by consciousness. A check in the response of imitating is paralleled by a purpose to do what another person is doing. Then some pathway of reaction is incorporated with the checked response in such manner that the check is overcome and the imitating is realized. This pathway of reaction is paralleled by a means of control, which appears in consciousness.

From the physical point of view, it is plain that the individual does not acquire new purposes and new means of control when he is apparently at rest, a condition in which the factors of his experience appear to be subject and object. When the organism is thus responding to a stimulus by merely looking at some object or by merely sensing it in some other way, no new response is made; the energy passes over a pathway of response already formed in the brain. It is only when the pathways of response are changed that new purposes and new means of control appear in consciousness.

That "a little learning is a dangerous thing" is sometimes exemplified by a loose kind of thinking which makes psychology seem to support the mistaken theory that new experience is caused by the interaction of subject and object, as in the case of a person merely looking at a pen. Here we have the I on the one hand and the pen on the other. In this loose thinking, the subject is confused with the psychophysical organism and the object with the environment. It is true that the organism and the environment do interact, but they are not to be identified with the subject and the object. Both natural science and teleology, as we are about to see, pronounce against this mistaken identity.

Natural science tells us that the organism is affected by stimuli from the environment and reacts to these stimuli,

and that the passing of stimuli over into response makes a brain activity which is paralleled in consciousness by a single experience of which the subject is one aspect and the object is the other. Neither subject nor object depends upon the organism more than the other; neither depends upon the environment more than the other; as the two aspects of one experience, they are together the mental counterpart of a change in the physical organism produced by the interaction of the organism and the environment.

Teleology explains that the organism, instead of being identified with the subject, is as much an object in experience as is the environment; and that both the organism and the environment are equally physical objects used by natural science in explaining mental phenomena. The subject is so far from being identified with the organism that it is distinguished in consciousness through its contrast with the organism, just as much as it is distinguished through its contrast with what natural science terms the environment.

IV

Problems for further study are (1) how new purposes are made; (2) how new means of control are made; and (3) how these together constitute personal development.

The individual process has now been analyzed into its factors, which have been found to be purposes and means of control. Since the development of the individual consists in acquiring new purposes and new means of control, three problems at once appear: (1) How do the factors of the individual process make new purposes? (2) How do they make new means of control? and (3) How do purposes and means of control, which are both the

factors and the products of the individual process, together constitute personal development? The answers to these three problems complete the taking apart and the putting together of the individual process, or, in other words, its analysis and synthesis.

REFERENCES

CHARTERS, W. W., Methods of Teaching, 1912, pp. 21-23. (Distinguishes briefly between appreciation and control of values. Cf. purposes and means of control.)

HOWERTH, I. W., The Art of Education, 1912, pp. 144–166. (Distinguishes between ideas and ideals. Cf. means of control and purposes.)

MÜNSTERBERG, H., Psychology and the Teacher, 1910, pp. 196-201. (Gives the strict scientific use of the term feeling.)

PAULSEN, F., A System of Ethics, 1906, pp. 11-12. (States that "what is good in life will in the last analysis be decided by immediate, incontrovertible feeling.")

PROBLEMS

1. a. Name five purposes you have attained to-day. b. Name five means of control you have used in attaining these purposes. c. What is the essential difference between these purposes and means of control?

2. Name some purpose which you expect to attain several years from now and some of the more important means of control you expect to use for the realization of this purpose.

3. Name three acts that at various times you have performed both as ends in themselves and as means of control.

4. Explain what corresponds to purposes and what corresponds to means of control in the following: "Consequently the educational values of different subjects. . . consist (a) in the scope, kind, strength, and permanence of the incentives to activity; and (b) in the kind, degree, and permanence of the power to think and to execute that those subjects may develop." - Hanus, P., Educational Aims and Educational Values, p. 7.

1

5. a. What is the essential function of feeling? b. Give an illustration of the function of feeling taken from your own experience. 6. a. What is the essential function of thought? b. Give an illustration of the function of thought taken from your own experience. 7. Is a mere knowledge of what is right a guarantee that the right will be done? Explain.

8. What evidence does the theory of evolution give in support of the fact that knowledge and appreciation are for the sake of action? 9. What justification is there for saying that an idea is an incipient action?

10. According to the natural science explanation of the basis of consciousness, would a human being perfectly adjusted to his environment be conscious? Explain.

CHAPTER IV

HOW NEW PURPOSES ARE MADE

Acquired purposes are originally means of control to which feelings of value have been transferred from the ends these means served. The steps in the process through which a means of control is made into a purpose are (1) a feeling of the value of some purpose, (2) the association with this purpose of some means for its realization, and (3) the use of the means in realizing the purpose.

I

The fact that the value of a purpose is explained by transforming the
purpose into a means to some end, suggests the way in which the
purpose was made.

That new purposes appear in the life of the individual is a matter of common experience. As a child of ten, a youth of twenty, and a man of forty, he has a change of purposes corresponding to the change in his activities, for purposes are the ends towards which these activities are directed. "And one man in his time plays many parts." But however pronounced the change in purposes may be, the process through which it takes place is not directly evident; for, as Athena sprang full-armed from the head of Zeus, so purposes seem to spring immediately into consciousness, fully equipped for the leadership of activity. To find how purposes and means of control already in the experience of the individual work together to make new purposes, is the problem of this chapter.