It would take voluminous quotations from the huge record to document Chief Judge Hincks' conclusions. Our order on certiorari accepts their truth. The trial court commented:

"That such conduct was unprofessional needs no exegesis: I so hold. Even more closely than that dealt with in the preceding Section it touches the vitals of the judicial process: even greater is its tendency to obstruct the attainment of personal justice. And the proven volume of this misconduct also was such as to constitute a serious obstruction to the proper conduct of the trial. Overpersistence in argument, as observed above, tends to breed confusion. Provocative conduct tends to breed turbulence. Insolent and disrespectful remarks to the Court tend to undermine the judicial authority indispensable to the power effectively to cope with such intrusions which by their very nature obstruct the development of the real merits of the case.

"For proved misconduct falling within this branch of the charge, I conclude that an order of disbarment is required."

The Court, as it must by its grant of certiorari, bases its action on the facts of disrespect to the trial court, wilful delay, and a purpose to discredit the administration of justice. It differs from the trial court only as to the measure of discipline required. By reversing the judgment below, without discussion of the accepted rule in

5 The Court refers to the language of the order, "permanently disbarred." This, of course, should be read as a disbarment subject to reinstatement. See Drinker, Legal Ethics, 49, and the cases collected in 7 C. J. S. 814; 5 Am. Jur. 443; 6 Fed. Dig. 355; 48 A. L. R. 1236. Reinstatement may follow "a sincere and timely change of attitude." Such an attitude on the part of Mr. Sacher, Chief Judge Hincks says in his decision, did not exist even at the time of the hearing of the charges.

REED, J., dissenting.

6

347 U.S.

federal courts that the exercise of judicial discretion in disbarment will not be overturned on review unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, this Court now summarily places itself in the position of a trial court. It acts, not upon an abuse of discretion by the trial court, but upon a record to determine for itself the proper extent of punishment. Certainly this Court does not mean to rule that conduct such as the accepted facts disclose does not support the discretion of the trial judge in disbarring Mr. Sacher.'

The rule as to review of disbarment of Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, announced by Chief Justice Marshall, has been the guide for United States Courts:

"There is, then, no irregularity in the mode of proceeding which would justify the interposition of this Court. It could only interpose, on the ground that the Circuit Court had clearly exceeded its powers, or had decided erroneously on the testimony. The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession. Upon the testimony, this Court would not be willing to interpose where any doubt existed." Id., at 531. Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364. These early cases were under mandamus practice. We now proceed by appeal and certiorari. See Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801, 804. The principles of the Burr case still govern and the weight accorded the conclusion of the trial court remains unchanged. In re Sacher, 206 F. 2d 358, 361; In re Chopak, 160 F. 2d 886, 887; In re Schachne, 87 F. 2d 887, 888; In re Spicer, 126 F. 2d 288, 289, 292; In re Patterson, 176 F. 2d 966, n. 1.

7 Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216, 222–223: "The question is simply whether there has been an abuse of discretion, and is to be determined in accordance with familiar principles governing the exercise of judicial discretion. That exercise implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action. . . . It takes account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case and 'is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.' . . . While probation is a matter of grace, the probationer is entitled to fair treatment, and is not to be made the victim of whim or caprice." See United States v. McWilliams, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 259, 261, 163 F.2d 695, 697, and cases cited.

1

Such a change of the course of decision is a disservice to the orderly progress of trials. It stimulates rather than deters the adoption of the strategy of the Dennis case. It intrudes unnecessarily this Court's views of the proprieties into the discipline of bars of regions and communities whose attitude toward courtroom behavior diverges from our own. It is enough if we stand ready to say that an abuse of discretion by a trial court will not be allowed to stand. We should not substitute our discretion for that of the trial judge. Calm and reasoned presentation of facts and law are not only more effective but are essential if administration of justice by the courts is not to be disrupted by such courtroom tactics as were used in the Dennis trial. We demand tolerance for those who differ. Conformity is not expected or desired. There is room for every shade of opinion and expression short of incitement to crime. But there is not room for violence, offensive expletives or interference with orderly procedure in a courtroom, and such an attitude is not to exalt order over liberty but to exalt reason over force. An atmosphere filled with unproven personal charges or innuendoes of wrongful action is not conducive to dispassionate appraisal of the truth of matters under judicial investigation. I would uphold the discipline administered by the bar and trial judge by affirming this judgment.

347 U.S.

BURTON, J., dissenting.

ALASKA STEAMSHIP CO., INC. v. PETTERSON.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 287. Argued March 8-9, 1954. Decided April 5, 1954.

The judgment below is affirmed on the authority of the cases cited. 205 F. 2d 478, affirmed.

Robert V. Holland argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Stanley B. Long.

John Geisness argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Samuel B. Bassett.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 100; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.

2

The Sieracki1 and Pope & Talbot cases cited as the basis for the Court's decision do not justify the result announced. They evidence this Court's latest and broadest statement of a shipowner's liability for the unseaworthiness of his ship and its equipment, but they do not reach the instant case. They assert the liability of a shipowner to stevedores and carpenters who, in consequence of the unseaworthiness of his ship or its equipment, are injured on board in navigable waters while engaged in work connected with loading or unloading the ship. Those cases establish that such liability for unseaworthiness exists although the injured maritime workers are not employees of the shipowner but

1 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85. 2 Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406.

396

BURTON, J., dissenting.

are employees of a third party who is under contract to supply stevedoring services.

The question presented by the instant case goes further. It asks whether a shipowner is liable for injuries. suffered on his ship by a stevedore, even when those injuries result from unseaworthiness of equipment that does not belong to the shipowner and is not part of the ship's equipment, but belongs to the stevedore's independent employer, is part of that employer's loading equipment, and is brought on board by such employer. There is no suggestion in the cited cases that the shipowner's responsibility extends beyond the seaworthiness of his ship and its equipment, and I see no adequate reason for judicially extending it beyond that limit.

As the instant case offers a new precedent, it is important to recite its facts so that its effect may be accurately measured and limited in the absence of a supporting opinion.

The Court of Appeals stated the question which it decided as follows:

"The question presented is whether a vessel's owner is liable for injuries received by an employee of a stevedoring company (an independent contractor) on board ship while engaged in the loading of the ship where the injuries are caused by a breaking block brought on board by the stevedoring company." Petterson v. Alaska S. S. Co., 205 F. 2d 478.

Respondent Petterson was an able-bodied stevedore, 73 years old, employed as a longshore foreman by the Alaska Terminal and Stevedoring Company. That company was engaged by petitioner Alaska Steamship Company, Inc., to load the latter's vessel, the S. S. Susitna. In May 1950 respondent thus became engaged in loading that vessel while it was docked in what is assumed to be navigable water in the State of Washington. Petterson's employer, the stevedoring company, was authorized by