gases or other destructive agencies could be produced. This definition was so wide that it was bound to cover the revelation of the secrets of

dye making.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he believed the framers of the proposal had not this object in view.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that an effective gas mask could not be made without knowledge of the gas which it was to contend with. PRESIDENT WILSON said that whatever weight might be given to the military opinion on this matter it was certain that many people other than military experts were interested in the revelation of these secrets. There was a further difficulty. However much the Allies might demand the revelation of secrets, they would never be certain that they possessed them all. Twenty-five years of University experience had made him well aware that the most difficult secrets to obtain were those of inventors. Many researchers were so suspicious of their fellow men that they contrived to keep their formulae in their own head for years. In no sphere of life was there so intense a competition as among inventors, each of whom wished to be the first in the field with his invention. This was certainly no less true of Germany than of other countries. He had made objections of a similar character to other proposals, as he thought it was a mistake to exact more than could with certainty be obtained. It could serve no useful purpose to expose oneself to be deceived. The Allies must trust their own inventors to cope with their German rivals. There was a whispering gallery connecting not only the Foreign Offices, but also the laboratories of the world.

BARON SONNINO agreed that the Germans might reveal their second best secrets, but would probably succeed in keeping their best ones. PRESIDENT WILSON said that they would certainly not reveal their

new ones.

MR. BALFOUR said that though President Wilson's remarks appealed to him, he felt that he was not in possession of military knowledge and did not feel disposed to take a decision before he had heard what the Military Authorities had to say. He understood that both the French and British military authorities were agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the Military experts were doubtless authorities as to what they wanted to obtain, but that he regarded himself as an authority as to what they would get.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would nevertheless like to know what their

case was.

M. CLEMENCEAU was also of the opinion that the experts should be consulted.

BARON SONNINO said that in any case the formula suggested was too wide.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was always prepared to hear military opinion, but that he wished to register his dissent from the proposal put forward.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the military experts were unable to answer the objections that had been raised, he would adopt President Wilson's view.

PRESIDENT WILSON then suggested that this question also should be sent to the Military Advisers at Versailles, in order that they should formulate a military opinion on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, but added that the two categories of objection raised should be communicated to them, namely:

8

That in all probability the secrets would not be obtained;

That if obtained they would confer an unfair advantage to competing industries in Allied countries.

(The following Resolution was then adopted :

"The Military Advisors of the Supreme War Council at Versailles are requested to state the military advantages of exacting from the Germans the revelation of their secret processes for the manufacture of lethal gases.

It is to be observed:

(a) That no means of supervision exist capable of guaranteeing the veracity of the statements the Germans might make on this subject.

(b) That such a demand for the revelation of German secrets of manufacture might give an unfair advantage to rival industries in Allied countries".)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to raise the question of the Kiel Canal. A document had been submitted to the Council of

Kiel
Canal

Four as being a unanimous report of a Commission on this subject. On examination, the report had proved to be an old report, previously dismissed. It had come up again unamended. He had telephoned to the Secretary of the Naval Committee, who had replied that he knew nothing of it.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that there had been unanimity on this subject in the Waterways Commission, which had referred the report back to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the question had a military side, on which naval authorities should be called upon to state their views. PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the naval authorities might sit in combined session with the Waterways Commission.

(It was then decided to refer the question of the Kiel Canal to a Joint Session of Naval Experts, and of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways & Railways.)

(5) BARON SONNINO said that two drafts had been proposed on the subject of the validity of Prize Court Decisions. The British draft

Prize Court
Decisions

proposed a clause to be inserted in the treaty stipulating that the validity of Allied Prize Court decisions should not be challenged by the enemy. The American draft proposed, in addition, that the Allies should have the power to invalidate similar decisions taken by German Prize Courts. Both these drafts had been remitted to the Drafting Committee to be fused into one clause. The American draft also contained an additional paragraph, on which he understood the American Delegates did not insist.

MR. LANSING remarked that the United States did not insist on the form, but wished the substance to be preserved. The reason for this was that Prize Courts in America had ceased to function at the armistice. Nevertheless, the United States wished to maintain certain seizures made subsequently, and therefore without Prize Court decisions.

Responsibility for Violation of Belgian Neutrality

(7) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had another point to submit to the meeting. A resolution had been adopted regarding responsibilities, and it had been considered right that Belgium should undertake the prosecution. This had been agreed, he thought, with the consent of M. Hymans. He had heard since that the President of the Belgian Council had come to Paris, and was prepared to refuse his consent to this proposal. As representative of a monarchical State, he held the view that Belgium could not take the lead in prosecuting a monarch.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he did not think this obstacle unsurmountable. The essential point was that the Kaiser was to be tried for a high misdemeanour, which might not legally amount to a crime, namely:-for violating the neutrality of Belgium. If Belgium refused to be prosecutrix she would not refuse to be witness. He further pointed out that in the draft adopted, Belgium had not been specifically set down as prosecutrix.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if that was so, he did not wish to press the point any further.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 16th April, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/66

BC-59

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 4 p. m.

M. CLEMENCEAU called on M. Pichon to explain how the suggestion of submarine cables now stood.

A Question of German Submarine Cables

M. PICHON said that on the 24th March, 1919, the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been

passed by the Council of Ten, namely:—

"The Treaty of Peace should not debar Germany from repairing at her own expense submarine cables cut by the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, nor from replacing at her expense any parts which had been cut out from such cables or which, without having been cut, are now in use by any of those Powers".

It had been agreed that this text should be referred to the Drafting Committee for the submission of a draft clause for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace. The Drafting Committee had prepared a text (See I. C. 178)1 which, however, was only accepted by the American representative subject to the approval of his Government. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d'Orsay on the 30th April, 1919, the text in question had again come under discussion. Mr. Lansing had been unable to accept the draft text proposed by the Drafting Committee and had proposed certain amendments (See I. C. 178), which both Mr. Balfour and Admiral de Bon had been unable to accept. Consequently, it had been decided to refer the whole question to the Heads of Government for final decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether Mr. Balfour held the view that the Article, as drafted by the Drafting Committee, carried out the intentions of the Resolution passed on the 24th March, 1919.

MR. BALFOUR, in reply, said he would like to give his version of what had occurred. On the 24th March, 1919, at the Conference of the Ten, which Mr. Lloyd George had not attended, a prolonged discussion of the cable question had taken place. A Resolution had been unanimously accepted, which was to be referred to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Articles of the Peace Treaty. Both Mr. Lansing and he (Mr. Balfour) had adhered to that Resolution, which was to govern the action of the Drafting Committee. The question had now arisen as to the correct interpretation to be given to the original Resolution. Mr. Lansing would no doubt explain his point of view. He, himself, interpreted the clause to mean that all acts taken by the Allies in connection with enemy submarine cables during the war should stand, and that Germany should have no claim to compensation. Thus, for instance, should a cable line have been cut and diverted, the new system so established should stand. On the other hand, Germany would have a perfect right to reconstruct her former cable system as it stood before the war. Το illustrate his argument, he would ask the Council to imagine a German cable line going from A to C through B. During the war the

1FM-10, p. 645.