Mr. Mill tells us, that if a government be composed of the three simple forms, which he will not admit the British constitution to be, two of the component parts will inevitably join against the third. Now, if two of them combine and act as one, this case evidently resolves itself into the last; and all the observations which we have just made will fully apply to it. Mr. Mill says, that "any two of the par ties, by combining, may swallow up the third;" and afterwards asks, "How is it possible to prevent two of them from combining to swallow up the third?" Surely Mr. Mill must be aware, that in politics two is not always the double of one. If the concurrence of all the three branches of the legislature be necessary to every law, each branch will possess constitutional power sufficient to protect it against any thing but that physical force, from which no form of government is secure. Mr. Mill reminds us of the Irishman, who could not be brought to understand how one juryman could possibly starve out eleven others.

other almost entirely chosen by a privileged ample, may, by physical force, subjugate them class, who possess the elective franchise on both nor is there any form of government, account of their property, or their connection Mr. Mill's Utopian democracy not excepted, with certain corporations. Mr. Mill's argu- secure from such an occurrence. We are ment proves that, from the time that these two speaking of the powers with which the consti powers were mingled in our government, that tution invests the two branches of the legisla is, from the very first dawn of our history, one ture; and we ask Mr. Mill how, on his own or the other must have been constantly en- principles, he can maintain that one of them croaching. According to him, moreover, all will be able to encroach on the other, if the the encroachments must have been on one consent of the other be necessary to such enside. For the first encroachment could only croachment? have been made by the stronger, and that first encroachment would have made the stronger stronger still. It is, therefore, matter of absolute demonstration, that either the Parliament was stronger than the crown in the reign of Henry VIII., or that the crown was stronger than the Parliament in 1641. "Hippocrate dira ce que lui plaira," says the girl in Molière; "mais le cocher est mort." Mr. Mill may say what he pleases; but the English constitution is still alive. That, since the Revolution, the Parliament has possessed great power in the state, is what nobody will dispute. The king, on the other hand, can create new peers, and can dissolve Parliaments. William sustained severe mortifications from the House of Commons, and was, indeed, unjustifiably oppressed. Anne was desirous to change a ministry which had a majority in both houses. She watched her moment for a dissolution, created twelve tory peers, and succeeded. Thirty years later, the House of Commons drove Walpole from his seat. In 1784, George III. was able to keep Mr. Pitt in office, But is it certain that two of the branches of in the face of a majority of the House of Com- the legislature will combine against the third? mons. In 1804, the apprehension of a defeat "It appears to be as certain," says Mr. Mill, in Parliament, compelled the same king to part "as any thing which depends upon human from his most favoured minister. But in 1807, will; because there are strong motives in fahe was able to do exactly what Anne had done vour of it, and none that can be conceived in nearly a hundred years before. Now, had the opposition to it." He subsequently sets forth power of the king increased during the inter-what these motives are. The interest of the vening century, or had it remained stationary? Is it possible that the one lot among the infinite number should have fallen to us? If not, Mr. Mill has proved that one of the two parties must have been constantly taking from the other. Many of the ablest men in England think that the influence of the crown has, on the whole, increased since the reign of Anne. Others think that the Parliament has been growing in strength. But of this there is no doubt, that both sides possessed great power then, and possess great power now. Surely, if there were the least truth in the argument of Mr. Mill, it could not possibly be a matter of doubt, at the end of a hundred and twenty years, whether the one side or the other had been the gainer.posed to that of the people. But is it identical But we ask pardon. We forgot that a fact, irreconcilable with Mr. Mill's theory, furnishes, in his opinion, the strongest reason for adhering to the theory. To take up the question in another manner, is it not plain that there may be two bodies, each possessing a perfect and entire power, which cannot be taken from it without its own concurrence? What is the meaning of the words stronger and weaker, when applied to such bodies as these? The one may, indeed, by physical force altogether estroy the other. But this is not the question. A third party, a general of their own. for ex

democracy is, that each individual should receive protection. The interest of the king and the aristocracy is, to have all the power that they can obtain, and to use it for their own ends. Therefore the king and the aristocracy have all possible motives for combining against the people. If our readers will look back to the passage quoted above, they will see that we represent Mr. Mill's argument quite fairly.

