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and important problem. And, perhaps, this problem, in the good providence of God, against the anxieties, fears, and protests of good men, is to be wrought out in France, just as God in his good providence led the older New England Commonwealths to complete religious liberty -to the entire separation of the church and state-to the entire abolition of the compulsory support of religion-against the anxieties, fears, protests, and prayers of a majority of the Christians in those commonwealths-a result which all now acknowledge to be good. Let us wait in hope, if not in faith.

We ought also to mention one other reason of anxiety which presents itself the financial embarrassments of the government.

These, it ought to be remembered, have been produced, in the greater part, by the selfish extravagance of the overthrown dynasty. And as to the other part, it is nothing more than must temporarily result from that interruption of commercial confidence and productive industry which accompanies any fundamental change in government. That interruption will be only temporary. It is already passing away. And when quiet and confidence are again restored, the enterprise

and energy of a free people, and the economy and beneficence of a free government, will, doubtless, give to France greater financial prosperity than she has ever enjoy. ed. On this point, we shall do well to consider the financial embarrassments of the period during, and for years subsequent to, our own revolution, and the prosperity which has ensued.

On the whole our hopes greatly surpass our fears, respecting the French revolution of 1848, and constrain us to rejoice in it as an event of great promise for France. That church and state will be separated, and that a form of government, truly republican, will be established, and prosperously administered, we expect, though not with the greatest confidence. But, that the result will be a decided progress in civil and religious liberty and prosperity, we have no doubt whatever.

We have called this revolution an event of great promise for France. That promise is not for France only, but for all nations. Its influencewho can measure it? It goes on its way swift and resistless as the electric power. And its waywhere will it end? Verily its line will go out through all the earth, and its words to the end of the world.

THE ETHICS OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

THERE is one grand topic in the science of duty to which neither Paley nor Wayland has assigned a chapter, and of which the "Christian Directory" of Baxter, the "Ductor Dubitantium" of Jeremy Taylor, and all the tomes of the more ancient casuists, take no notice. In no system of Ethics with which we are acquainted, in no collection or compilation of casuistry which VOL. VI.

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has come to our knowledge, is there any formal attempt to trace out and apply the principles by which a citizen in a republic should be guided in the exercise of his right of suffrage. How shall I give my vote in a popular election ?-is a great question for conscientious men in these United States. It is a question which comes up not only once in four years at the election of a

President, but every two years at the election of Representatives in Congress, and every year once and again at the state and municipal elections. The question has been a practical question, of frequent recurrence, in Great Britain, ever since England had any rudiments of free institutions. It is now likely to become a question of the same kind of practical importance, in almost every country of Christendom. And yet, with the exception of here and there an occasional sermon by some New England preacher, who gets much censure for meddling with a theme so far beyond his province, we are not aware that any serious attempt has ever been made to define and exhibit the principles by which a free citizen should be guided in the performance of his high duty as a constituent member of the State.

It is not with the expectation of supplying so great a deficiency, that we have ventured to introduce the subject thus distinctly to public at tention. It will be enough for us to throw out the few thoughts and inquiries which occur to us, and which may invite others to a more ample and exact discussion. In due time, we doubt not, the Ethics of the Right of Suffrage will be a distinct chapter in all systems of Ethical Science-a chapter without which no system can be recognized as complete in a free country. If our humble effort may contribute any thing to such a result, that is all we hope for.

I. We begin then by asking, Are the ethics of the right of suffrage defined and settled by any universal rule of the Christian religion laid down in the Scriptures? Is there any express rule in the Bible which will always show us how to vote in 'an election? We should hardly have thought of this question, if we had not sometimes heard and seen Scripture quoted to show conclusively which of two or three tickets must

needs be preferred by all voters who recognize the authority of the Bible. The text which above all others has been used in this way, is a part of the advice which Jethro gave to Moses, [Ex. xviii, 21,]"Thou shalt provide out of all the people, able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness, and place such over them to be rulers of thousands, and rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens." Doubtless this was good advice to Moses. That it may reasonally be regarded as advice divinely prompted, we will freely admit. That it contains principles which every conscientious man will spontaneously regard when called to give his vote or influence in a popular election, we will not for a moment question. But that it gives us a formula by which the individual voter must invariably be governed in the exercise of his right of suffrage, to the exclusion of all other considerations-that all doubts and difficulties that may arise in attempting to decide between different candidates of different parties and systems policy, may be solved by the appli cation of this formula-is what can not be made to appear. Such a thing as a popular election in a free com monwealth, where some thousands

