drew." The British Government wished it to appear that they had acted fairly by the Bolsheviks. He had put forward proposals for a military enquiry to be held, but he did not pre-judge the decision. It might be that as a result of that enquiry, no action might be found possible. But, in any case, until the military experts had reported, it would not be wise brutally to brush aside the Prinkipo proposal until alternative plans were ready.

M. SONNINO enquired what would be the result if the Bolsheviks stated that they would stop all hostilities and come to Prinkipo. In ten days' time it would be impossible to ascertain whether hostilities. had really been stopped. On the other hand, the effect would have been to disorganise still further the Allied forces in Russia. His thesis was this: The Bolsheviks had been given a period of time up to the 15th February in which to comply with the conditions contained in the original wireless. The Bolsheviks had not complied with those terms and conditions (the Bolsheviks had continued their offensive). Why, therefore, prolong by ten days the period already granted? The Bolsheviks could not do more than fail to comply, as they had done, with the conditions of the Allies, and in ten days' time the Allies would be faced with the same situation; but with the additional disadvantage that their own forces would have become further disorganised. He begged the members of the Conference to realise what effect this policy would have, not only in Russia but in Allied countries. The prestige given to Bolshevism was a real disaster in its effect on Allied countries. Consequently, no good effect could be obtained by granting the Bolsheviks this added prestige. The Bolsheviks had been given a chance; why should they be given a second and a third and a fourth chance? He strongly opposed the sending of the proposed message.

BARON MAKINO said that he also had received messages from Siberia bearing out the statements made by M. Clemenceau as to the disastrous effect the original wireless had created in the minds of all friendly groups in Siberia. At the time that the invitation had been issued to the various groups in Russia, no such consequence had been anticipated. If now a second telegram were sent, it was most important that its intent and purpose should not be misunderstood by the friendly forces in Siberia.

MR. BALFOUR wished to ask the military authorities a question of fact. It was being said that the Bolsheviks had pretended to accept, but they had not in reality done so, because they had not complied with the fundamental condition in regard to the cessation of hostilities. But had the Allied troops abstained from hostilities? Or, to put his question in another way: had all the Allied military operations been defensive in their character!

MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that during the interval between the dispatch of the invitation and the present moment, the Bolshevik forces had made the most heavy attacks on all fronts.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that a good many points of great difficulty had been raised that afternoon. He proposed therefore that the further consideration of the two questions: the dispatch of the message and the creation of a Council on Russian Affairs, should be adjourned till Monday afternoon.

(It was agreed to adjourn until Monday, 17th February, at 3 p. m., the further consideration of the two questions relating to the situation in Russia, namely:—

(1) The wireless message in regard to Prinkipo, and

(2) The creation of an Allied Council for Russian Affairs.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked permission to read the following telegram, dated Warsaw, February 14th, 1919, which had been received from M. Paderewski:

Situation in Poland

"German troops have commenced offensive on a large scale in German Poland. They have occupied the towns of Babimost and Kargowa. Their initiative will place them in an advantageous military situation before anticipated cessation of hostilities. Germans are making considerable use of asphyxiating gas. The Polish forces, numbering 25,000, only 10,000 being engaged, are insufficient to stop this offensive. The situation is grave. It is urgent that situation be placed immediately before Allied competent authorities.

(Signed) Paderewski.”

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that he had prepared a draft reply which he submitted for the acceptance of his colleagues.

(It was agreed that the following telegram should forthwith be sent to Marshal Foch:

"The Supreme War Council urgently draws Marshal Foch's attention to the following message received from the Polish Government. It is evident that the Germans have hastened their offensive in order to present Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact.

The Supreme War Council holds the opinion that the line of demarcation between the German and Polish troops fixed by Marshal Foch must be maintained.")

(The Conference adjourned to Monday afternoon, February 17th, 1919, at 3 p. m.)

FEBRUARY 16, 1919.

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/41

BC-84

SWC-9

Minutes of the Meeting of the Supreme War Council Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 17th February, 1919, at 3 p. m.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had returned that morning from his journey into Germany with the signature of the Germans to the Armistice conditions agreed on by the Supreme War Council.