Now we should have thought that, without the help of either history or experience, Mr. Mill would have discovered, by the light of his own logic, the fallacy which lurks, and indeed scarcely lurks, under this pretended demɔnstration. The interest of the king may be op

with that of the aristocracy? In the very page which contains this argument, intended to prove that the king and the aristocracy will coalesce against the people, Mr. Mill attempts to show that there is so strong an opposition of interest between the king and the aristocracy, that if the powers of government are divided between them, the one will inevitably usurp the power of the other. If so, he is not entitled to conclude that they will combine to destroy the power of the people, merely because their interests may be at variance with those of the people. He is bound to show, not merely that

in all communities the interest of a king must be opposed to that of the people, but also that, in all communities, it must be more directly opposed to the interest of the people than to the interest of the aristocracy. But he has not shown this. Therefore he has not proved his proposition on his own principles. To quote history would be a mere waste of time. Every school-boy, whose studies have gone so far as the abridgments of Goldsmith, can mention instances in which sovereigns have allied themselves with the people against the aristocracy, and in which nobles have allied themselves with the people against the sovereign. In general, when there are three parties, every one of which has much to fear from the others, it is not found that two of them combine to plunder the third. If such a combination be formed, it scarcely ever effects its purpose. It soon becomes evident which member of the coalition is likely to be the greater gainer by the transaction. He becomes ar object of jealousy to his ally, who, in all probability, changes sides, and compels him to restore what he has taken. Everybody knows how Henry VIII. trimmed between Francis and the Emperor Charles. But it is idle to cite examples of the operation of a principle which is illustrated in almost every page of history, ancient or modern, and to which almost every state in Europe has, at one time or another, been indebted for its independence.

derstands the words, "interest of the com munity."

It does not appear very easy, on Mr. Mill's principles, to find out any mode of making the interest of the representative body identical with that of the constituent body. The plan proposed by Mr. Mill is simply that of very frequent election. "As it appears," says he, "that limiting the duration of their power is a security against the sinister interest of the people's representatives, so it appears that it is the only security of which the nature of the case admits." But all the arguments by which Mr. Mill has proved monarchy and aristocracy to be pernicious, will, as it appears to us, equally prove this security to be no security at all. Is it not clear that the representatives, as soon as they are elected, are an aristocracy with an interest opposed to the interest of the community? Why should they not pass a law for extending the term of their power from one year to ten years, or declare themselves sena. tors for life? If the whole legislative power is given to them, they will be constitutionally competent to do this. If part of the legislative power is withheld from them, to whom is that part given? Is the people to retain it, and to express its assent or dissent in primary assemblies? Mr. Mill himself tells us that the community can only act when assembled, and that, when assembled, it is incapable of acting. Or is it to be provided, as in some of the American republics, that no change in the fundamental laws shall be made without the consent of a convention, specially elected for the purpose? Still the difficulty recurs: Why may not the members of the convention betray their "In the grand discovery of modern times, trust, as well as the members of the ordinary the system of representation, the solution of all legislature? When private men, they may the difficulties, both speculative and practical, have been zealous for the interests of the comwill perhaps be found. If it cannot, we seem munity. When candidates, they may have to be forced upon the extraordinary conclusion, pledged themselves to the cause of the constithat good government is impossible. For as tution. But as soon as they are a convention, there is no individual or combination of indi- as soon as they are separated from the people, viduals, except the community itself, who would as soon as the supreme power is put into their not have an interest in bad government, if in-hands, commences that interest, opposite to the trusted with its powers, and as the community itself is incapable of exercising those powers, and must intrust them to certain individuals, the conclusion is obvious: the community itself must check those individuals, else they will follow their interest, and produce bad government. But how is it the community can check? The community can act only We know well that there is no real danger when assembled; and when assembled, it is in such a case. But there is no danger, only incapable of acting. The community, how-because there is no truth in Mr. Mill's princiever, can choose representatives."

Mr. Mill has now, as he conceives, demonstrated that the simple forms of government are bad, and that the mixed forms cannot posibly exist. There is still, however, it seems, a hope for mankind.

The next question is-How must the representative body be constituted? Mr. Mill lays down two principles, about which, he says, "it is unlikely that there will be any dispute."

"First, The checking body must have a degree of power sufficient for the business of checking.

"Secondly, It must have an identity of interest with the community. Otherwise, it will make a mischievous use of its power."

The first of these propositions certainly admits of no dispute. As to the second, we shall hereafter take occasion to make some remarks on the sense in which Mr. Mill un

interest of the community, which must, according to Mr. Mill, produce measures opposite to the interests of the community. We must find some other means, therefore, of checking this check upon a check; some other prop to carry the tortoise, that carries the elephant, that carries the world,

ples. If men were what he represents them to be, the letter of the very constitution which he recommends would afford no safeguard against bad government. The real security is this, that legislators will be deterred by the fear of resistance and of infamy from acting in the manner which we have described. But restraints, exactly the same in kind, and differ. ing only in degree, exist in all forms of go vernment. That broad line of distinction which Mr. Mill tries to point out between monarchies and aristocracies on the one side, and democracies on the other, has in fact no existence. In no form of government is there an absolute identity of interest between the

people and their rulers. In every form of government the rulers stand in some awe of the people. The fear of resistance and the sense of shame operate, in a certain degree, on the most absolute kings and the most illiberal oligarchies. And nothing but the fear of resist ance and the sense of shame preserves the freedom of the most democratic communities from the encroachments of their annual and biennial delegates.

