Opinion of the court. "Plaintiffs ordered to reply as though demurrer had not been filed. C. H. Hempstead, Esq., counsel for plaintiff, excepted to the ruling of the court." "December 7th. "C. H. Hempstead, Esq., made a verbal motion praying for judgment and damages on the pleadings. Motion argued by Messrs. Baskin and Hempstead for plaintiffs, and Messrs. Marshall and Carter for defendant. "Pleadings submitted to the court and held under advise ment." "December 8th. "Motion for judgment overruled. Rulings excepted to by plaintiffs' counsel." The Supreme Court of the Territory dismissed the appeal, and the plaintiff took this writ of error. Mr. De Wolfe, for plaintiff in error; Mr. Van Cott, contra. Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. There is no evidence contained in the transcript that any exceptions were taken to the action of the District Court of the Territory, except such as appears from the minutes of the clerk. These minutes are mere memoranda, stating, in the briefest and most general manner, the proceedings had in court. They do not purport to give the particulars of the proceedings, but only to describe their character. They were made to preserve an account of the general order of business of the court, and to assist the clerk in the subsequent preparation of the formal record. In this case they state that, on a day mentioned, the plaintiffs' counsel filed a demurrer, which was argued and taken under advisement; that, on the subsequent day, the demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiffs excepted. And, also, that afterwards, on a certain day, the plaintiffs' counsel made a verbal motion for judgment and damages on the pleadings; that the motion was argued and, on the following day, overruled, and that the ruling was excepted to. These entries do not present the action of the court and the exceptions in such form that we can take any notice of Opinion of the court. them. It is no part of the duty of the clerk to note in his entries the exceptions taken, or to note any other proceedings of counsel, except as they are preliminary to, or the basis of, the orders or judgment of the court. To be of any avail, exceptions must not only be drawn up so as to present distinctly the ruling of the court upon the points raised, but they must be signed and sealed by the presiding judge. Unless so signed and sealed, they do not constitute any part of the record which can be considered by an appellate court.* It is true, as stated by counsel, that the object of a bill of exceptions is to make matter of record what would not otherwise appear as such, and that no bill is necessary where the error alleged is apparent upon the record. So here, had the demurrer been in the transcript, and it had appeared that the plaintiffs had relied upon its sufficiency, and final judgment thereon had passed against them, the error of the court, if any existed, would have been open to examination, for it would have been disclosed by the proceedings. No bill of exceptions, then, could have presented more clearly the ruling of the court. But the demurrer is not in the transcript, and it is only a matter of conjecture whether it was a special or general one; to the form or substance of the answer. Nor is any order overruling the demurrer shown; a statement of the clerk in his entries that such was the fact is all that appears. But, independent of this consideration, the ruling of the court on this point would not be noticed, for it appears that the plaintiffs, instead of relying upon the sufficiency of the alleged demurrer, filed a replication to the answer. They thus abandoned their demurrer, and it ceased to be a part of the record.‡ The exception to the ruling in denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings is not only subject to the general objection already stated, but to the further objection, that * Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheaton, 119; Leveringe v. Dayton, 4 Washington's Circuit Court, 698. † Suydam v. Williamson, 20 Howard, 427. Aurora City v. West, 7 Wallace, 92; Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Id. 42; Brown : Saratoga Railroad Co., 18 New York, 495. Statement of the case. the grounds upon which the motion was made or denied are not given. The motion was not made at the trial, and, as counsel suggests, it may have been denied on a point of practice, without respect to the merits. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. GILBERT & SECOR v. UNITED STATES. 1. An act of Congress directing the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a contract with certain parties, provided it could be done on terms previously offered by the parties, does not, of itself, create a contract. 