their formation depends. That condition is the perception of resemblances between different individuals. Until resemblances are perceived, no concept of the resembling objects can be formed. That is why a child finds it so hard to understand the meaning of numbers. Four horses, four cats, four toys, etc., resemble each other in being four, but they seem to the young child to have nothing in common and therefore he does not know what you mean when you call them all fours. Not till his mind is able to detach the fact common to them all will he be able to understand you.

One of my students recently told me of a pupil to whom he could not teach numbers. The child was eight years old, and after persistent efforts to learn the significance of numbers would say, when asked how many cows there were in the field, seven or nine, for example, when she should have said three.

The difficulty in such cases is that the child has not formed the concept of numbers, the child has not seen that three dogs resemble three blackboards in one particular in the particular of being three.

Until this resemblance is clearly seen, the attempt to teach the names of numbers must be utterly unavailing.

QUESTIONS ON THE TEXT.

1. Make a careful summary of the last lesson.

2. Define class-image. What is meant by "externalized as things "?

3. What is the first thing to be done in explaining conception, and why?

4. How does a child come to know individual persons and things? 5. State and explain the two directions in which the class-image is modified.

6. State and explain the three processes involved in conception. 7. What is the difference between percept, image, and concept? 8. In what two ways are concepts formed?

9. What kind of concepts has a child when he first starts to school?

10. Upon what condition does the formation of concepts depend?

SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS.

1. At what age do children generally begin to understand the meaning of numbers?

2. Why is it desirable to use a variety of objects — sticks, straws, grains of corn, etc. — in teaching children to count?

3. Does this lesson throw any light on the question as to the proper age for taking up the study of grammar?

LESSON XXXI.

CONCEPTION.

(Continued.)

WE saw in the last lesson that involuntary concepts are almost certain to be indistinct and inaccurate, and that when children first start to school, unless they have been carefully instructed at home, nearly all their concepts are of this kind. They have observed the objects they see about them closely enough to learn their names, and talk about them with a certain degree of intelligence. Because they can apply their names correctly, teachers are in great danger of thinking that the corresponding concepts are all that they need to be. But that is a mistake.

Words do not Convey Thoughts."While an external object may be viewed by thousands in common," said Professor S. S. Green, "the idea or image of it addresses itself only to the individual consciousness. My idea or image of it is mine alone - the reward of careless observation, if imperfect; of attentive, careful, and varied observation, if correct. Between mine and yours a great gulf is fixed. No man can pass from mine to yours, or from yours to mine. Neither in any proper sense of the term can mine be conveyed to you. Words do not convey thoughts; they are not the vehicles of thoughts in any