of

or, as is the case with us every four years, some millions-of elec tors, are to determine by their votes, not only what men shall hold the reins of power, but what shall be the course and policy of the government,-is a thing which neither Jethro nor Moses had ever heard of, and to which no passage in the Old Testament or in the New makes any allusion. The case in reference to which the advice of Jethro was offered, was essentially different from the case of an indi vidual elector in a republic. Moses had in his own hands the entire and exclusive power of appointment to office. Of course the question of his duty in relation to every appoint

any question touching the correctness of this improved translation, it is enough to say that the precept, after all, does not tell us what kind of politics-whether democratic, whig, or liberty-party-is such as becometh the gospel of Christ. As to the ethics of the right of suffrage, we are left to judge for ourselves by other light than that which this text affords us.

II. If then Christianity, in its au

ment, was a question involving only a single element. In selecting a man for any particular office, he needed only to be satisfied as to the man's qualifications. Is he able? is he firm in his allegiance to the national religion?-is he a man of integrity?—is he a man who will not be in danger of being moved from his duty by mercenary considerations?-has he these qualifications above any other man that can be thought of for such an office?-thentic standards, prescribes no defithese were the only points which Moses had any occasion to consider in the exercise of his appointing power. But had he been merely one of twenty, or even one of a triumvirate, invested with the appointing power, then in every case of conferring an office, the question of his duty would have involved another element, and would have had some resemblance to the question respecting the duty of a voter in a popular election.

We remember another text which has been quoted and argued from, as showing how men must needs vote, who are governed by Christian principles. Paul, writing to the Christians at Philippi, and having expressed a confident hope that his life would be spared and that he would be again permitted to visit them, says, as represented by King James's translators, [Phil. i, 27,]" Only let your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ; that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, I may hear of your affairs, that ye stand fast in one spirit," &c. The word translated "Let your conversation be," is nоlitevεσ08,-which sounds somewhat like our English, or Anglo-American word, politics; and so, by an improved version, the text is made to read, "Only let your politics be as it becometh the gospel of Christ,"—that is, in the performance of all your civil and political duties, and especially in determining what party to vote with, act as Christians. Without raising

nite rule which can relieve us of the necessity of inquiring after the principles of duty in this matter, it is plain that the elector in exercising his right of suffrage, instead of depending on some divinely prescribed formula, must use his best discretion, just as every man must needs do in a thousand other questions which are referred to the decision of an enlightened moral sense. And we may suppose him to ask in the next place, "Am I bound to throw my ballot always for that man whom I judge to be the best man, without regard to any other consideration than that of his fitness for the office?" An affirmative answer to this question implies that the individual voter ought to act in all instances just as if he had an unlimited control over the election of the men who are to be entrusted with the functions of government. But does his duty require him-does it even permit him to act thus? Is not the fact that his right in the matter is the right, not of appointment, but only of suffrage, a fact that materially affects his duty? Is he not bound to take some notice of the known views and intentions of other electors? Is he not bound to consider beforehand what effect his vote is likely to have upon the result? May he not consult with others beforehand as to whom he and they can agree to vote for? Ought he not to do so? If he has one opinion as to the fittest man for the office, and others have a different opinion, may it not sometimes

be his duty to yield his opinion to theirs, and so to give his ballot for a man whom he does not regard as quite the best man. If he knows in advance that the best man--or the man whom he regards as suchcan not be persuaded to accept the office, must he still vote for him? If he knows in advance that his best man can not be elected, must he still refuse to vote for any other man, be the certain consequences what they may? If it is perfectly understood that one or the other of two candidates will be elected, must he, under the conscientious necessity of voting at all hazards for the best man, give a vote which has no other tendency than to secure the election not only of a much inferior man, but, as the case may be, of the very worst man? Let the voter, instead of yielding blindly to an unauthorized formula, throw himself upon the guidance of his moral sense enlightened by the analysis of the case in which he is to act, and he will see that he is under responsibilities for which that formula makes no provision.

