of his theory is not true. What a motley array of witnesses, liars, thieves, adulterers, murderers, together with patriots, reformers, and saints! They all agree that a white color is white, but do they all agree as to the moral quality of the same act? There is scarcely a crime which was not at some time in the history of the race felt by individuals as a worthy act in the light of conscience, and the conscientious conflicts of the present day show that the moral sense is not an infallible authority. As soon as the saints attempt to reform the sinners, to create in them a new sense of what is worth while, they must begin to reason with them, and the moment they begin to reason about values, they turn their backs upon the intuitional doctrine, for to show the reason for a value is to show it to be worth while, not in itself, but rather as a means to some end upon which its worth depends. Indeed, ethical theory came into existence just because our immediate feelings of the values of acts are neither uniform nor absolutely reliable, and must, therefore, be supplemented by a rational attempt to find the values of acts in the light of the ends which they serve. To sum up the evidence, the utilitarian has given unimpeachable testimony that many values are derived, but his testimony can be refuted when a failure to see that there are many ultimate ends leads him to say that only one exists. The intuitionalist has given unimpeachable testimony that some values are ultimately known only through immediate appreciation, but his testimony can be refuted when a failure to see the derived nature of many values leads him to say that intuition is the only authority. Putting together the parts of this testimony that must be accepted, we have the view of the matter which this chapter attempts to make clear; namely, that some purposes are original, or primary, and that others are means of control to which feelings of value have been transferred from the ends that they serve. Thus far, it must be understood, we have permitted only the extremists to testify. Many ethical thinkers who have taken intermediate positions are in substantial agreement with the conclusion advocated here. Those utilitarians who do not select some one special value, such as pleasure, for the ultimate worth from which all other values are derived, but who consider the ultimate end to be human welfare or perfection, are not blind to a part of the truth if they recognize the fact that since the will aims at definite, concrete activities, welfare or perfection is an empty abstraction, unless filled with a variety of concrete ultimate values. Those intuitionalists who hold that only general rules or classes of ends are known ultimately through immediate appreciation, are not blind to a part of the truth if they recognize that these general rules or classes of ends have significance only in that they designate groups of particular values each of which is felt to have absolute worth. VII According to natural science, the steps in the physical process Let us now see how natural science supports with its authoritative evidence the conclusion that has been presented from the teleological point of view with regard to how a new purpose is made. The physical counterpart of a purpose, according to natural science, is a response to stimuli checked in its functioning. Just as changes in the nervous system due to the stimuli of vibrating air and ether are accompanied by the consciousness of sounds and colors, and thus give "as in a symbolic language, news of the external world," so changes in the nervous system due to the reactions to these stimuli are accompanied, when checked in their functioning, by purposes, and thus give, as in a symbolic language, news of the responses to this world of external vibration. The light stimulus of an apple affects the nervous system of a child. As the result of nervous connections made previously, this stimulus tends to pass over into the response of eating. But if the fruit is on a table beyond the child's reach, or if he has to walk across the room or is otherwise delayed in getting the apple, the reaction of eating is checked in its functioning, although it may go even so と far as to make his mouth "water." Under these physical conditions, he feels a desire to eat the apple, he appreciates the worth of carrying out the action for which the nervous system has been set. If the reaction persists, if it is not abortive, the child feels a purpose. Natural science would explain the illustrations given in the first part of this chapter by saying that in such cases brain connections have been established between certain stimuli and the responses of locking the door, washing dishes, going to the office, and studying the principles of education; and that when evening comes and the man is in the upper part of the house, when the meal is finished and the housewife is engaged in conversation, when eight o'clock arrives and other activities interfere with going to the office, and when the hour for the study of the principles of education has struck and the student is at a distance from the library or is invited to go walking, the reactions for which the nervous systems of the respective individuals have been set, although started by appropriate stimuli, are checked, because the situations in which the individuals are at the time do not for the moment permit the completion of the reactions, or give stimuli setting off also other reactions which interfere with them. When the activity is obstructed, each feels a desire which makes him conscious of the end of his action and of its worth. If the tendency to the activity continues, the conscious accompaniment is a purpose. Since a purpose is the conscious parallel of an obstructed reaction, a new purpose must be the accompaniment of a new obstructed reaction. The materialistic explanation of the steps in the making of a new reaction, a new 1Pp. 70-71. habit of response, must point, therefore, to the physical counterpart of the making of a new purpose. Let us now examine the steps in the making of a new habit of response and then find their mental counterparts. In the process of adjustment to environment, new habits of response are made as modifications in the nervous system. The usual steps in the physical process through which a new reaction is added to an old one are: (1) a reaction checked in its functioning; (2) a diversion of nervous energy into some channel of response not previously connected with this reaction, — a physical process by which the check may be removed; and (3) an incorporation, through action, of the new form of response with the old habit. The experiences of which these steps are the physical counterparts may now be found. (1) A reaction checked in its functioning is the physical counterpart of a purpose; (2) new reactions to the situation which may overcome the check are the physical parallels of the consciousness of means of control in the service of the purpose; and (3) the incorporation, through action, of the new response with the old habit is the physical parallel of the use of the means in the realization of the purpose. Before the new response has been completely incorporated with the old habit, the old habit will be checked, in a greater or less degree, in the situation under which the new response first appeared, and the new response, although it now will appear more easily, will still have as its conscious accompaniment the idea of a means of control. When, however, the process has been completed so that the new response has become an integral part of the habit, this new part of the reaction, when checked, may be accompanied by a purpose which parallels it alone. |