constitutional issues urged were held not to be raised or not supported by the facts. In Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States a vendor of coal at prices fixed by the Fuel Administration sued the government for the additional amount that it would have received had it been free to sell for what purchasers would have paid It alleged that “a contract on the part of the government must be implied, both from the statute and by virtue of the Fifth Amendment, on the ground that its property was taken for public use." To this Mr. Justice Holmes replied that "if the law requires a party to give up property to a third person without adequate compensation the remedy is, if necessary, to refuse to obey it, not to sue the lawmaker." The government, he said, did not take the property by limiting the price at which it could be sold, "and no lawmaking power promises by implication to make good losses that may be incurred by obedience to its commands."'** In American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States a vendor of copper to the government relied on the Fifth Amendment to get as just compensation the price fixed by the Price fixing Committee of the War Industries Board at the time when deliveries were made instead of the lower price previously fixed when the order for the copper was given. It claimed that it had accepted the order under duress and that therefore the copper was requisitioned, but the court found that it had made a contract with the government and that its right was limited by the price therein agreed upon.21 Though the only question technically determined in Sloan Ship L. Rev. 447; C. W. Middlekauff, "The Enforcement of the Liquor Laws," 4 ILL. L. QUART. 107; and a note in 10 Calif. L.. Rev. 70. 18 259 U. S. —, 42 Sup. Ct. 481 (1922). 19 In Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 C. S. - 42 Sup Ct. 4 (1922), a vendor of coal at government fixed prices contended that the Act of August 10, 1917, contained a promise on the part of the government to guarantee a just return, but the court found that the section thus relied on applied only to sales to the government and not to sales to private purcha ers, 20 259 U. S., 42 Sup. Ct. 420 (1922). 21 The Lever Act, which had been held void for vagueness in a criminal prosecution (see 19 MICH. L. REV. 9, 402), was also declared void in a civit action in a New York case noted in 31 YALE L.. J. 108. The extent of the war powers is considered in Harold M. Bowman, "The Constitution in the War," 2 BOSTON U. L. REV. 22. Issues growing out of the war are discussed yards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation22 was one of statutory construction whether Congress had made the defendant in effect an alter ego of the government or a private corporation authorized to act as agent of the government, the decision illustrates significant new modes of governmental action whose constitutionality apparently was unquestioned. Under statutory authority the shipping board created the fleet corporation under the laws of the District of Columbia, with capacity to sue and be sued. All the stock was in fact owned by the government, though this was not necessary under the statute. To the original power to purchase, construct and operate ships was later added more extensive authority to exercise functions conferred upon the President and by him delegated either directly to the corporation or to the shipping board, with permission to act through the corporation. The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, denied to the corporation immunity from suit even in the courts of the states. In dissenting, Chief Justice Taft suggests that the majority opinion may be confined to the allegations on the pleadings and to acts of the corporation in the earlier stages of its existence before it became the repository of powers derived from the President. His dissent is based on apprehension that the decision goes farther than this and treats the defendant as a private corporation in all respects. He agrees with the majority that the corporation is not entitled to priority in bankruptcy proceedings of its debtors, since he thinks that the United States itself enjoys such priority only in respect to taxes. Justices Van Devanter and Clarke join in the dissent. The exact status of the fleet corporation will not clear until we have more decisions, but the power of the national government to go into business as the sole stockholder of a private corporation is clearly indicated. Thus the United States may emulate the enterprise of North Dakota in its adventures in the realm of state capitalism. The Shipping Act was passed before the entrance of the United in Charles Kellogg Burdick, "The Treaty-Making Power and the Control of International Relations," 7 CORNELL L. Q. 34, and Julius Henry Cohen, "The Obligation of the United States to Return Enemy Alien Property," 21 COLUM. L. Rev. 666. States into the war, but, as Mr. Justice Holmes suggests, "no doubt in contemplation of the possibility of war, to create a naval reserve and a merchant marine." This is the only reference to the constitutional source of the congressional authority thus exercised. Whether such business enterprise might be entered upon by virtue of the commerce power or the postal power, or both combined, without the aid of the war power, are questions that will not be definitely settled by any sanction conferred upon the activities of the fleet corporation. By a later statute of June 5, 1920, the property of the fleet corporation has been transferred to the shipping board, with the result that the payment of judgments obtained against the corporation may be dependent upon the grace or favor of the government.23 The long-established power of the national government to deny the use of the mails to persons against whom so-called fraud orders have been issued by the postmaster general after an administrative hearing was reaffirmed in Leach v. Carlile over the dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. The former in his dissenting opinion. pointed out that other modes of carrying letters are forbidden by 23 On the general subject involved in the Sloan case, see Eldred E. Jacobsen, "The Status of Government-Owned and Government-Controlled Corporations," 10 GEORGETOWN L. J. (No. 2) 1. Three cases involving issues raised by proprietary enterprises of the