2. A complaint filed with the Board at the instance of a radio officer charged his union with violating the same sections by causing a steamship company discriminatorily to refuse to employ him. The Board found that the union had a contract with the company requiring it to employ unior members in good standing, when available; that it did not provide for a hiring hall giving the union complete control over the selection of radio officers; that the company offered the radio officer a job and he was willing to accept it; that the company was prevented from employing him by the wrongful refusal of a union officer to certify his good standing, because of his alleged violation of union rules; that this restrained and coerced him in his statutory right to refrain from observance of union rules, in violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A); that it caused the company to discriminate against him by denying him employment; and that the normal effect of such discrimination was to encourage membership in the union, in violation of § 8 (b)(2). The Board ordered the union to withdraw objection to his employment, to reimburse him for loss of pay and to take other corrective actions. Held: The Board's order is sustained. Pp. 28-33, 39-42, 55. 3. A complaint filed with the Board charged an employer with discrimination against nonunion employees in violation of § 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3), by granting retroactive pay increases and vacation payments to union employees and refusing such benefits to other employees solely because they were not union members. The Board found that this had been done; that the union was the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the employer's delivery department; that the union-security clause in the union's contract with the employer was invalid; that nothing in the contract with the union prohibited equal payment to nonunion employees; and that the natural and probable effect of the discrimination was to encourage membership in the union. The Board issued an order requiring the employer to cease and desist from such practices, to reimburse the nonunion employees for the losses sustained by reason of the discrimination against them, and to post appropriate notices. Held: The Board's order is sustained. Pp. 34-38, 46-48, 55.

4. The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights. P. 40.

5. Sections 8 (a)(3) and 8 (b)(2) were designed to allow employees to exercise freely their right to join or to abstain from joining unions, the only limitation being in the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) which

authorizes employers to enter into certain union-security contracts. P. 40.

6. Congress intended to prevent utilization of union-security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. Pp. 40-41.

7. Under the Act, an employer may discharge an employee for nonmembership in a union if the employer has entered into a valid union-security contract and if the other requirements of the proviso are met; but no other discrimination aimed at encouraging employees to join, retain membership in, or stay in good standing in, a union is condoned. Pp. 41-42.

8. Although it is essential to a violation of § 8 (a) (3) that the employer's motive in discriminating against the employee be to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization, specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element of the proof. Pp. 42-48.

(a) The recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where the conduct of the employer inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the commonlaw rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Pp. 44-46.

(b) Discrimination by an employer solely on the basis of union membership status so foreseeably causes employee response as to obviate need for any other proof of intent. Pp. 45-46.

(c) Encouragement of union membership is a natural and foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at the request of a union. P. 52.

9. To establish a violation of § 8 (a) (3) it is not essential that there be evidence of actual encouragement of union membership; a tendency to encourage is sufficient, and such tendency is sufficiently established if its existence may reasonably be inferred from the nature of the discrimination. Pp. 48-52.

(a) Insofar as the power of the Board to draw reasonable inferences is concerned, the 1947 amendments of the Act did not alter the prior law. Pp. 49-51.

(b) Where an employer discriminated against an employee upon the instigation of a union, and the purpose of the union in causing such discrimination was clearly to encourage members to perform obligations or supposed obligations of membership, it was reasonable for the Board to infer encouragement of union membership.

(c) The Act does not require, for the purposes of violations of § 8 (a) (3), that the employees discriminated against be the ones encouraged; nor that the change in the employees' "quantum of desire" to join a union have immediate manifestations. P. 51. 10. It was within the authority of the Board to proceed against a union for a violation of § 8 (b) (2) and to order the union to pay back-pay to an employee, without joining the employer, finding him guilty of a violation of § 8 (a) (3), or requiring reinstatement by the employer. Pp. 52-55.

11. The 6-month period of limitations prescribed in § 10 (b) of the Act did not bar the amendment of an individual employee's charge of discrimination so as to charge that the discriminatory treatment extended to all nonunion employees, since the employer had adequate notice and was not prejudiced by the amendment. P. 34, n. 30.

12. A question which was not presented in the petition for certiorari is not properly before the Court. P. 37, n. 35.

196 F. 2d 960, affirmed.

196 F. 2d 1, reversed.

197 F. 2d 719, affirmed.

No. 5. On a petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, 93 N. L. R. B. 1523, the Court of Appeals granted enforcement. 196 F. 2d 960. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 852. Affirmed, p. 55.

No. 6. On a petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, 94 N. L. R. B. 1494, the Court of Appeals denied enforcement. 196 F. 2d 1. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 853. Reversed, p. 55.

No. 7. On a petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, 93 N. L. R. B. 299, the Court of Appeals granted enforcement. 197 F. 2d 719. This Court granted certiorari. 345 U. S. 902. Affirmed, p. 55.

Abner H. Silverman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 5 on the original argument, and Emanuel Butter on

17

Opinion of the Court.

the reargument. With them on the briefs was Herbert S. Thatcher.

Bernard Dunau argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board. With him on the briefs on the original argument were Walter J. Cummings, Jr., then Solicitor General, George J. Bott, David P. Findling, Mozart G. Ratner, Elizabeth W. Weston and Louis Schwartz in Nos. 5 and 6, and Acting Solicitor General Stern, Mr. Bott, Mr. Findling, Dominick L. Manoli and Frederick U. Reel in No. 7. With him on the briefs on the reargument were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Mr. Bott, Mr. Findling and Mr. Manoli.

Julius Kass argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner in No. 7.

John J. Manning argued the cause for respondents in No. 6. With him on the brief was Clif Langsdale.

Stephen C. Vladeck filed a brief for the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York and Vicinity, as amicus curiae.

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

The necessity for resolution of conflicting interpretations by Courts of Appeals of § 8 (a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (a)(3), impelled us to grant certiorari in these three cases. That section provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer .. by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: The Court of Appeals for

1"SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer

"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in

Opinion of the Court.

347 U.S.

the Eighth Circuit in No. 6 (hereinafter referred to as Teamsters), following a decision of the Third Cir

this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made [; and (ii) if, following the most recent election held as provided in section 9 (e) the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to authorize such labor organization to make such an agreement: ] and has at the time the agreement was made or within the preceding twelve months received from the Board a notice of compliance with sections 9 (f), (g), (h), and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 9 (e) within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; . . . .”

Section 8 (a) (3) was enacted as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, in 1947, and amended in 1951, 65 Stat. 601. Provisions added by the 1951 amendment are in italics; provisions eliminated in 1951 are in brackets. This section derived from § 8 (3) of the 1935 Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3), with the proviso amended. See note 42, infra.

2 Labor Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 196 F. 2d 1, certiorari granted, 344 U. S. 853. See also Labor Board v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 196 F. 2d 702.