say, without hesitation, that it is impossible to | damental laws, and representative assemblies acquit him of having meditated violence, and In the fifteenth century, the government of violence which might probably end in blood. Castile seems to have been as free as that of He knew that the legality of his proceedings our own country. That of Arragon was beyond was denied; he must have known that some all question far more so. In France, the soveof the accused members were not men likely reign was more absolute. Yet, even in France, to submit peaceably to an illegal arrest. There the States-general alone could constitutionally was every reason to expect that he would find impose taxes; and at the very time when the them in their places, that they would refuse to authority of those assemblies was beginning obey his summons, and that the House would to languish, the Parliament of Paris received support them in their refusal. What course such an accession of strength, as enabled it, would then have been left to him? Unless we in some measure, to perform the functions of suppose that he went on this expedition for the a legislative assembly. Sweden and Denmark sole purpose of making himself ridiculous, had constitutions of a similar description. we must believe that he would have had recourse to force. There would have been a scuffle; and it might not, under such circumstances, have been in his power, even if it were in his inclination, to prevent a scuffle from ending in a massacre. Fortunately for his fame, unfortunately, perhaps, for what he prized far more, the interests of his hatred and his ambition, the affair ended differently. The birds, as he said, were flown, and his plan was dis-government in their own hands. In France concerted. Posterity is not extreme to mark abortive crimes. And thus his advocates have found it easy to represent a step which, but for a trivial accident, might have filled England with mourning and dismay, as a mere error of judgment, wild and foolish, but perfectly innocent. Such was not, however, at the time, the opinion of any party. The most zealous royalists were so much disgusted and ashamed, that they suspended their opposition to the popular party, and, silently, at least, concurred in measures of precaution so strong as almost

to amount to resistance.

Let us overleap two or three hundred years, and contemplate Europe at the commencement of the eighteenth century. Every free constitution, save one, had gone down. That of England had weathered the danger; and was riding in full security. In Denmark and Sweden, the kings had availed themselves of the disputes which raged between the nobles and the commons, to unite all the powers of

the institution of the states was only maintained by lawyers, as a part of the ancient theory of their government. It slept a deep sleep-destined to be broken by a tremen. dous waking. No person remembered the sittings of the three orders, or expected ever to see them renewed. Louis the Fourteenth had imposed on his Parliament a patient silence of sixty years. His grandson, after the war of the Spanish succession, assimilated the constitution of Arragon to that of Castile, and extinguished the last feeble remains of liberty in the Peninsula. In England, on the other From that day, whatever of confidence and hand, the Parliament was infinitely more pow loyal attachment had survived the misrule of erful than it had ever been. Not only was its seventeen years, was, in the great body of the legislative authority fully established, but its people, extinguished, and extinguished forever. right to interfere, by advice almost equivalent As soon as the outrage had failed, the hypo-to command, in every department of the excrisy recommenced. Down to the very eve of his flagitious attempt, Charles had been talking of his respect for the privileges of Parliament and the liberties of his people. He began again in the same style on the morrow; but it was too late. To trust him now would have been, not moderation, but insanity. What common security would suffice against a prince who was evidently watching his season with that cold and patient hatred which, in the long run, tires out every other pas-England alone? It was not surely without a sion?

It is certainly from no admiration of Charles that Mr. Hallam disapproves of the conduct of the House in resorting to arms. But he thinks, that any attempt on the part of that prince to establish a despotism would have been as strongly opposed by his adherents as by his enemies; that the constitution might be considered as out of danger; or, at least, that it had more to apprehend from war than from the king. On this subject Mr. Hallam dilates at length; and with conspicuous ability. We will offer a few considerations, which lead us to incline to a different opinion.

The constitution of England was only one of a large family. In all the monarchies of western Europe, during the middle ages, there existed restraints on the royal authority, fun

ecutive government, was recognised. The appointment of ministers, the relations with foreign powers, the conduct of a war or a negotiation, depended less on the pleasure of the prince than on that of the two Houses.

What then made us to differ? Why was it that, in that epidemic malady of constitutions, ours escaped the destroying influence; or rather that, at the very crisis of the disease, a favourable turn took place in England, and in

cause that so many kindred systems of government, having flourished together so long, languished and expired at almost the same time.

It is the fashion to say, that the progress of civilization is favourable to liberty. The maxim, though on the whole true, must be limited by many qualifications and exceptions. Wherever a poor and rude nation, in which the form of government is a limited monarchy, receives a great accession of wealth and knowledge, it is in imminent danger of falling under arbitrary power.

In such a state of society as that which existed all over Europe during the middle ages, it was not from the king, but from the nobles, that there was danger. Very slight checks sufficed to keep the sovereign in order. His means of corruption and intimidation

ere

very scanty. He had little money, little pa- | jealousy, and resent with prompt indignation, tronage, no military establishment. His armies resembled juries. They were draughted out of the mass of the people; they soon returned to it again; and the character which was habitual prevailed over that which was occasional. A campaign of forty days was too short, the discipline of a national militia too lax, to efface from their minds the feelings of civil life. As they carried to the camp the sentiments and interests of the farm and the shop, so they carried back to the farm and the shop the military accomplishments which they had acquired in the camp. At home they learned how to value their rights-abroad how to defend them.

