children is neither of individuals nor of classes. Not of individuals, because the child has only noted resemblances between things, or between the same thing seen at different times. But the perception of individuals is impossible without the perception of differences. Two men with exactly similar beard, same complexion, of the same size

exactly similar in every respect, and occupying the same position — would not be two men, but one. Two men also who seemed to be exactly alike in every respect would be regarded as the same person, however unlike they might be. Also, the first knowledge of children is not of classes, because, until they know individuals, they can not know classes, since a class means and is nothing but a collection of individuals resembling each other in certain particulars. But their first ideas of things are vague, confused ideas of resemblances between things not known to be different. To avoid circumlocution, we will

call this idea a class-image.

QUESTIONS ON THE TEXT.

1. Trace the progress of the mind from indefinite sensations to the knowledge of external objects.

2. What kind of knowledge do children first gain of external objects?

3. Justify your answer.

4. State the case reported by Perez. What does it prove?

SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS.

1. Report any cases similar to the one reported by Perez, that have come under your observation.

2. Have you noticed children calling other men "papa,” and if so, did you notice whether they seemed to look upon them as strangers, or

whether their manner towards them was the same as towards their

own papa ?

3. Can you prove by your observation of children that they perceive resemblances more easily than differences?

4. Can you prove by your own experience that you do the same thing?

St

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LESSON XXX.

CONCEPTION.

(Continued.)

Steps towards the Knowledge of Concepts.

Since a knowledge of class-images antecedes a knowledge of individuals, to explain conception we have first to explain how the knowledge of class-images externalized as things becomes a knowledge of definite individuals. Evidently the various steps or stages that mark the progress of the mind from those undifferentiated, indefinite sensations with which our mental life began to the formation of concepts are (1) the knowledge of class-images externalized as things; (2) the knowledge of individuals; and (3) the formation of concepts.

How a Knowledge of Class-Images Becomes a Knowledge of Individuals. To see how the knowledge of class-images externalized as things becomes the knowledge of individuals, we must study our own experiences. Why did I confuse the two brothers mentioned in the last lesson ? Because I saw no differences between them. It seems hard to realize that a child can see no difference between a large man with a full beard and a small one with But our powers of perceiving both resemblances and differences are much greater than a child's; and if I

none.

could confuse two people whom I now see to be very unlike, we shall be able to realize that a child may see two very different things without being able to observe any difference between them. How did I finally gain the power to tell them apart? By withdrawing my attention from them as wholes and fixing it upon individual features — size, color of eyes, and the like. In precisely similar ways the child gains the power to distinguish individuals. And here we can see why it is so hard for him to acquire it. It is easy for you to withdraw your attention from objects as wholes and fix it upon parts or qualities, but it is very hard for a child. The individual features are there, but he does not see them because he does not attend to them. But little by little he gains the power to fix his attention upon individual features, and as he acquires it he gains a knowledge of individuals.

What Differences are First Noted? When a child distinguishes individuals because he notes some of the differences between them, it is easy to see that he will first note only the most striking differences. The first difference that he notes between a big black dog and a small white one is probably a difference in color. The class-image of dog has become, on the one hand, the perception of individual dogs. Seeing no difference between them except in color, and noticing that they are both called dogs, he drops out of his class-image of dog the element of color, and associates what is left with the name dog" whenever he hears it. What is left of the classimage when the element of color is dropped out of it is a rudimentary concept, and the act of mind by which it is reached is conception.

STEPS IN FORMING A CONCEPT.

283

Let us observe closely

Steps in Forming a Concept. the steps that led from the percept of the individual to the concept of the class. The first step taken by the child towards the formation of the concept consisted in fixing his attention upon both dogs, or upon one dog and an image of the other at the same time. Let us call this first step comparison. The second consisted in withdrawing his attention from the point of unlikeness—color — and fixing it upon their points of likeness. Precisely as an essential step towards a knowledge of individuals consists in withdrawing the attention from the objects as wholes and fixing it upon individual parts or features, so an essential step towards a formation of concepts consists in withdrawing the attention from the points in which the objects compared are seen to be unlike, and fixing it upon those in which they are seen to be like. Let us call this step abstraction. The third step consisted in applying the name "dog" to all other objects having the same characteristics-in making the name general by making it the name of a class. Let us call this generalization. These three acts of the mind, then comparison, or the fixing of the attention upon two or more objects at the same time; abstraction, or withdrawing it from some of their unlike nesses and putting it upon some of their likenesses; generalization, or the making of a name general by making it the name of all the individuals possessing similar qualities -are the three acts that constitute conception.

Concepts Liable to Change. We see at once that the concept the product of conception is liable to constant

change. The only difference that the child first observes between the two dogs is a difference in color. As he