because he had concededly been a long-time resident prior to his recent visit to China. Plainly greater latitude is allowed administrative officers in action which decides only whether individuals are entitled to the benefits conferred by statutes. Thus, in United States v. Lane" the court accepted without question the finding of the land department that work done by a prospector was not enough to entitle him to privileges open to those who have "opened or improved” a coal mine. Mr. Justice McKenna said that, where there is discretion, the finding of the land department, though disputable, is impregnable to mandamus. So, in Cameron v. United States96 it was held that the findings of the Secretary of the Interior that a tract covered by a mineral location is not mineral land, and that there had been no sufficient discovery, are conclusive, in the absence of fraud or imposition. United States v. Poland held that where a land patent was issued by land officers in violation of the statute the government is entitled to have it canceled unless a successor of the patentee is a bona fide purchaser. A patent was also canceled in United States v. Southern Pacific Co.98 In this same group may be put National Lead Co. v. United States," which accepted the interpretation of the Treasury Department that the drawback allowed on exportation of products from raw materials previously imported should, when more than one product is derived from those materials, be apportioned according to the relative value of the respective products and not according to their relative weight. This was an instance where the administration had to fill in a gap in the statute. Though in the particular case the court plainly thought the administrative ruling right in itself, it often shows an inclination not to substitute its Opinion for that of the administration, particularly when the complainant is in the position of looking a gift horse in the mouth. of Several cases involved administrative determinations in the course carrying on government business. Grand Trunk Western Ry. 250 U. S. 549, 40 Sup. Ct. 33 (1919). 251 U. S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 127 (1920). 251 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 47 (1919). See 20 COLUM. L. REV. 228. 252 U. S. 140, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1920). Co. a plaintiff suing in the state court under the federal Employers' Liability Law complained because the state practice did not allow him to sue the company and the negligent engineer jointly in a single count. Mr. Justice Brandeis told him that such questions are normally matters of pleading and practice relating solely to the form of remedy and therefore wholly questions of state law. Only when they become matters of substance which affect a federal right, as in the case of the burden of proof in actions under the Employers' Liability Law, does the state decision become subject to federal review. Such questions as that involved in the preceding case might appropriately be classified together under the head of substantive elements in rights of action, and dealt with under the police power rather than in the section on judicial procedure. Such a group of cases would embrace also Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen,” which sustained a Minnesota statute providing that "when a cause of action has arisen outside of this state, and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time. no such action shall be maintained in this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of this state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued." A North Dakota citizen injured in Canada was barred from suing in Canada by the Canadian statute of limitations. He brought his action in Minnesota within the time available for a Minnesota citizen. He complained that the Minnesota statute which barred him but did not bar citizens of Minnesota violated the provision in the federal Constitution that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with him But the Supreme Court said that the provision does not guarantee citizens of other states absolute equality with citizens of the state whose action is questioned, and that the plaintiff had all that he deserved if he had as long to sue in Minnesota as in the country where he worked and got hurt. For a year he is on an equality with *252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 254 (1920). See Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup Ct. 865 (1915), and New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 307, 38 Sup Ct $35 (1918). the United States for depredations committed by a hostile tribe, and held that the agreement in a treaty to give protection so long as the President may deem it necessary imposed no liability in the absence of a finding that there was failure to provide such protection as the President deemed necessary. The case illustrates the principle that a right dependent upon administrative action cannot arise unless the requisite action is taken. United States v. Payne10s held that the Secretary of the Interior is the final judge of whether names shall be enrolled as members of the Creek Nation and that until he has taken final action he may abandon his preliminary conclusions. The Secretary had written the commissioner approving his report, but he was allowed to rescind this without giving any hearing or adducing any reasons. Such action prior to any actual enrollment was held not to deny due process of law. Two other cases accepted long-continued administrative constructions of statutes. Ash Sheep Co. v. United States109 adopted the administrative conclusion that "cattle" includes sheep. in view of warrant in the dictionaries aided by the presumption that Congress would have amended the statute had it disliked the administrative interpretation of its scope. In Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson110 Mr. Justice Pitney declared: "Whatever view we might entertain, were the matter res nova, we are advised that by the practice and administrative rulings of the Comptroller of the Currency during a long period, if not from the beginning of national banking, liabilities which are incurred by one person avowedly and in fact as surety or as indorser for money borrowed by another are not included in the computation. We feel constrained to accept this as a practical construction of the section. ***” The question arose in a suit by a national bank against one of its officers for loaning amounts in excess of that permitted by the statute to a single borrower. issippi. Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that "there is truth in the proposition that the Constitution does not require the state to furnish a court," but he declared that "it also is true that there are limits to the power of exclusion and to the power to consider the nature of the cause of action before the foreign judgment based upon it is given effect," and that "it is plain that a state cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts otherwise competent." An argument that suit was foreclosed in Illinois because Alabama provided that the action could be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction within the state "and not elsewhere" was dealt with by saying that "when the cause of action is created the invalidity of attempts to limit the jurisdiction of other states to enforce it has been established by the decisions of this court," and further that "had these decisions been otherwise they would not have imported that a judgment rendered exactly as required by the Alabama statute was not to have the respect due to other judgments of a sister state." A question of res adjudicata was decided in Napa Valley Electric Co. v. California," but as the case involved the credit to be given to a state judgment in a federal court, it is not technically an application of the full-faith-and-credit clause. Yet the case is a precedent that would be followed when the second action is brought in the court of a sister state. Constitutional questions are frequently questions of common law which constitutional clauses make matters of adjudication in the Supreme Court. The Constitution brings the question before the Supreme Court, but does not direct how it shall be decided. The quarrel in the instant case was whether the refusal of the California Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from the state railroad commission or to order the record to be certified by the commission for review in the court was a final adjudication er merely a refusal to adjudicate. In holding it to be the former, Mr Justice McKenna referred to the "common, and at times necessary, practice of courts to determine upon the face of a pleading what action should be taken upon it." It was for the state court to decide what was proper practice under the statute-whether it might act without having the record of the commission before it. The Cali Fauntleroy v Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup Ct. 641 (1908), fornia cases were thought to show that the state court regarded the refusal of applications for certiorari to review the orders of the commission as decisions that those orders are lawful. The refusal in question was therefore held to be an exercise of judicial power, and as the refusal was not appealed from, it was held a final judgment which precluded a reexamination of the same issues in a subsequent proceeding.** IX. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER ANd Procedure Underlying all questions as to the propriety or the effect of administrative action are the constitutional issues whether the delegation of power to the administrative officer is within the restrictions set by what is left of the principle of the separation of powers, whether the general regulations or the specific findings of the administration can be accepted as final, and whether the procedure indulged in by the administration is proper. These questions are frequently interrelated. The finality of administrative adjudications may depend upon whether they were reached by appropriate methods. The validity of the regulation or order may depend upon the scope of the power that may be delegated. The requisites of the procedure may vary with the effect to be ascribed to the action taken. Summary proceedings may be sanctioned where the action taken is necessarily As the Supreme Court's decision of constitutional issues involving questions of jurisdiction and of res adjudicata depends often upon its conception of the proper principles of conflict of laws, the following notes and articles may be of interest to students of constitutional law: on domicil, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 33 Harv. L. REV. 803, 18 Mich. L. Rrv. 331, 332; on law governing question of capacity, 5 CORNELL, L. Q. 312, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 612, 726, and Ernest G. Lorenzen, "The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws", 20 COLUM. L. Rev. 247; on jurisdiction for divorce and effect of decree in other states, 20 COLUM. L. Rev. 491, 617, 33 Harv. L.. Rrv. 729, 4 MINN. L. Rev. 456, 29 Yalɛ L. J. 119; on foreign judgments, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 984, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 142, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 546, Herbert F. Goodrich, “Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree", 5 Iowa L. BULL, 230, and Ernest G Lorenzen, "The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad", 29 Yatz L. J. 188, 208; on injunction to restrain foreign proceedings, 33 Harv. L. Rxv. 92, on service of process at request of a foreign court, 33 HARV. L. Rrv. 9:8, on construction or enforcement of foreign statutes, 29 Yale L. J. 230, 129, 798, on proof of foreign law, 33 HARV. L. Rev. 315, on "renvoi“, 29 YALE L.. J. 214. |