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This is the first step of the Peace Conference towards a solution of the Lithuanian question. We rejoice in it, and thank the Conference. Nevertheless, we cannot conceal the apprehensions caused by the method used by the Peace Conference in studying the Lithuanian question. Our apprehensions are caused by the fact that the subcommission on Polish affairs is taking up the study of our question in its entirety. There is surely nothing surprising in the fact that this commission is interesting itself in the facts concerning the frontier to be traced between Lithuania and Poland. Nevertheless, in leaving the sub-commission the liberty of taking up the Lithuanian question in all its complexity, there is the risk that the impression will be created that this question is only a corollary of the Polish question; in other words, that the Peace Conference has already decided upon the future of Lithuania by attaching it to Poland. This impression will have still more foundation if it is borne in mind that the Poles have not ceased to claim the annexation of Lithuania to Poland under some form. In any case, it is certain that the Poles will give this interpretation to the examination of the Lithuanian question by the Conference and will use it for their propaganda. 'The result will be the increasing of the Lithuanian-Polish tension. Moreover, the Lithuanian question has an especial importance in the policy of Eastern Europe, for it directly concerns the interests of the three great neighbouring States, Poland, Germany and Russia; and when it is considered that Lithuania has for centuries been a great and powerful centre of culture, the inevitable conclusion is reached that only the creation of a Lithuanian Commission analogous to the Polish Commission, should be instituted for an equitable settlement of the Lithuanian question. The creation of a Commission of this kind would not risk engendering misunderstandings, for it would not have the slightest influence upon the future decisions of the Conference.

Finally, we must express the regret that liberty has not been accorded to the Lithuanian Delegation to appoint itself the members who are to give the information in question. The choice of the Secretariat General could easily have fallen upon Delegates who were less qualified than others to elucidate the desired question.

In spite of the inconveniences raised above, the Delegation has resolved to send the members called by the Secretariat of the Peace Conference instructing them to furnish to the sub-commission on Polish Affairs all information relative to the frontiers between Lithuania and Poland.

Accept [etc.]

P. KLIMAS

Secretary

A. VOLDEMAR President of the Delegation

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/10

FM-10

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation of the Foreign Ministers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 3 p. m.

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1. M. PICHON said that the first item on the Agenda had been brought forward at the request of the British Delegation.

Policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in

the Baltic States

MR. BALFOUR said he was surprised to hear this. The matter, no doubt, was one of great importance which should be discussed at an early date. The British Delegation felt that matters should not be left as they were and it appeared that the American Delegation shared the same feeling. All he had before him, however, was the report made by Messrs. Lord and Morison, American Members of the Russian Section of the Territorial Division. (For Report, see Appendix

"A".) All the recommendations in this report he was not quite prepared to accept. It would be necessary for the British Delegation to examine the proposals seriatim.

MR. LANSING Said that the report had been prepared for the use of the American Delegation alone. It was still under consideration. The questions involved had a large political bearing and he was not, himself, prepared to discuss the matter at the present meeting, until it had been thoroughly considered by the American Delegation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was quite ready to make certain observations on the proposals, if it was so desired.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer postponement.

(It was then agreed that the question be postponed to a later meeting and that the subject should be brought on the Agenda at the instance of the American Delegation. Mr. Balfour observed that, as the situation was critical, it would be desirable that a decision should be taken as early as possible.)

2. M. PICHON read the following memorandum, presented by the French Delegation:

"The French Delegation considers it advisable to draw the attention of the British Delegation to the fact that the articles of the Treaty of Peace concerning Slesvig contain provisions regarding decisions which the Allied and Associated Governments must take before the execution of this Treaty.

Organization of Temporary Regime in Slesvig After

the Conclusion of Peace

The question concerns the formation of an International Commission composed of five members, three to be appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments and the remaining two by the Norwegian and Swedish Governments respectively. This Commission would have general powers of administration and would, therefore, be responsible for the maintenance of order within the zone evacuated by the Germans.

The French Delegation considers that it would be advisable to come to an immediate agreement regarding the choice of the three Governments nominated by the Allied and Associated Governments to appoint delegates to the Commission-which, in the opinion of the French Delegation, should be the American, British and French Governments. A decision on the matter should be speedily reached.