2. If such parties afterwards sign a written agreement with the secretary, on terms less favorable to them than the act of Congress authorized the secretary to make, they must abide by their action in accepting the less favorable terms. APFEAL from the Court of Claims; the case being this: By an act of March 3d, 1847, making appropriations for the naval service, certain sums were set apart for floating drydocks at Philadelphia, at Pensacola, and at Kittery, which the Secretary of the Navy was directed to have built. Proposals were received for these docks from several persons, and among them from Gilbert & Secor, who offered to build the dock at Kittery for $732,905. The proposals were made on a basis that the docks should have what is known "as tar and felt sheathing." If the sheathing known as copper sheathing" was required, the offer was to do the work for an additional sum of $72,742. 66 Upon an examination of the proposals, and on full consideration of the plans proposed, it was found that the appropriation made by Congress in the act just mentioned, was insufficient to pay for the work on the plan approved by the secretary. Thereupon, under the advice of the AttorneyGeneral, the secretary declined to make any contracts. At the next session, Congress having considered the matter, passed another act,* in which the secretary was di * Act of 3d August, 1848. Statement of the case. rected, in the execution of the act already mentioned, to enter into a contract with Dakin & Moody for the construction of a sectional floating dry-dock, basin, and railways at Philadelphia, and with Gilbert & Secor, for the construction of a balance floating dry-dock, basiu, and railways at Pensacola, and with one or the other of the parties for the construction of a floating dry-dock, basin, and railways upon either of those plans that the secretary might prefer for the navy yard at Kittery; provided that such contracts could be made at prices that should not exceed by ten per cent. the prices which had been submitted by either of said parties. It was also provided that the secretary should, in contracting with said parties, enlarge the dimensions of said works at each yard to a capacity sufficient for docking war steamers of the largest class. Under the powers conferred by this statute, the Secretary of the Navy contracted with Dakin & Moody, for the dock at Philadelphia, and with Gilbert & Secor, for the work at Pensacola. In determining which of the proposed plans (both of which it seems were patented) he would select for Kittery, he seems to have considered whether he could get the dock at that place copper-sheathed without any additional cost. It is recited in the contract, signed by him and the plaintiffs, for the work at that place, that "the Secretary of the Navy, in the execution of the aforesaid law, after mature deliberation thereon, and in consideration that the said parties of the second part will copper-fasten said dock at Kittery, according to the specifications for the Pensacola dock hereto annexed, has determined to select, and does hereby select, the balance dock, basin, and railways of Gilbert & Secor, parties of the second part, as best adapted for the navy yard at Kittery." A contract, with the recital just mentioned, and a provision that the dock should be copper-sheathed, was accordingly concluded. The work was to be done according to minute specifications, for the sum originally proposed, on the assumption that felt and tar sheathing would be used. When executing this contract, Gilbert & Secor had protested against Opinion of the court. that provision. The contract also provided for the enlargement necessary for war steamers, and for the increase of the price of the work by ten per cent. The whole work being completed, the price named in the contract, $732,905 was paid to Gilbert & Secor. They, however, contended that this sum was the sum named on an assumption that tar and felt sheathing, and not copper, would be used, and they accordingly asked for the $72,742 ad. ditional. The government declining to pay it, Gilbert & Secor then brought suit in the Court of Claims. That court dismissed their petition, and they took the present appeal. Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson for them, appellants here, contended that the proposals were made under the first act of Congress, that it was in execution of that act, and of the proposals under it, that all which was subsequently done was done; and that what was thus subsequently done amounted to an acceptance of their proposals. No new proposals, it is certain, had been made. Under what else then than the old ones, could anything be done by the government? The second act was passed only because the first one did not make an appropriation sufficient to meet the proposals, and was, in fact, an acceptance of them; the secretary only being required to complete the matter in form. Mr. Norton, contra. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The present claim for $72,742.82 is the difference in value between felt and tar sheathing, and copper sheathing, the latter of which, by their contract, Gilbert & Secor, the claimants, were required to put on the dock, and did put on it. The claimants do not make any question that by the terms. of the agreement signed by them, and by the Secretary of the Navy, they were bound to copper sheath the dock, and that this was included in the work which they agreed to do. for the aggregate sum already mentioned. Nor do they contend that there was any mistake in reference to that par |