III. But our inquirer is not yet satisfied. He has other questions to propound." Admitting that I am not required to give my ballot always for the one whom I regard as absolutely the best man, inust I not at least vote always for one whom I regard as a good man? Is it right for me in any case to give my ballot for a man who is not only comparatively deficient but positively objectionable?" And this question takes a great many forms. One will ask, "Is it not palpably wrong to vote in any circumstances for a duellist, or for a Sabbath-breaker, or for one who speaks profanely?" Another asks, "Can I vote for a slaveholder without being a partaker in his sin ?" Another asks, "Can I, in any case vote for a Roman Catholic ?"--or, "Can I vote for a Unitarian ?"—or, "Can I vote for a man who does not acknowledge the supreme authority of the Bible ?"

Now in regard to questions of this class, nothing is plainer than that the considerations which they suggest are considerations deserving the most serious attention of every man who would exercise his right of suffrage according to the will of God. In many cases-in perhaps the majority of cases as they actual ly occur, no question involved in the election is paramount to the question of the personal character of the men who are to be entrusted with the various powers of goverament. There is a state election, we will suppose, just at hand; and you are inquiring how you shall exercise your right of suffrage. One or the other of two leading parties is sure to get the control of the state for the ensuing year. the ensuing year. With one of these parties you have a general agreement of opinion, so far as questions purely political are concerned. Its success in the pending election will have the effect of advancing those views of a protective tariff, or those views of the best mode of keeping the public ac counts, or those views of the banking system, which you regard as right. But that party has proposed as its candidate for the highest office in the state, a showy, windy dema. gogue, a man in whose personal integrity you have no confidence, a man whose influence in society is a corrupting influence, a man known as a despiser of the Sabbath and an enemy of religious institutions, a man whom, if he were your next door neighbor, you would not think of making the executor of your will and the guardian of your children. At the same time, the other partyerroneous as you esteem it in respect to the questions of public policy which are at issue-proposes as its candidate for the same office a man of the very highest and purest personal character. In such a case as this, the question of your duty is easily answered. What are the merely commercial or financial in

terests, supposed to be involved in the election, when compared with the moral interest which the state has in the character of her own chief magistrate? In the view of every man who has any just moral sensibilities, the benefit which will result to the state from having in her highest place of honor a man who will honor the place instead of one who will dishonor it, exceeds by far any benefit which can be expected to arise from the success of your views on the political questions which divide the parties. Your moral sense, if you will but listen to it, tells you what to do. So in regard to all offices which the people confer directly or indirectly, and which may therefore be regarded as tokens of the people's favor. Principles of political economy-all the ordinary questions which are the ostensible division between political parties are of little consequence to the common welfare, in comparison with the influence which comes from the personal character of the men of whom it may be said, Behold the men whom the people delight to honor!

Yet it is not safe to say, without any qualification, that the conscientious elector may never vote for a candidate whose personal character is exceptionable. Nor is it safe to assert absolutely that there can be no case in which the elector may be bound in conscience to vote for that one of two candidates whose personal character is more exceptionable than the personal character of his competitor. There may be cases, in which the personal character of the man voted for is of far less moment than the questions of public policy, which are to be determined by the election. The duty of voting for men of unexceptionable private character, or even the duty of voting for the better man of two candidates instead of the worse man of the two, is not, like the duty of veracity, a simple and invariable obligation. No law of God revealed in the Scrip

tures-no law of God revealed in the instinctive moral sense, gives us any such formula to be followed at all hazards. If we had such a formula, duly authenticated as from God, all consideration of consequences would be preposterous; the consequences would be God's, and to him alone would it belong to care for them. But having no such formula, we are bound to judge for ourselves what is right, in each of the innumerable complex cases that arise for our decision. It may happen that the question really at issue in a national election, is not simply whether this man who has never been concerned in a duel, or that man who has fought in duels, shall be president, but the far more momentous question between peace and war, or the equally momentous question between the extension of the area of freedom and the extension of the area of slavery. It may be that every vote given for the respectable gentleman who never penned and never received a challenge-nay every vote not actually given for his exceptionable competitor, is in effect a vote for a system of measures which will involve the country in a most needless war and which will consign millions of men to the horrors of a life-long bondage. In some state elections, the question may be not simply whether some devout communicant in the Protestant Episcopal Church, or some Presbyterian elder, shall be elected governor in preference to a man who makes no religious profession or pretension, but whether that state shall commit itself for the abolition of slavery within its own jurisdiction. That religious man may have pledged himself against the fanaticism of attempting to abolish an institution which is sanctified in his eyes by its having had a place among the arrangements of Abraham's household; while that irreligious man with all his faults has become the leader in a bold and there

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