to proceed to territory occupied by the Germans to the east of the Vistula". He again wished to draw attention to the fact that the Conference did not know what the "vague notes" referred to by General Nudant were, nor what it was that had been categorically refused by the Germans. GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the telegram from General Nudant, just read by President Wilson, had been despatched at 14 hours 15 the previous afternoon. At the same time, the papers relating thereto had been sent by special messenger, but they could not reach Paris before tomorrow, the 22nd March. MR. LLOYD GEORGE Suggested that what was interpreted as "a clear and categorical refusal" would probably be found to be due to the refusal given to the Germans to discuss the question at Spa. It was probable that the German delegates at Posen were not authorised by the German Government to carry out the necessary negotiations relating to Armistice Conditions, which had invariably been carried out at Spa. He sincerely regretted the fact that General Weygand had sent his reply without first consulting the Supreme War Council, especially as the telegram was one which might have led to very serious results, including the resumption of hostilities. GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the telegram from M. Noulens to which he had replied was one dated the 12th March 1919, which read as follows: "The Inter-Allied Commission of Warsaw learns from intercepted telegrams that the German Government were inclined to refuse to grant passes to Allied officers to study the preparatory measures to be taken in connection with the transport of troops through Dantzig, stating that a request had already been forwarded to Marshal Foch requesting that the troops should be disembarked at Königsberg and at Libau. That proposal would put aside the decision taken by the Inter-Allied Commission to insist on the enforcement of Article XVI of the Armistice of November last. Should another port be approved by the Allied Governments, the Germans would take that condition to imply a disavowal of the Commission; inevitable complications would delay the transportation of the troops; and lastly, the fear of insurrections which the Germans invoked as a reason for keeping the troops away from Dantzig would certainly take place, whereas it was hoped that the early arrival of Haller's Division and the authority which that event would give us to reason with the Poles, were likely to prevent the occurrence of any disturbances." General Weygand, continuing, said that he had forthwith replied to that telegram, because he knew that the Germans, if unable to get what they wanted in one way always tried to get it by other means. In this case again their intention had been to complicate the issue and to create dissensions. Had he given any other reply to the Germans, they would have taken it as a disavowal of the Commission, to whom the Council had given full powers to settle this question. Thus, M. Noulens having been given full authority, the Germans appealed to Spa, and Dantzig having been selected as the port of debarkation, the Germans offered Königsberg or Libau. Consequently, he had felt justified in replying at once to M. Noulens to allow him to continue his negotiations. M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that under the circumstances the meeting should be adjourned to await the receipt of General Nudant's reports from Spa. A telegram should also be despatched forthwith to M. Noulens asking him to report in clear and precise terms what demands had been made to the Germans. He regretted that an adjournment until Monday should be necessary; but that was unavoidable even though the Germans might thereby gain confidence from a knowledge of the fact that no decision had been reached. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a copy of the exact answer given by the German Delegation should also be obtained. M. PICHON proposed sending the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw: (m) Draft of - "You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark to Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn: also the precise replies made by the Germans." MR. LLOYD GEORGE requested that the reports received from General Nudant should forthwith be circulated. MARSHAL FOCH enquired whether, pending further decision the transportation of troops by rail to Poland was duly authorized. The transportation of troops by that route would be extremely slow, but still some results would be obtained. (n) Marshal Foch's MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that President Wilson's comment on that subject was irrefutable. Should the Allied and Associated Governments agree to send the Polish troops to Cracow by that route after the Germans had refused passage through Dantzig, it would mean yielding to the German pretentions. PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in the interval preparations for the expedition of the troops to Dantzig should be completed. (0) Communication M. PICHON enquired, in view of the fact that an adjournment had been agreed to, whether the fact should not be published that the Supreme War Council had decided upon the transportation of the Polish troops via Dantzig. to Press in Regard to Decisions Reached by Meeting MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be advisable to wait before publishing anything on the subject. MR. BALFOUR pointed out that considerable difficulty existed in connection with the supply of the required tonnage for the transport of troops via Dantzig. He was informed by the experts that passenger ships would alone be suitable for this work, and that none were available, unless ships at present employed for the transport of British and American troops were temporarily withdrawn for the purpose. PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had already been called upon, in accordance with a decision taken on the 17th March last, to submit a scheme showing what should be the contribution in shipping of each of the Allied and Associated Governments for the transport of General Haller's troops from France to Dantzig. MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be extremely unwise under these circumstances to publish the fact that the Supreme War Council had decided to send General Haller's Army to Poland by sea, because considerable difficulties existed in regard to tonnage, the withdrawal of which would seriously affect the shipping programme relating to Australian troops. (1) To send the following telegram to M. Noulens at Warsaw: "You are requested to telegraph immediately the exact terms of your demands to the German Commission to permit Allied Polish troops to disembark at Dantzig and their free passage on the railway line to Thorn also the precise replies made by the Germans." (2) To adjourn further consideration of the question pending receipt and circulation of reports to be received from General Nudant for M. Noulens. (3) To obtain report from the Allied Maritime Council, in accordance with the decision taken on 17th March, 1919.) (The Meeting then adjourned). PARIS, 20th March, 1919. 'See BC-52 (SWC-18) p. 383. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/62 BC-55 Minutes of a Conversation Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, March 21st, 1919, at 6 p. m. Publication in MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he raised the following question with considerable disinclination. It would be in the recollection of the Conference that on Tuesday last a discussion took place on the subject of Poland. It was necessary that at these meetings the members should express themselves quite freely and quite clearly. He was therefore surprised on the following morning to find in the French papers not only a full report of the Committee's finding illustrated by secret maps; but, in addition, a garbled account of what he himself had said in the Council. The account contained actual quotations of the words used by him between quotation marks. Had a verbatim report been given, he would not have objected so strongly. But the report gave a very wrong impression of what he had said, and the distortion permitted an opportunity for violent attacks against him. He did not mind the personal attacks, except in so far as they did undoubtedly tend to create ill-feeling, more especially as England itself was abused for its action in Syria. The Conference would recollect that President Wilson had on a previous occasion drawn the attention of the Council to a similar occurrence. The report then complained of had also been a very garbled version of what had actually taken place at the meeting. There had been sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the information must have come from British sources and had probably been supplied by someone who had been present at the meeting. Feeling that the honour of the British Delegation was thereby involved, he had directed that measures be taken in order to discover the offender. The case was tracked down, with the result that not only was the person concerned dealt with as far as possible, but also the newspaper correspondent responsible was sent away from Paris. He was afraid from internal evidence that the incident now complained of had come from French sources, for reasons which he could give. It was most unfortunate that such disclosures shoud be made, and he felt sure that the French delegates would not resent his taking notice of the matter. That very afternoon General Bliss had told him that an American gentleman just returned from Berlin stated that the disclosures which were daily appearing in the papers in connection with the peace negotiations were causing the greatest harm in Germany. From what this witness had seen and heard in Germany, he felt convinced that if the whole peace terms, however stiff, were at once presented, they would be accepted. But the disclosure of one condition at a time had the effect of driving the Germans to desperation, especially as each new thing was published to the world with the suggestion that the Allies were not agreed among themselves. He wished to speak quite plainly, and to say that if |