Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/59 BC-52 SWC-18 Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, March 17, 1919, at 3 p. m. ALSO PRESENT AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Admiral W. S. Benson Major General M. N. Patrick Prof. Lord Colonel W. S. Browning Colonel E. G. Gorrell Captain Schofield Commander Carter BRITISH EMPIRE General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., Major General W. Thwaites, C. B. Major General Hon. C. J. Sackville- Rear Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B. Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, Captain C. T. M. Fuller, C. M. G., Paymaster Captain Pollard, C. B., R. N. M. Leygues M. J. Cambon Marshal Foch FRANCE General Weygand General Degoutte General Belin General Le Rond General Duval Admiral de Bon M. Degrand M. Fromageot Comdt. de V. Levavasseur Comdt. Lacombe Lieut. de V. Odend'hal ITALY General Cavallero Admiral Thaon di Revel Admiral Grassi Capt. di Corvetta Capt. F. Ruspoli M. Brambilla 1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question on the Agenda related to the Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, and he Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace would call upon M. Mantoux to read the document which had been circulated, Article by Article. He understood there were certain parts which had been reserved; and he enquired whether the Commission had prepared any special reports in regard to those paragraphs, or whether Marshal Foch or General Weygand would be in a position to give the necessary explanations. GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the sub-Committees which had dealt with subjects such as the Kiel Canal, and Cables, had submitted special reports, which had been duly considered by the Allied Military, Naval and Aerial Commission. When the time came, he would if so desired, give the summary of those reports. (M. Mantoux then read the draft Military, Naval and Aerial Terms of Peace, Article by Article. For full text, see Annexure "A".) PRESIDENT WILSON asked to be assured that the exterior dangers from the Bolsheviks and so forth, which the Germans might have to meet on their eastern frontiers had been considered by the military experts in fixing the total number of effectives to be allowed to Germany. Article 2 MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Commission considered that the 100,000 men allowed, in addition to the gendarmerie, would be quite sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory of Germany and for the defence of her frontiers. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired, following up President Wilson's point, how many German troops had been engaged in suppressing the various Spartacist insurrections through Germany, including Bavaria. MARSHAL FOCH replied that he had no exact idea; only vague estimates were available. MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the number of German troops so engaged had exceeded 100,000. MARSHAL FOCH replied in the negative. PRESIDENT WILSON said that in putting his question he had in mind such isolated places as East Prussia, which adjoined Russia. MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the province of East Prussia would have no direct contact with Russia, as Lithuania intervened. MARSHAL FOCH said that in the whole of Eastern Germany, the number of German troops did not exceed 28,000 to 30,000 men. (Article 2 was approved.) PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the use of the word "never" in the second paragraph of Article 3. In his opinion, that word would cover all future time, and if that were intended, some permanent machinery would have to be set up to ensure the execution of the conditions therein set forth. MR. BALFOUR suggested that President Wilson's point would be met by substituting the word "not" for "never". Article 8 (It was agreed that paragraph 2 of Article 3 should read:-"The number and strengths of the units of infantry Articles 4 & 5 constitute maxima which must not be exceeded".) (Were read and accepted.) M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had proposed the following text in substitution of the one which had been previously reserved by the Supreme War Council:-"The number of Employés Article 6 or Officials of the German States, such as Customs House Officers, Forest Guards, Coastguards, must not exceed that of the employés or officials functioning in 1913. The number of gendarmes and employés or officials of the local or municipal police, may only be increased to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913 in the districts or municipalities in which they are employed. These employés and officials shall never be assembled for military training". MR. BALFOUR suggested that the word "not" should, as in the previous Article, be substituted for "never" in the last paragraph. (This was agreed to.) MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that if the Peace Conference were to decide that the territory on the Western bank of the Rhine should be administratively severed from the rest of Germany, the eastern section would, under this article, still be authorised to have the number of employés formerly needed by the entire German Empire. PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question had better be postponed for the present, as it could not be settled until a decision had been reached on the territorial question itself. (Clause 6 was accepted, subject to such modifications as might be required when the territorial question relating to the future constitution of German territories on the Western bank of the Rhine came to be settled). Articles 7 & 8 Article 9 (Were read and accepted.) PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the word "not" should be substituted for the word "never" in the last line of the first paragraph. (This was agreed to.) (Article 9 was accepted, as amended.) PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the very great scope and difficulty of the second sentence of this Article, namely:— Article 10 "All orders shall be notified to the Allied and Associated Governments, and may not be carried out until after such notification". No limiting time was given, and no provisions were made to set up a permanent machinery for receiving the notification therein referred to, and for granting permits. In his opinion, the execution of that sentence was not feasible, and he proposed that it should be deleted from the text. It would be impossible to introduce a guarantee of that nature without setting up an instrumentality permanently limiting the sovereignty of Germany. The only other alternative would be to reserve the right of going to war with Germany in the event of her failing to make the notification therein referred to. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the same difficulty would arise if Germany were to set up an army of 200,000 men in place of the 100,000 allowed her. PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. He pointed out that in the Convention provisions had been made for the setting up of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, but no time limit of any kind had been given. He quite agreed to the setting up of these Commissions during the definite time required for carrying out the necessary disarmament. But all these Commissions of Control had been made instrumentalities of the Inter-Allied High Command, which, in his opinion, meant an indefinite continuation of that Command, and of the Allied and Associated armies. In his opinion, if the Allied armies were to be maintained for ever in order to control the carrying out of the Peace Terms; not peace, but Allied armed domination would have been established. His Government would never agree to enter into such an arrangement and, were he to enter into such an agreement, he would be far exceeding his authority under the United States Constitution. MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that there was very great force in what President Wilson had said. In his opinion, Article 10 was the sort of clause which would be a perpetual source of irritation and humiliation to any country; whilst, on the other hand, it would not ensure the purpose intended. For instance, if in 1870 the Germans had imposed on France a condition to limit her army, that would have been a reasonable proposition. But if Germany had, in addition, imposed a condition that France was not to order a single rifle without asking her permission, that would have been intolerable. In 40 years' time, when Germany might have recovered her self-respect, should she require to order anything to replace the armaments permitted to her, she would have to give notice separately to France, Great Britain, America, Italy and Japan. He did not know what the Germans were made of, but he certainly knew what France and Great Britain would have felt about it. In his opinion, such a condition would constitute a constant source of insult, whilst, on the other hand, it did not really serve any useful purpose. Should the Germans mean to evade it, they would merely refrain from making the required notification. The first part of Article 10, which President Wilson was ready to accept, was merely a treaty obligation, whereas the second part of the first paragraph was merely intended to check that obligation. In his opinion, however, it did not succeed in doing that, and the Allied and Associated Governments would obviously be thrown back on the ordinary means which Governments possess of checking the doings of other countries. Although diplomatically the Allies had been taken by surprise when Germany declared war, and especially in regard to the use that might be made of the guns, the number of men and the number of guns possessed by Germany had been fully and accurately known. The construction of guns and the training of men could not be carried out clandestinely. Should there be a clause in the League of Nations requiring each member to notify to the others its programme of armaments and stocks of war material, that would be in no way humiliating, as every country would be bound to do the same thing. PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that a condition to that effect already practically existed in the League of Nations Covenant. MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the clause as it now stood would merely be making for trouble. Should some German Minister say that he would defy the Allies and refuse to give the information required: would the Allies be prepared to go to war? That might be done should Germany proceed to order rifles or war material greatly in excess of the quantities prescribed; but not otherwise. His military advisers took substantially the same view as President |