The appointment of the Norwegian and Swedish members might be postponed until the signature of the Treaty of Peace. Opinions should, however, be taken at once to see whether the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments at Christiania and Stockholm should be asked to request the Norwegian and Swedish Governments, immediately after such signature, each to appoint a delegate to the International Commission.

A more urgent question is that of the composition of the Allied forces intended to maintain order in the part of Slesvig evacuated by the Germans, until the allotment of the territory in which the plebiscite will be taken.

The report of the Commission1 suggests (in accordance with the request of the Danish Government) that Allied naval forces, accompanied by landing parties, should be sent to the port of Flensborg. The troops required for maintaining order would be divided up according to the Commission's instructions.

The French Delegation considers that it would also be advisable to decide which Powers should send ships, the number thereof, and the strength of the landing parties.

The Danish Government considered that 1,000 men would suffice, but Germany has, during the last few weeks, brought about a state of affairs in Slesvig which might render a larger number necessary. This question should be urgently referred to the naval experts now in Paris, in order that they might come to an agreement regarding the steps to be taken.

They should be informed that the Allied ships should arrive at Flensborg immediately after signature of the Treaty of Peace, without waiting for the ratification thereof as evacuation must take place ten days after its signature, and the population must also be reassured and a régime instituted in Slesvig which will stop German machinations.

The French Delegation is of the opinion that these various questions could usefully form the subject of discussion at one of the earliest meetings of the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs."

He asked if any member had any objections to raise to these proposals.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that the sooner an invitation was sent to Sweden and Norway the better.

M. PICHON explained that it had been thought desirable not to make a formal invitation until the signature of the Treaty. An informal request, however, might be sent immediately.

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether it would not be advisable to consult the military as well as the naval experts. He thought that the question of policing the area was rather a military than a naval one.

M. PICHON said that, as the main item would be the occupation of the port of Flensborg, he thought that the naval forces would probably be adequate.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that in the policing of the coast the Navies could assist, but it was obvious that the Military would have to play the main part on shore.

MR. LANSING suggested that the naval experts be asked to decide among themselves whether they could undertake the whole operation. If not, the military authorities might be asked to supply any supplementary forces required.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that it would save time for the naval and military experts to meet at once.

MR. LANSING said that, if the proposal was that the operation should be primarily a naval one and that a naval officer should be in general

'Report of the Commission on Belgian and Danish Affairs, March 22, 1919.

charge, it was desirable that the military contribution should be clearly subordinate. A joint meeting of the military and naval experts at the start might produce a different impression. He suggested that the naval experts, without referring the matter again to the Council, should call in their military colleagues, should they find that they could not undertake the whole task themselves.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that he anticipated that a considerable force would be required and that the naval authority would inevitably be compelled to apply to the military authorities for assistance. It did not seem likely that the British Fleet would be able to spare a large detachment, and the American Navy and the French would only be able to send small ships. Hence, it appeared to him from the very outset clear that military aid would be required.

(It was then decided that the naval advisers of France, Great Britain and the United States of America should meet to devise means of carrying out the policy outlined in the memorandum. They should, if necessary, confer with the military advisers of the same Powers, with the object of supplementing naval by military effort on land. The memorandum quoted above was adopted.)

Draft Article for Treaty of Peace Relating to Treaty Concluded Between the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco on July 17th, 1918

3. M. PICHON said that a Treaty had been signed between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, copies of which had been circulated to the various Delegations. (See Appendix "B".) At the time when the Treaty had been signed, there was a fear that the German branch of the dukes of Urach might urge their claim to the succession. The Treaty had then been made by common accord between the Government of the French Republic and the Prince of Monaco, ensuring that his successor should be his grand-daughter. It would be necessary to guarantee this Treaty by an article recording the fact that the High Contracting Parties had cognisance of the agreement.

MR. LANSING enquired whether the High Contracting Parties were asked to recognise the validity of the Treaty.

M. PICHON replied that they were only asked to recognise that they had taken cognisance of the Treaty.

MR. LANSING said that he could see no reason why the Allies should not go further and recognise the Treaty.

(It was then decided unanimously that an article to the following effect should be included in the Supplementary Clauses of the Treaty of Peace:

"The High Contracting Parties recognise the Treaty signed by the Government of the French Republic on July 17th, 1918, with His Serene Highness, the Prince of Monaco, defining the relations between France and the Principality.")

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