Report of Marshal Foch on Renewal of Armistice

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had met the German plenipotentiaries at 3 p. m. on the 14th. He had put before Herr

Erzberger the convention decided on by the Powers. Herr Erzberger had taken the text, and, in reply, had handed in a declaration covering 23 pages. (For text of which see Annexure "A".) This declaration contained a justification from the German point of view of the execution of the terms of the original armistice. The two principal demands made related:

(1) To the repatriation of prisoners.

To the action taken by the French in Alsace-Lorraine against German industrialists holding property removed from France and Belgium.

In respect to the first, Marshal Foch had addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State :

(a) Repatriation of German Prisoners

"In reply to your communication of February 3rd, I have the honour to inform you that the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers considers the repatriation of German prisoners of war impossible for the moment; but these Powers will see to it with the greatest care that all the seriously sick and wounded are repatriated with the least possible delay.

Consequently, France is actually taking steps to begin the immediate repatriation of about 2,000 German prisoners of war besides the prisoners of war already sent to Germany or Switzerland. Great Britain is disposed to proceed in the same manner as rapidly as possible."

In respect to the second, Herr Erzberger's view was that proceedings could not be taken against private individuals holding property

(b) Restoration of French & Belgian Property

removed from France and Belgium during the war, because they had received it from the German Government. The restoration of this property must therefore be a matter for negotiation between the Governments. The Allied point of view was that these goods could be recovered wherever found. Marshal Foch had, therefore, addressed the following reply to the German Secretary of State:

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum contained in your letter of the 27th January.

In this connection, I would remind you that in the course of the last interview at Trèves, I stated that I could not accept the view of the German Government; that is to say, that German subjects who had carried away and taken in charge industrial apparatus coming from the occupied territories should benefit by the terms of Article 6 of the Convention of 11th November, as having participated in acts of war.

I merely undertake to transmit to the competent judicial authorities the special cases which you may think it your duty to submit to

me.

1For text, see vol. I, p. 1.

I have, therefore, forwarded the memorandum to the said judicial authorities, who will decide on this particular question of law." Continuing, Marshal Foch said that on the 15th the German Plenipotentiaries alleged that, by reason of the slow communication with Berlin and Weimar, they could not say when they (c) German Reluc- would be able to sign the Armistice. Further they wished to modify and extend the text of the Convention submitted to them. Marshal Foch, on the 16th,

tance To Sign New

Armistice
Conditions

had sent them the following communication:

"In reply to your letters of the 15th February, I have the honour to inform you that:

(1) The text of the Convention which was handed to you yesterday was drawn up by the chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments.

I can neither change it nor add to it.

(2) As the Armistice expires on the 17th February at 5 o'clock in the morning, the latest hour for signing a new extension is 18 hours on the 16th February,- in order to give time for communicating orders to the troops.

If the Convention be not signed at the latter hour, I shall be obliged to leave Trèves and the Armistice will cease to operate at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 17th February."

After this, the conditions of the new Armistice were signed with a slight alteration respecting the line of demarcation between German and Polish troops. This modification affected the Silesian frontier, where, as there were no Poles, it was decided to adhere to the prewar frontiers. (For final text, see Annexure "B.")

After signing the Convention, Herr Erzberger had handed to Marshal Foch a declaration from Herr Scheideman, in the following terms:

"The German Government recognises the grave nature of the consequences which would be involved both by the acceptance, and particularly by the refusal of the Convention. When it gave instructions to its delegates to sign it, it did so feeling convinced that the Allied and Associated Governments were going to make a serious effort to give to the world that peace which is so ardently desired, during the short period for which the armistice was being prolonged. Nevertheless, the German Government feels obliged to indicate its own point of view as regards the three conditions imposed in the Convention, by making the following observations:

I. The agreement ignores the fact that the German Government has been constituted by the popular will, in an orderly manner. The agreement imposes on the Germans, in the form of orders and prohibitions marked by harshness and favouring the rebelling Poles, the necessity of evacuating a number of important places such as Birnbaum and the town of Bentschen without any delay. These places are in German hands, their population is mostly German, and they are particularly important in regard to the intercourse with Eastern Germany. In addition to this, the Allied and Associated Powers