Little as we are disposed to join in the vulgar clamour on this subject, we think that such an event ought to be, if possible, averted; and this could only be done, if Charles was to be left on the throne, by placing his domestic ar rangements under the control of Parliamen'. A veto on the appointment of ministers was demanded. But this veto Parliament had virtually possessed ever since the Revolution. It is no doubt very far better that this power of the legislature should be exercised, as it is now exercised, when any great occasion calls for interference, than that at every change it should have to signify its approbation or disapproba tion in form. But, unless a new family had been placed on the throne, we do not see how this power could have been exercised as it is now exercised. We again repeat, that no restraints which could be imposed on the princes who

done, as it was done at the Revolution, by expelling the reigning family, and calling to the throne princes, who, relying solely on an elective title, would find it necessary to respect the privileges and follow the advice of the assemblies to which they owed every thing, to pass every bill which the legislature strongly pressed upon them, and to fill the offices of state with men in whom it confided. But as the two Houses did not choose to change the dynasty, it was necessary that they should do directly what at the Revolution was done indirectly. Nothing is more usual than to hear it said, that if the Long Parliament had content ed itself with making such a reform in the government under Charles as was afterwards made under William, it would have had the highest claim to national gratitude; and that in its violence it overshot the mark. But how was it possible to make such a settlement un-reigned after the Revolution could have added der Charles? Charles was not, like William and the princes of the Hanoverian line, bound by community of interests and dangers to the two Houses. It was therefore necessary that they should bind him by treaty and statute.

Mr. Hallam reprobates, in language which has a little surprised us, the nineteen propositions into which the Parliament has digested its scheme. We will ask him whether he does not think that, if James the Second had remained in the island, and had been suffered, as he probably would in that case have been suffered, to keep his crown, conditions to the full as hard would have been imposed on him? On the other hand, if the Long Parliament had pronounced the departure of Charles from London an abdication, and had called Essex or Northumberland to the throne, the new prince might have safely been suffered to reign without such restrictions; his situation would have been a sufficient guarantee. In the nineteen propositions, we see very little to blame except the articles against the Catholics. These, however, were in the spirit of that age; and to some sturdy churchmen in our own, that may seem to palliate even the good which the Long Parliament effected. The regulation with respect to new creations of Peers is the only other article about which we entertain any doubt.

One of the propositions is, that the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour. To this surely no exception will be taken. The right of directing the education and marriage of the princes was most properly claimed by the Parliament on the same ground on which, after the Revolution, it was enacted, that no king, on pain of forfeiting his throne, should espouse a papist. Unless we condemn the statesmen of the Revolution, who conceived that England could not safely be governed by a sovereign married to a Catholic queen, we can scarcely condemn the Long Parliament, because, having a sovereign so situated, they thought it necessary to place him under strict restraints. The influence of Henrietta Maria had already been deeply felt in political affairs. In the regulation of her family, in the education and marriage of her children, it was still more likely to be felt There might be another Catholic queen; possibly, a Catholic king.

to the security which their title afforded. They were compelled to court their parliaments. But from Charles nothing was to be expected which was not set down in the bond.

It was not stipulated that the king should give up his negative on acts of Parliament. But the Commons had certainly shown a strong disposition to exact this security also. "Such a doctrine," says Mr. Hallam, “was in this country as repugnant to the whole history of our laws as it was incompatible with the subsistence of the monarchy in any thing more than a nominal pre-eminence." Now this ar ticle has been as completely carried into effect by the Revolution, as if it had been formally inserted in the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. We are surprised, we confess, that Mr. Hallam should attach so much importance to a prerogative which has not been exercised for a hundred and thirty years, which probably will never be exercised again, and which can scarcely, in any conceivable case, be exercised for a salutary purpose.

But the great security, that without which every other would have been insufficient, was the power of the sword. This both parties thoroughly understood. The Parliament insisted on having the command of the militia, and the direction of the Irish war. "By Ged, not for an hour!" exclaimed the king. Keep the militia," said the queen after the defeat of the royal party, "keep the militia; that will bring back every thing." That, by the old constitution, no military authority was lodged in the Parliament, Mr. Hallam has clearly shown. That it is a species of power which ought not to be permanently lodged in large and divided assemblies, must, we think, in fairness be conceded. Opposition, publicity, long discussion, frequent compromise, these are the characteristics of the proceedings in such bodies. Unity, secrecy, decision, are the qualities which military arrangements require. This undoubtedly was an evil. But, on the other hand, at such a crisis to trust such a king with the very weapon which, in hands less dangerous, had destroyed so many free consti tutions, would have been the extreme of rash ness. The jealousy with which the oligarchy of Venice and the States of Holland regarded their generals and armies induced them per

petually to interfere in matters of which they were incompetent to judge. This policy secared them against military usurpation, but placed them under great disadvantages in war. The uncontrolled power which the king of France exercised over his troops enabled him to conquer his enemies, but enabled him also to oppress his people. Was there any intermediate course? None, we confess, altogether free from objection. But, on the whole, we conceive that the best measure would have been that which the Parliament over and over proposed; that for a limited time the power of the sword should be left to the two Houses, and that it should revert to the crown when the constitution should be firmly established; when the new securities of freedom should be so far strengthened by prescription, that it would be difficult to employ even a standing army for the purpose of subverting them.

