Counsel for Appellants. zens' Bank, recognizing and enforcing its non-liability - MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, MR. JUSTICE BROWN and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented on the ground that the judgments relied on by the appellee are not res judicata, although in all other respects they concurred. LOUISIANA v. NEW ORLEANS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. No. 483. Argued January 15, 18, 1897. - Decided May 24, 1897. New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, affirmed and followed. THE case is stated in the opinion. The case was argued with New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, ante, 371, as one case. Mr. M. J. Cunningham, Attorney General of the State of Opinion of the Court. Louisiana for appellants. Mr. F. C. Zacharie and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse were on his brief. Mr. William A. Maury for appellee. Mr. Henry Denis and Mr. Branch K. Miller were on his brief. Mr. Samuel L. Gilmore for appellant. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The reasons given for our decree in the case of New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, just decided, are decisive of this cause, which comes on error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. The controversy presented to that court was whether property bought in by the Citizens' Bank under foreclosure of its stock and stock loan mortgages became a part of its capital, and as such was not liable to taxation. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held, conceding, arguendo, the nontaxability of the capital that the real estate so purchased was taxable. State ex rel. Citizens' Bank v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. Ann. 35. The theory on which the writ of error was prosecuted is that this decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana constitutes an impairment of the obligations of the contract arising from the charter of the bank. As, in the case just decided, we have held that the property bought in by the bank under foreclosure of its stock mortgages was not the capital of the bank, and therefore was not covered by the estoppel of the thing adjudged, the conclusions there expressed are in all respects applicable and decisive of the controversy here presented, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is, therefore, Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. HOVEY v. ELLIOTT. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 255. Argued March 30, 31, 1897.- Decided May 24, 1897. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to order the answer of the defendant in a chancery suit pending in that court to be stricken from the files, and a decree to be entered that the bill be taken pro confesso against him, simply because he was held to be guilty of contempt in neglecting to pay into court money held by him which was the subject of controversy in the suit, and declined to appear when summoned to do so. A court possessing plenary power to punish for contempt, unlimited by statute, has not the right to summon a defendant to answer, and then after obtaining jurisdiction by the summons, refuse to allow the party summoned to answer or strike his answer from the files, suppress the testimony in his favor, and condemn him without consideration thereof and without a hearing, on the theory that he has been guilty of a contempt of court. The judicial history of the law concerning contempt of court in England and in this country reviewed and considered. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Everett P. Wheeler and Mr. A. S. Worthington for plaintiff in error. Mr. John Selden for defendant in error. Mr. H. B. Titus filed a brief for same. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The facts out of which this controversy grows are fully stated in Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, but we briefly reiterate those which are material to an understanding of the issues now presented. A. R. McDonald, a British subject, obtained an award from the Mixed Commission appointed under the treaty of 1871 for the settlement of the "Alabama claims." 17 Stat. 863. Before the payment of the award, two suits in equity were commenced in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia Opinion of the Court. against McDonald and one William White, to whom it was asserted McDonald had made a fraudulent assignment of his claim. One of the suits was by Thomas R. Phelps, who alleged that he was the owner of the claim as the assignee in bankruptcy of McDonald; the other was brought by Hovey and Dole, who claimed to be entitled to a one-fourth interest in the award in consequence of an alleged contract which they asserted they had made with McDonald entitling them to an interest, to that extent, for professional services rendered or to be rendered in the prosecution of the claim. Injunctions were issued against the collection by McDonald and White of the fund. In the Phelps suit a consent decree was entered, which was also assented to by the parties in the Hovey and Dole case, releasing one-half of the award, and authorizing G. W. Riggs, who was appointed receiver, to collect the other half and retain it to abide the result of both suits. The receiver, moreover, was directed to invest the money by him collected either in registered bonds of the United States or of the District of Columbia guaranteed by the United States. The bills and amended bills were demurred to in each suit, and the demurrer in both cases being sustained the bills were dismissed. The decree of dismissal in the Hovey and Dole case, entered on the 24th of June, 1875, simply stated that the demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed with costs. On the same day an appeal, without supersedeas, to the general term was noted on the minutes of the court. This decree was a few days thereafter, on the 28th of June, amended by ordering the receiver to pay over the funds in his hands and providing for his discharge. This decree was presented to the receiver, and in accordance with personal and verbal instructions given him by a judge of the court by which the decree of dismissal was rendered, the receiver delivered the bonds in his custody to McDonald. On the same day the firm of Riggs & Company, supposing that they had a perfect right so to do, purchased the bonds from McDonald at their full market value, and caused them to be transferred into their The decree of dismissal in the Phelps case, which was also appealed from, was affirmed by the general term of the name. Opinion of the Court. Supreme Court of the District, but that in the case of Hovey and Dole was reversed. The latter case was put at issue by filing an answer, averring fraud and wrongdoing on the part of Hovey and Dole, the answer alleging facts which, if found to be true, would have defeated a recovery by the complainants. After replication, testimony was taken at various times during the years 1875 and 1876. In June, 1877, the complainants obtained an order from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia at general term, requiring the defendants McDonald and White to "pay over to the registry of the court" the sum of $49,297.50, which had been paid them by the receiver. This order was disobeyed, and thereupon the complainants, in September, 1877, moved the defendants McDonald and White to show cause "why they and each of them should not be punished for disobedience of the order as for a contempt." On December 8, 1877, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia made a decree at general term that "the rule upon the defendants to show cause why they should not be decreed to be in, and punished as for a contempt of court, etc., be made absolute, and that the said McDonald and White be taken and deemed to be in contempt of the aforesaid order," etc. Such decree further provided that "unless McDonald and White, within six days from the entry of this order, and the service of a copy thereof upon their solicitors, shall in all respects comply with the said order of June 19, 1877, and pay into the said registry of this court the sum of $49,297.50, the answer filed by them in the cause be stricken out, and that this cause proceed as if no answer therein had been interposed; and that, until the said defendants shall comply with the said order of June 19, 1877, all proceedings on the part of said defendants in this cause be and the same are hereby perpetually stayed." On December 29, 1877, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia at general term, on motion of the complainants, and proof of non-compliance on the part of the defendants McDonald and White with the requirements of the decree of December 8, 1877, "ordered, adjudged and decreed that the answer filed in this cause by the defendants McDonald and |