We have seen how Mr. Mill proposes to render the interest of the representative body identical with that of the constituent body. The next question is, in what manner the interest of the constituent body is to be rendered identical with that of the community. Mr. Mill shows that a minority of the community, consisting even of many thousands, would be a bad constituent body, and, indeed, merely a aumerous aristocracy.

"The benefits of the representative system," says he, "are lost in all cases in which the interests of the choosing body are not the same with those of the community. It is very evident that, if the community itself were the choosing body, the interest of the community and that of the choosing body would be the same."

On these grounds Mr. Mill recommends that all males of mature age, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, shall have votes. But why not the women too? This question has often been asked in parliamentary debate, and has never, to our knowledge, received a plausible answer. Mr. Mill escapes from it as fast as he can. But we shall take the liberty to dwell a little on the words of the oracle. "One thing," says he, "is pretty clear, that all those individuals whose interests are involved in those of other individuals may be struck off without inconvenience. . . .

this light women may be regarded, the interest of almost all of whom is involved either in that of their fathers, or in that of their husbands."

terest of a Chinese the same with that of the woman whom he harnesses to his plough? Is the interest of an Italian the same with that of the daughter whom he devotes to God! The interest of a respectable Englishman may be said, without any impropriety, to be identi cal with that of his wife. But why is it so? Because human nature is not what Mr. Mi.l conceives it to be; because civilized men, pursuing their own happiness in a social state, are not Yahoos fighting for carrion; because there is a pleasure in being loved and esteemed, as well as in being feared and servilely obeyed. Why does not a gentleman restrict his wife to the bare maintenance which the law would compel him to allow her, that he may have more to spend on his personal pleasures? Because, if he loves her, he has pleasure in seeing her pleased; and because, even if he dislikes her, he is unwilling that the whole neighbourhood should cry shame on his meanness and ill-nature. Why does not the legislature, altogether composed of males, pass a law to deprive women of all civil privileges whatever, and reduce them to the state of slaves? By passing such a law, they would gratify what Mr. Mill tells us is an inseparable part of human nature, the desire to possess unlimited power of inflicting pain upon others. That they do not pass such a law, though they have the power to pass it, and that no man in England wishes to see such a law passed, proves that the desire to possess unlimited power of inflicting pain is not inseparable from human nature.

If there be in this country an identity of interest between the two sexes, it cannot possibly arise from any thing but the pleasure of being loved, and of communicating happiness. For that it does not spring from the mere in. . Instinct of sex, the treatment which women experience over the greater part of the world abundantly proves. And if it be said that our laws of marriage have produced it, this only removes the argument a step further; for those laws have been made by males. Now, if the kind feelings of one-half of the species be a sufficient security for the happiness of the other, why may not the kind feelings of a mo narch or an aristocracy be sufficient at least to prevent them from grinding the people to the very utmost of their power?

If Mr. Mill will examine why it is that women are better treated in England than in Persia, he may perhaps find out, in the course of his inquiries, why it is that the Danes are better governed than the subjects of Caligula.

If we were to content ourselves with saying, in answer to all the arguments in Mr. Mill's Essay, that the interest of a king is involved in that of the community, we should be accused, and justly, of talking nonsense. Yet such an assertion would not, as far as we can perceive, be more unreasonable than that which Mr. Mill has here ventured to make. Without adducing one fact, without taking the trouble to perplex the question by one sophism, he placidly dogmatizes away the interests of one-half of the human race. If there be a word of truth in history, women have always We now come to the most important practibeen, and still are, over the greater part of the cal question in the whole Essay. Is it desiraglobe, humble companions, playthings, cap-ble that all males arrived at years of discretives, menials, beasts of burden. Except in a few happy and highly civilized communities, they are strictly in a state of personal slavery. Even in those countries where they are best treated, the laws are generally unfavourable to them, with respect to almost all the points in which they are most deeply interested.

Mr. Mill is not legislating for England or the United States; but for mankind. Is then the interest of a Turk the same with that of he girls who compose his haram? Is the in

tion should vote for representatives, or should a pecuniary qualification be required? Mr. Mill's opinion is, that the lower the qualifica tion the better; and that the best system is that in which there is none at all.

"The qualification," says he, "must either be such as to embrace the majority of the population, or something less than the majority. Suppose, in the first place, that it em braces the majority, the question is, whether the majority would have an interest in op

The first remark which we have to make on this argument is, that, by Mr. Mill's own account, even a government in which every human being should vote would still be defec-distinction which Mr. Mill has altogether over tive. For, under a system of universal suffrage, the majority of the electors return the representative, and the majority of the representatives make the law. The whole people may vote, therefore, but only the majority govern. So that, by Mr. Mill's own confession, the most perfect system of government conceivable is one in which the interest of the ruling body to oppress, though not great, is something.

