Opinion of Miller, J., the Chief Justice, and Field, J., dissenting. ture, and, in the end, become dangerous, on account of its wealth and influence. It would seem that this apprehension is more imaginary than real, for the security against this course of action, is to be found in the nature of the object for which the corporation was created. It was created specially to promote the endowment of a seminary of learning, and it is not to be presumed that it will ever act in such a manner as to jeopardize its corporate rights; nor can there be any wellgrounded fear that it will absorb, in its effort to establish a literary institution of a high order of merit, in the city of St. Louis, any more property than is necessary to accomplish that object. Should a state of case in the future arise, showing that the corporation has pursued a different line of conduct, it will be time enough then to determine the rights of the parties to this contract, under this altered condition of things. The present record presents no such question, and we have no right to anticipate that it will ever occur. It is enough for the purposes of this suit to say, that so long as the corporation uses its property to support the educational establishments for which it was organized, it does not forfeit its right not to be taxed under the contract which the State made with it. We cannot see that the case of the University is distinguishable from that of the Home of the Friendless. JUDGMENT REVERSED, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to proceed IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS OPINION. Mr. Justice MILLER, dissenting. The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice FIELD, and myself, do not concur in these judgments. It is the settled doctrine of this court, that it will, in every case affecting personal rights, where, by the course of judicial proceedings, the matter is properly presented, decide whether a State law impairs the obligation of contracts; and if it does, will declare such law ineffectual for that purpose. And it is also settled, beyond controversy, that the State Opinion of Miller, J., the Chief Justice, and Field, J., dissenting. legislatures may, by the enactment of statutes, make contracts which they cannot impair by any subsequent statutes. It may be conceded that such contracts are so far protected by the provisions of the Federal Constitution that eveu a change in the fundamental law of the State, by the adoption of a new constitution, cannot impair them, though express provisions to that effect are incorporated in the new constitution. We are also free to admit that one of the most beneficial provisions of the Federal Constitution, intended to secure private rights, is the one which protects contracts from the invasion of State legislation. And that the manner in which this court has sustained the contracts of individuals has done much to restrain the State legislatures, when urged by the pressure of popular discontent under the sufferings of great financial disturbances, from unwise, as well as unjust legislation. In this class of cases, when the validity of the contract is clear, and the infringement of it by the legislature of a State is also clear, the duty of this court is equally plain. But we must be permitted to say, that in deciding the first of these propositions, namely, the validity of the contract, this court has, in our judgment, been, at times, quick to discover a contract that it might be protected, and slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts were not so, by reason of the want of authority in those who profess to bind others. This has been especially apparent in regard to contracts made by legislatures of States, and by those municipal bodies to whom, in a limited measure, some part of the legislative function has been confided. In all such cases, where the validity of the contract is denied, the question of the power of the legislative body to make it necessarily arises, for such bodies are but the agents and representatives of the greater political body—the people, who are benefited or injured by such contracts, and who must pay, when anything is to be paid, in such cases. That every contract fairly made ought to be performed is a proposition which lies at the basis of judicial education, and is one of the strong desires of every well-organized Opinion of Miller, J., the Chief Justice, and Field, J., dissenting. judicial mind. That, under the influence of this feeling, this court may have failed in some instances to examine, with a judgment fully open to the question, into the power of such agents, is to be regretted, but the error must be attributed to one of those failings which lean to virtue's side. In our judgment, the decisions of this court, relied upon here as conclusive of these cases, belong to the class of errors we have described. We do not believe that any legislative body, sitting under a State constitution of the usual character, has a right to sell, to give, or to bargain away forever the taxing power of the State. This is a power which, in modern political societies, is absolutely necessary to the continued existence of every such society. While under such forms of government, the ancient chiefs or heads of the government might carry it on by revenues owned by them personally, and by the exaction of personal service from their subjects, no civilized government has ever existed that did not depend upon taxation in some form for the continuance of that existence. To hold, then, that any one of the annual legislatures can, by contract, deprive the State forever of the power of taxation, is to hold that they can destroy the government which they are appointed to serve, and that their action in that regard is strictly lawful. It cannot be maintained, that this power to bargain away, for an unlimited time, the right of taxation, if it exist at all, is limited, in reference to the subjects of taxation. In all the discussion of this question, in this court and elsewhere, no such limitation has been claimed. If the legislature can exempt in perpetuity, one piece of land, it can exempt all land. If it can exempt all land, it can exempt all other property. It can, as well, exempt persons as corporations. And no hindrance can be seen, in the principle adopted by the court, to rich corporations, as railroads and express companies, or rich men, making contracts with the legislatures, as they best may, and with such appliances as it is known they do use, for perpetual exemption from all the burdens of supporting the government. Argument for the plaintiff in error. The result of such a principle, under the growing tendency to special and partial legislation, would be, to exempt the rich from taxation, and cast all the burden of the support of government, and the payment of its debts, on those who are too poor or too honest to purchase such immunity. With as full respect for the authority of former decisions, as belongs, from teaching and habit, to judges trained in the common-law system of jurisprudence, we think that there may be questions touching the powers of legislative bodies, which can never be finally closed by the decisions of a court, and that the one we have here considered is of this character. We are strengthened, in this view of the subject, by the fact that a series of dissents, from this doctrine, by some of our predecessors, shows that it has never received the full assent of this court; and referring to those dissents for more elaborate defence of our views, we content ourselves with thus renewing the protest against a doctrine which we think must finally be abandoned. BRONSON V. KIMPTON. The cases of Bronson v. Rodes and Butler v. Horwitz (7 Wallace, 229 and 258) affirmed. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of New York. Kimpton filed a bill against Bronson in one of the State courts of New York to compel satisfaction of a mortgage executed by him to Bronson on the ground that it had been paid. The mortgage was given to secure a bond for the payment of a certain sum in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the United States. The payment relied on was a tender of United States notes equal in nominal amount to the sum due on the bond and mortgage. The Supreme Court of New York held the tender sufficient, and adjudged satisfaction; and this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Ap peals, and was now here for review. Mr. J. A. Townsend (by whom the case of Bronson v. Rodes* had been elaborately and ably argued at the last term) now stated for the plaintiff in error that, as was obvious, there was no essential difference between this case and that, or Butler v. Horwitz,† which had been adjudged at the same time, and he relied upon these two decisions as conclusive of the case. The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the judgment of this court to the effect that the questions being no other than those already fully considered and determined in the cases referred to by the counsel, this case was necessarily REVERSED, AND WOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. BENNET v. FOWLER. 1. Whether a given invention or improvement shall be embraced in one, two, or more patents, is a matter about which some discretion must be left with the head of the Patent Office; it being often a nice and perplexing question, and one not capable, of being prescribed for by a general rule. 2. Accordingly, in a case where two reissued patents, both related to the lifting and depositing a load of hay in a mow of a barn, or in a rick or shed, but, in one of them the lifter was somewhat differently constructed, so as to adapt it specially to the stacking of hay (which, as this court assumed, had doubtless led the office to divide the improvements, and issue separate patents, in a case where the improvements had been embraced in one in the original patent), the reissue in the twofold form was held proper. 3. Where the defendant proposes to maintain at the final hearing of a case in chancery, that his machine does not infringe the complainant's patent, proof of non-infringement should appear in the testimony. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Fowler filed a bill in that court to enjoin Bennet and others from infringing two reissued patents, No. 1870 and * 7 Wallace, 229. † Ib. 258. |