But it is not required of the economist, that his theories should quadrate with the peculiar bias of the mind of a particular person. His conclusions are drawn from observing the principles which are found to determine the condition of mankind, as presented on the large scale of nations and empires. He has to deal with man in the aggregate-with states, and not with families with the passions and propensities which actuate the great bulk of the human race, and not with those which are occasionally found to influence the conduct of a solitary individual.

It should always be kept in view, that it is never any part of the business of the economist to inquire into the means by which the fortunes of individuals may have been increased or diminished, except to ascertain their general operation and effect. The public interests ought always to form the exclusive objects of his attention. He is not to frame systems, and devise schemes, for increasing the wealth and enjoyments of particular classes; but to apply himself to discover the sources of national wealth, and universal prosperity, and the means by which they may be rendered most productive.

Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear it objected to some of the best established truths in political and economical science, that they are at variance with such and such facts, and that, therefore, they must be rejected. It is cerain, however, that these objections most frequently originate in an entire misapprehension of the nature of the science.

A

Itwould be easy to produce a thousand instances of individuals who have been enriched by monopolies, as they are sometimes by robbery and plunder; but it would be not a little rash to conclude from thence, without farther inquiry, that the community in general can be enriched by such means! This, however, is the single consideration to which the political economist has to attend. The question never is, whether a greater or smaller number of individuals can be enriched by the adoption of a particular measure, or by a particular institution, but whether its tendency is to enrich the public. Admitting that monopolies and restrictive regulations frequently enable individuals to accumulate ample fortunes, this is so far from being, as is often contended, any proof of their real advantageousness, that it is distinctly and completely the reverse. It is demonstrably certain, that if monopolies and exclusive privileges enrich the few, they must, to the same extent, impoverish the many; and are, therefore, as destructive of that NATIONAL WEALTH, to promote which ought to be the principal object of every institution, as they are of natural freedom of industry.

To arrive at a well-founded conclusion in economical science, it is not, therefore, enough to observe results in particular cases, or as they affect particular individuals; we must further inquire whether these results are constant and universally applicablewhether the same circumstances which have given rise to them in one instance, would in every instance, and in every state of society, be productive of the

B

same or similar results.-A theory which is inconsistent with an uniform and constant fact must be erroneous; but the observation of a particular result at variance with our customary experience, and when we may not have had the means of discriminating the circumstances attending it, ought not to induce us hastily to modify or reject a principle which accounts satisfactorily for the greater number of appearances. r

The example of the few arbitrary princes who have been equitable, humane, and generous, is not enough to overthrow the principle which teaches that it is the nature of irresponsible power to debauch and vitiate its possessors-to render them haughty, cruel, and suspicious: nor is the example of those who, attentive only to present enjoyment, and careless of the future, lavish their fortunes in boisterous dissipation or vain expence, sufficient to invalidate the general conclusion, that the passion for accumulation is infinitely stronger and more universal than the passion for expence. Had this not been the case, mankind could never have emerged from the condition of savages. The multiplied and stupendous improvements which have been made in different ages and nations -the forests that have been cut down-the marshes and lakes that have been drained and subjected to cultivation-the harbours, roads, and bridges that have been constructed-the cities and edifices that have been raised-are all the fruits of a saving of income, and establish, in despite of a thousand particular instances of prodigality, the vast ascendancy and superior force of the accumulating principle.

It is from the want of attention to these consi derations that much of the error and misapprehension with which the science of Political Economy has been, and still is infected, has arisen. Almost all the absurd theories and opinions that have successively appeared have been supported by an appeal to facts. But a knowledge of facts, without a knowledge of their mutual relation-without being able to show why the one is a cause and the other an effect -is, to use the illustration of M. Say, really no better than the indigested erudition of an almanack-maker, and can afford no means of judging of the truth or falsehood of a general principle.

Neither should it be forgotten, that the alleged facts so frequently brought forward to show the fallacy of general principles, are, in most cases, so carelessly observed, and the circumstances under which they have taken place so indistinctly defined, as to render them altogether unworthy of attention. To observe accurately, requires a degree of intelligence and acuteness, a freedom from prejudice, and a patience of investigation belonging to a few only. "There is," to use the words of the celebrated Dr Cullen," a variety of circumstances tending to vitiate the statements dignified with the name of experi ence. The simplest narrative of a case almost always involves some theories. It has been supposed that a statement is more likely to consist of unsophisticated facts, when reported by a person of no education; but it will be found an invariable rule, that the lower you descend in the medical profession, the more hy

pothetical are the prevailing notions. Again, how seldom is it possible for any case, however minutely related, to include all the circumstances with which the event was connected. Hence, in what is commonly called experience, we have only a rule transferred from a case imperfectly known, to one of which we are equally ignorant. Hence, that most fertile source of error, the applying deductions drawn from the result of one case to another case, the circumstances of which are not precisely similar. Without principles deduced from analytical reasoning, experience is an useless and a blind guide."*

Every one who has had occasion to compare the discordant statements of the mass of common observers, with respect to the practical bearing and real operation of any measure affecting the public interests, must be convinced that Dr Cullen's reasoning is still more applicable to political and economical science than to medicine. Circumstances which altogether escape the notice of ordinary observers, often exercise the most powerful influence over national prosperity; and those again which strike them as being most important, are often comparatively insignificant. The condition of nations, too, is affected by so many circumstances, that without the greatest skill and caution, joined to a searching and refined analysis, and a familiar command of scientific principles, it is in most cases quite impossible to discri

* Cullen's MS. Lectures.