It is scarcely necessary to discuss the effects which a general spoliation of the rich would produce. It may indeed happen, that where a legal and political system full of abuses is inseparably bound up with the institution of property, a nation may gain by a single convulsion, in which both perish together. The

interest of the next generation, and it may be for the remote interest of the present generation, that property should be held sacred. And so no doubt it will be for the interest of the next pacha, and even for that of the present pacha, if he should hold office long, that the inhabitants of his pachalic should be encouraged to accumulate wealth. Scarcely any despotic sove-price is fearful: but if, when the shock is over, reign has plundered his subjects to a large a new order of things should arise, under extent, without having reason, before the end which property may enjoy security, the indusof his reign, to regret it. Everybody knows try of individuals will soon repair the devastahow bitterly Louis the Fourteenth, towards the tion. Thus we entertain no doubt that the close of his life, lamented his former extrava- Revolution was, on the whole, a most salutary gance. If that magnificent prince had not event for France. But would France have expended millions on Marli and Versailles, and gained, if, ever since the year 1793, she had tens of millions on the aggrandizement of his been governed by a democratic convention! grandson, he would not have been compelled | If Mr. Mill's principles be sound, we say that at last to pay servile court to low-born money- almost her whole capital would by this time lenders, to humble himself before men, on have been annihilated. As soon as the first whom, in the days of his pride, he would not explosion was beginning to be forgotten, as have vouchsafed to look, for the means of sup- soon as wealth again began to germinate, as porting even his own household. Examples soon as the poor again began to compare their to the same effect might easily be multiplied. cottages and salads with the hotels and banBut despots, we see, do plunder their subjects, quets of the rich, there would have been an though history and experience tell them, that other scramble for property, another maximum, by prematurely exacting the means of profu- another general confiscation, another reign of sion, they are in fact devouring the seed-corn, terror. Four or five such convulsions followfrom which the future harvest of revenue is to ing each other, at intervals of ten or twelve spring. Why then should we suppose that the years, would reduce the most flourishing counpeople will be deterred from procuring imme- tries of Europe to the state of Barbary or the diate relief and enjoyment by the fear of distant Morea. calamities, of calamities which, perhaps, may not be fully felt till the times of their grandchildren?

The civilized part of the world has now nothing to fear from the hostility of savage nations. Once the deluge of barbarism has These conclusions are strictly drawn from passed over it, to destroy and to fertilize; and Mr. Mill's own principles: and, unlike most of in the present state of mankind we enjoy a full the conclusions which he has himself drawn security against that calamity. That flood will from those principles, they are not, as far as no more return to cover the earth. But is it we know, contradicted by facts. The case of possible that, in the bosom of civilization itthe United States is not in point. In a country self, may be engendered the malady which shall where the necessaries of life are cheap and the destroy it? Is it possible that institutions may wages of labour high, where a man who has be established which, without the help of earthno capital but his legs and arms may expect quake, of famine, of pestilence, or of the foreign to become rich by industry and frugality, it is sword, may undo the work of so many ages not very decidedly even for the immediate of wisdom and glory, and gradually sweep advantage of the poor to plunder the rich; and away taste, literature, science, commerce, mathe punishment of doing so would very speedilynufactures, every thing but the rude arts nefollow the offence. But in countries in which the great majorities live from hand to mouth, and in which vast masses of wealth have been accumulated by a comparatively small number, the case is widely different. The immediate want is, at particular seasons, craving, imperious, irresistible. In our own time, it has steeled men to the fear of the gallows, and urged them on the point of the bayonet. And if these men had at their command that gallows, and those bayonets, which now scarcely restrain them, what is to be expected? Nor is this state of things one which can exist only under a bad government. If there be the least truth in the doctrines of the school to which Mr. Mill belongs, the increase of population will necessarily produce it everywhere. The increase of population is accelerated by good and cheap government. Therefore, the better the government, the greater is the inequality of conditions; and the greater the inequality of conditions, the stronger are the motives which impel the populace to spoliation. As for America, we appeal to the twentieth century.

cessary to the support of animal life? Is it possible, that in two or three hundred years, a few lean and half-naked fishermen may divide with owls and foxes the ruins of the greatest of European cities-may wash their nets amidst the relics of her gigantic docks, and build their huts out of the capitals of her stately cathedrals? If the principles of Mr. Mill be sound, we say, without hesitation, that the form of government which he recommends will assuredly produce all this. But if these principles be unsound, if the reasonings by which we have opposed them be just, the higher and middling orders are the natural representa tives of the human race. Their interest may be opposed, in some things, to that of their poorer contemporaries, but it is identical with that of the innumerable generations which are to follow.

Mr. Mill concludes his essay, by answering an objection often made to the project of universal suffrage-that the people do not under stand their own interests. We shall not ge through his arguments on this subject, because