collects round it a vast retinue, composed of people who thrive by its custom, or are amused by its display, who may be sometimes reckon. ed, in an ostentatious enumeration, as forming a part of it, but who give no aid to its opera tions, and take but a languid interest in its success: who relax its discipline and dishonour its flag, by their irregularities; and who. after a disaster, are perfectly ready to cut the throats and rifle the baggage of their com panions.

Thus it is in every great division: and thus it was in our civil war. On both sides there was, undoubtedly, enough of crime and enough of error, to disgust any man who did not reflect that the whole history of the species is nothing but a comparison of crimes and errors. Misanthropy is not the temper which qualifies a man to act in great affairs, or to judge of

them.

Mr. Hallam thinks that the dispute might "Of the Parliament," says Mr. Hallam, "it easily have been compromised, by enacting may be said, I think, with not greater severity that the king should have no power to keep a than truth, that scarce two or three public acts standing army on foot without the consent of of justice, humanity, or generosity, and very Parliament. He reasons as if the question had few of political wisdom or courage, are recordbeen merely theoretical-as if at that time no ed of them, from their quarrel with the king to army had been wanted. "The kingdom," he their expulsion by Cromwell." Those who says, "might have well dispensed, in that age, may agree with us in the opinion which we with any military organization." Now, we have expressed as to the original demands of think that Mr. Hallam overlooks the most im- the Parliament, will scarcely concur in this portant circumstance in the whole case. Ire- strong censure. The propositions which the land was at that moment in rebellion; and a Houses made at Oxford, at Uxbridge, and at great expedition would obviously be necessary Newcastle, were in strict accordance with to reduce that kingdom to obedience. The these demands. In the darkest period of the Houses had, therefore, to consider, not an ab-war, they showed no disposition to concede stract question of law, but an urgent practical question, directly involving the safety of the state. They had to consider the expediency of immediately giving a great army to a king, who was at least as desirous to put down the Parliament of England as to conquer the insurgents of Ireland.

any vital principle. In the fulness of their success, they showed no disposition to encroach beyond these limits. In this respect we cannot but think that they showed justice and generosity, as well as political wisdom and courage.

The Parliament was certainly far from faultOf course, we do not mean to defend all their less. We fully agree with Mr. Hallam in remeasures. Far from it. There never was a probating their treatment of Laud. For the perfect man; it would, therefore, be the height individual, indeed, we entertain a more unmiof absurdity to expect a perfect party or a per-tigated contempt than for any other character fect assembly. For large bodies are far more in our history. The fondness with which a likely to err than individuals. The passions portion of the church regards his memory, can are inflamed by sympathy; the fear of punish- be compared only to that perversity of affection ment and the sense of shame are diminished which sometimes leads a mother to select the by partition. Every day we see men do for monster or the idiot of the family as the object their faction what they would die rather than of her especial favour. Mr. Hallam has incido for themselves. dentally observed, that in the correspondence of Laud with Strafford, there are no indica tions of a sense of duty towards God or man. The admirers of the archbishop have, in con sequence, inflicted upon the public a crowd of extracts, designed to prove the contrary. Now, in all those passages, we see nothing which a prelate as wicked as Pope Alexander or Car. dinal Dubois might not have written. They indicate no sense of duty to God or man; but simply a strong interest in the prosperity and dignity of the order to which the writer be longed; an interest which, when kept within Each of them attracted to itself in multi- certain limits, does not deserve censure, but tudes those fierce and turbid spirits, to whom which can never be considered as a virtue. the clouds and whirlwinds of the political hur- Laud is anxious to accommodate satisfactorily ricane are the atmosphere of life. A party, the disputes in the University of Dublin. He like a camp, has its sutlers and camp-follow-regrets to hear that a church is used as a stable, ers, as well as its soldiers. In its progress it and that the benefices of Irelan 1 are very poor

No private quarrel ever happens, in which the right and wrong are so exquisitely divided, that all the right lies on one side, and all the wrong on the other. But here was a schism which separated a great nation into two parties. Of these parties, each was composed of many smaller parties. Each contained many members, who differed far less from their moderate opponents than from their violent allies. Each reckoned among its supporters many who were determined in their choice, by some accident of birth, of connection, or of local situation.