national government may be noted here. In Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. —, 42 Sup. Ct. 32 (1921), the United States was held entitled to possession of land on the Virginia side of the Potomac River which had originally been below lowwater mark until filled in by the government. Whether the private owner of the adjoining land inshore had any rights for loss of access to the stream was not involved in the case. In Jones v. United States, 258 U. S. —, 42 Sup. Ct. 218 (1922), the government was successful in a suit to recover the value of land obtained from it fraudulently by entries in violation of the homestead laws, notwithstanding the fact that the fraud might not have been successful but for a mistake of law attributable to the government. Mr Justice Pitney did not sit. The federal Employees' Compensation Act was interpreted in Dahn v. Davis, 258 U. S. —, 42 Sup. Ct. 320 (1922), to make the compensation awarded thereby exclusive and thus to defeat any right of action under the statute making the director general of railroads liable under the Federal Control Act by a railway mail clerk who had previously recovered compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act. 24 258 U. S. 42 Sup. Ct. 227 (1922). See 22 COLUM. L. REV. 590. Congress and that even if this should be held unconstitutional, as suggested in an early decision, the postal service is the only feasible way of correspondence for most persons, and that therefore the notion of the earlier cases that the government should be free to withhold a service which it was not obliged to undertake at all is no longer a warrant for action which is in practical effect an infringement of freedom of written communication in violation of the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Clarke for the majority adduced the established rule and found that the case came within it since the postmaster general had acted upon evidence that the plaintiff's advertising was in fact fraudulent in the sense that his product lacked the remarkable invigorating qualities which he claimed for it.25 The constitutional question raised in Ng Fung Ho v. White® was this: "May a resident of the United States who claims to be a citizen be arrested and deported on executive order?" This was answered in the negative in the case of persons already resident who had not entered surreptitiously and who supported their claim. to citizenship by evidence sufficient, if believed, to establish it. Such deportation was declared to be obviously a deprivation of liberty, and one that "may result also in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living," to which was added: "Against the danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law." Thus Mr. Justice Brandeis rested the case squarely on constitutional grounds, although earlier he observed that "jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien" and "the claim to citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact," thus apparently declaring that the executive deportation was not war 25 For discussions of Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352 (1921), 19 MICH. L. Rev. 6, 504, 505, sustaining admin. istrative exclusion of excessively unpatriotic newspapers from the second. class mailing privilege, see 21 COLUM. L. REV. 715, and 1 Wis. L. Rev. 364. Another exercise of national power is discussed in Charles J. Williamson, "The Rights Conferred by Letters Patent for Inventions," 8 VA. L. Rev. 507. The general nature of the federal system is adverted to in Harry St. George Tucker, “The General Welfare,” 8 VA. L. Rev. 167. ranted by statute. The same decision sanctioned executive deportation of two aliens and the opinion referred with apparent approval to an earlier case establishing that, with respect to persons "in legal contemplation without the borders of the United States seeking entry, the mere fact that they claimed to be citizens would not have entitled them under the Constitution to a judicial hearing." We are left in doubt as to the constitutional rights of residents claiming citizenship who have entered surreptitiously and of residents whose claim to citizenship is not supported by a substantial offer of proof." During the past term the court has shown a disposition to relent somewhat from the rule apparently established two years ago that injuries within the maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts may not be subjected by Congress to the liabilities imposed by state compensation laws. None of the cases explicitly involves the power of Congress, but since they allow state laws to apply they indicate that Congress may expressly sanction state laws which affect only minor details and do not interfere with the supposedly **Questions with regard to aliens are considered in Richard W. Flournov, Jr, "Naturalization and Expatriation,” 31 YALE L. J. 848, n tes on the interpretation of the Naturalization Act of 1918 in 10 Car. I. Krv 59, and 41 Yatz I. J. 206; on state anti alien lind legislation, in 31 Yair L. J. 20; and on the right of a diseased alien wife of a citizen to admiss: in to the United States, in 70 U. PA, L. REV. 314. Issues with regard to the treaty making power are presented in T. W`·la Stinson, "Embargoes and Detentons under the Farly American Tre.tics,” 16 II I. Rv 174. a note in 10 GEORGETOWN I. J. (No 3) ot to Missin v H "land, 252 U S. 416, 40 Sup Ct. 382 (1920), 19 Min L. Fry 11, ari a note in 3 Loyota L. Rav. 51 to Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U $47441 S«p Ct 138 (1921), 20 Mien L. Riv 504 In Collins v. Loisel, 250 U. S -, 42 Sup Ct #09 (1) 231, t'e was whether certain extradition proceedings were in aane treaty with Great Britain. The treaty required evilen e i fcr." fent under the laws of the place of asylum to rust fy e mmpment was held to reter only "to the scope of the evilence or its s block out those elements, essential to convi tion,” and not to ar li of admissi' i'ity Mr. Brande's e' sed his op min by saving that tro pr cedural rule of a state could give to the prisoner a right to introdi e evidence made irrelevant by a treity" to rules * Kni kerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart 251 U. S. 149. 40 Sup Ct 418 (1229), 19 Mich. L. Krv. 11 See E Merrick Dodd, Jr. "Ihe New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common Law.” 21 Corum L. Krv 64′′ |